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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD

No 5, September-October 1985

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USSR REPORT
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
No 5, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1985

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WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS VIEWED ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY

Moscow RABOTNICHESKIY KLASS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 85 pp 16-28

[Article by Vsevolod Yevgenevich Mozhayev, AUCCTU member and chief of the AUCCTU International Department: "Proletarian Solidarity and Trade Union Unity"--Passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] The WFTU, the first united and truly worldwide organization of trade unions, was officially founded in Paris on 3 October 1984. This was an event of truly worldwide historic importance: On the wave of the democratic upsurge engendered by the resistance of the working people against fascist barbarity, a world trade union organization was born which simultaneously represented an embodiment of the ideas of unity, characteristic of the workers class from time immemorial, and the banner of peace and progress.

Quite a few works have been published in connection with the WFTU's 40th anniversary. Its activities have been seriously analyzed in all these works and therefore yet another scientific-historical analysis of the WFTU's work during the 40-years of its existence is hardly necessary. In our opinion, it is more advisable to try to single out some aspects of the WFTU's activities which are of interest from the viewpoint of the contemporary period and to trace their beginnings and see how they began, how they look today, and what prospects they offer.

Considering the WFTU from these positions, it is possible to note that the /struggle for peace, strengthening of solidarity, and achievement of unity/ has been the main direction of its activity. In this connection it is the purpose of these notes to evaluate what the detachments of the world trade union movement, which are united within the WFTU and stand on the revolutionary-class positions, have achieved. Without pretense to an exhaustive analysis of the historical path traversed by the federation, the author has tried to determine only what is especially topical for an evaluation of the WFTU's 40-years of activity.

I

The WFTU has always considered the struggle against war and in defense of peace as being the first and main one of its lofty goals. Examining the 40-year history of the federation's struggle for peace, one wishes to note,

first and foremost, its /consistency/ no matter where the armed conflicts broke out in those years and no matter where the hotbeds of tension fraught with danger of war were created, the WFTU has invariably come forth in favor of an immediate peaceful settlement.

Suffice it to recall the Korean war (1950-1953) when the WFTU, together with all peace-loving forces, adopted a clear and unambiguous position by demanding an unconditional end to the American aggression carried out under the UN flag. The federation also acted uncompromisingly in defense of the peoples of Vietnam against the American aggression (1965-1973). It was in response to the WFTU's appeal that the International Trade Committee of Solidarity with the Working People and People of Vietnam was formed as early as in the first year of the war. In 1968 the WFTU General Council held an extraordinary session on Vietnam in Moscow in which many organizations not affiliated with the federation participated. In 1970 the federation was the initiator of convening in Versailles the world trade union conference of solidarity with the working people and peoples of Indochina who were struggling against the American aggression.

All these great international measures were supplemented by actions of concrete assistance to the fighters against the aggressors. Both the WFTU and its affiliated branch international trade union associations and the federation's national member-organizations found various forms of providing such assistance. The Soviet Unions played an essentially important role in these actions.

The WFTU has firmly stood on the side of the Arab peoples in their struggle against Israel's expansionism. This was manifested in 1967 at the time of the Zionist aggression against the Arab states, in 1973 when the Arabs waged heavy battles against the Israeli aggressors, and in 1982 in connection with the Zionists' Lebanon adventure. The WFTU defends the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine and advocates a final and definite withdrawal of the Israeli aggressive forces from all occupied territories and a peaceful and just settlement of the entire Middle East problem. Precisely this clear policy explains the fact that the Trade Union Federation of Palestine and the progressive trade union organizations of a dozen other Arab countries are among the members of the WFTU. This is also the basis of the WFTU's firm ties with the International Conference of Arab Trade Unions.

At the same time, being an internationalist organization, the WFTU also values the struggle of the progressive forces of the Israeli trade union movement that oppose the expansionist policy of the ruling circles of their country. It is not by accident that these forces have united in the committee for relations with the WFTU.

The federation has adopted the same internationalist position in relation to the Cyprus problem by advocating its peaceful and just settlement that would take account of the interests of both communities of the country.

The WFTU has severely condemned all recent aggressive actions of imperialism: The American occupation of Grenada, the landing of British troops on the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, and the brigandage of "international" force in Lebanon. At present the efforts of the federation and its member-organizations

are aimed at putting an end to the American intervention in Nicaragua and the undeclared wars against Afghanistan and Kampuchea whose central trade union organizations, formed only in 1978 and 1979, immediately joined the WFTU.

This also shows the /class-proletarian, anti-imperialist character/ of the WFTU's activity, a character that can be called its second qualitative feature. We recall that the federation's statute, adopted by the First World Trade Union Congress, already emphasized the need for active participation of the working people and their trade unions in the struggle "against war and its causes." This essentially means that from the very moment of its foundation the federation has linked the antiwar struggle with the struggle against imperialism as the source of wars, militarism, and threats of war. The WFTU's active participation over a period of many years in the activity of the World Peace Council and in the work of the organs of international monogovernmental organizations attests precisely to this understanding of the essence of the antiwar actions of trade unions.

The struggle against nuclear weapons is also an expression of this. The WFTU has waged this struggle during its entire history. However, this struggle is especially topical now when imperialism headed by the U.S. ruling circles is making the most dangerous efforts to break the existing approximate military equilibrium in the world, achieve the military superiority of imperialism over the socialist community, and place the world at the brink of a nuclear conflict that would inevitably lead to the destruction of civilization.

As the threat of war from the United States and NATO is growing, so is the WFTU's antiwar activity intensifying. It has become an established constant practice on the occasions of statutory events of the WFTU and the international trade union associations to hold special sessions devoted to the struggle for peace and disarmament in all of its aspects. The federation has resolutely rejected the Reaganite "star wars" plans, supported the struggle of the working people, especially in Western Europe, against the deployment ((razmeshcheniye)) there of new American nuclear missiles, and advocated the formation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the Earth's globe, the zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and a complete ending of nuclear weapons tests.

All these actions show the class-proletarian and anti-imperialist character of the WFTU's antiwar activity because the threat of war is contrary to the interests of all working people and threatens their most essential right, the right to life. Imperialism uses the "Soviet military threat" to substantiate anti-worker repressions; the preparations for aggression invariably have a negative effect on the standard of living of the workers class.

The working people in Western countries are increasingly grasping these truths. The mass antiwar demonstrations that have been regularly held for a number of years now, including the demonstrations held by trade unions or with their participation, in most of the countries with strong trade union movements, attest to this fact. This is further reflected in the wide response among

the trade unions of different orientation to the appeal of the 10th World Trade Union Congress to annually observe the 1 September anniversary of the beginning of World War II as the Day of Trade Union Actions for Peace and Disarmament. This is also evident in the changes that are taking place in the attitude toward the problems of peace and disarmament among the reformist trade unions. For instance, the analysis of the resolutions adopted by the 13th Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (in Oslo in 1983) and the Fifth Congress of the European Confederation of Trade Unions (in Milan in 1985) convincingly shows that most of the demands incorporated in them have something in common with the demands that are persistently raised by the WFTU. And the organizations involved in this connection are in fact those which only quite recently still shunned the peace struggle as a purely political struggle beyond the framework of trade union interests.

All this clearly refutes the apprehension--still current here and there in the West--lest the WFTU, having placed the problems of peace at the center of its activity, might turn into a "branch of the peace movement." In fact the reverse is the case: today the antiwar movement is unable to fulfill the tasks facing it without relying on the mass actions of the workers class and working people of the world. It seems that the slogan "Peace is the cause of trade unions," which is gaining strength in the West, could be supplemented with the slogan that peace is impossible without the struggle of trade unions.

At the same time, the WFTU and its affiliated central trade union organizations are finding in their activity those approaches to the problems of peace and disarmament which maximally reflect the specific nature of trade unions as mass organizations of the working people.

First, these are the socioeconomic aspects of the problem of disarmament. Today a thorough analysis of these aspects of the problem is needed to prove to the world public the harmfulness of the arms race, the possibility for shifting (converting) military production to peaceful tracks without any consequences that would be unacceptable to the national economies, and the suitability of disarmament for solving many global problems, including those that are especially topical for the working people of developing countries. This analysis is also needed to dispel among the workers class of capitalist states the myth, forcefully cultivated by bourgeois propaganda, that the arms race is advantageous to the working people because it creates new workplaces.

The WFTU and its organizations systematically carry out this work in the spirit of unity. This approach made it possible to convene in Paris toward the end of 1981 a very broadly representative world trade union conference on the socioeconomic aspect of disarmament at which representatives of central trade union organizations of 62 countries, affiliated with all three world trade union associations, fruitfully cooperated. The conference worked out a businesslike and concrete document that provided a good basis for subsequent work of trade unions in this direction.

One of the practical consequences of the Paris conference was the formation of the International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament in Ireland's capital in 1982, and the committee has been named "The Dublin

Committee" after the city where it was formed. The committee has already held quite a few sessions to discuss various aspects of the problem of disarmament in order to formulate the trade union viewpoint on this problem. It is planned in 1986 to pass on the results of international research on the problems of conversion ((of military production to peaceful tracks--FBIS)) to the ILO. The Dublin Committee is open to broad discussions between trade unions of all orientations. The publication of their own conversion programs by trade unions of many countries in recent years confirms in a special way the fact that the interest in these topics is widespread. As examples we call attention to the analyses made in this connection by the International Association of Machine Building and Aircraft and Space Industry workers of the United States, the British Trade Union Congress, and several lower-level British trade union organizations.

Second, as early as in the mid-1960's the WFTU began to work out such a specific topic as the significance of trade and economic relations between states for the strengthening of peace. These relations, which have been subsequently called the "material fiber of detente," were discussed in the world trade union movement for the first time at the International Trade Union Conference that was convened at the WFTU's initiative and held in Budapest in 1966. The Budapest Conference, which is undeservedly only infrequently mentioned, became the forerunner of a number of other bilateral and multilateral meetings that were devoted to the same topic.

It would be possible to list further different actions of the WFTU which were imbued with the aspiration to defend peace and strive for disarmament. There are many but we want to note the main thing: The Federation has been and continues to be a firm champion of the cause of general peace and is engaged in extensive antiwar activities in the spirit of unity and solidarity.

II

Invariably adhering to the class positions, the WFTU has always understood solidarity in the broadest sense of the word. We note first of all the solidarity with the fighters against fascist and dictatorial regimes. To the WFTU, which came into being as a result of the unification of the working people of the world in the antifascist struggle, this has been a natural aspect of its activity from the very beginning and has remained one of the most important aspects of its activity to this day. In its time the WFTU headed the campaigns of solidarity of the world's trade unions with the Spanish and Portuguese working people in their actions against Europe's last fascist regimes, and with the Greek democrats struggling against the dictatorship of the "black colonels." Its consistent antifascist activity ensured for the federation the firm sympathies of the working people of these countries and led to the establishment of permanent ties with their largest central Trade Union organizations, the Spanish workers' commissions, the Portuguese Intersindical, and the General Confederation of the working people of Greece, even though they are not WFTU members.

The solidarity demonstrated by the federation toward all progressive trade union movements was undoubtedly one of the factors that contributed to the complete destruction of fascism on European soil.

But fascism is tenacious and the struggle against it continues on other continents. In recent years the WFTU has waged a struggle against the Chilean fascist junta and the dictatorial regimes in Guatemala, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Haiti. This is a difficult struggle because these regimes enjoy the powerful support of transnational monopolies and U.S. imperialism. However, serious successes have also been achieved in the antidictatorship struggle in Latin America. Of principal importance, for instance, is the liquidation of the military dictatorship in Uruguay against which the WFTU and its member-organization had waged an especially persistent struggle.

For many years the federation has continued its struggle against racism. This, too, is a logical consequence of the policy that was adopted and incorporated in their arsenal by the trade unions during the war against Hitlerism; as is known, Hitlerism was based on racist theory and practice. Today, 40 years after the rout of Hitlerite fascism, it is the Republic of South Africa with its inhuman apartheid policy that represents the main bulwark of racism. The WFTU is orienting its struggle against it. The federation and all of its members are helping in the most widely varied ways the South African Trade Union Congress, a WFTU member, which operates underground and abroad and represents the main trade union force of antiracist resistance. At the same time, the federation also respects other South African trade union associations acting against apartheid within the Republic of South Africa itself, including those which are not WFTU members.

Just as the actions against the fascist and dictatorial regimes unite the trade unions of different orientations, so does struggle against apartheid. Experience has shown that the slogans and demands raised in this struggle by central trade union organizations of different affiliations are similar to each other and at times even identical.

It is therefore natural that, during the period of work of the ILO General Conference in Geneva, it has already become a tradition to carry out united actions in the struggle against apartheid. The trade unions of various orientations have not only formulated a common platform of the struggle but are also heading practical actions in the boycott of trade and other relations with the racist regime of the Republic of South Africa.

The WFTU has invariably demonstrated and continues to demonstrate its solidarity with the struggle of the working people and peoples against colonialism. The very fact that the associations of the working people of the countries which were then under colonial domination joined the WFTU as members in the very first days of its existence attests to the federation's clear anticolonial course. Its activities in support of the struggles of the working people of Indonesia against the Dutch colonizers, the peoples of Indochina and Algeria against the French colonialists, and the peoples of South Yemen and other former British possessions against the British exploiters, as well as its comprehensive solidarity with the struggle of the working people and peoples which led to the destruction of the oldest colonial empire, the Portuguese empire, indisputably represent a part of the credit side of the WFTU's balance sheet.

Now only small fragments are left of the system of colonialism. However, the WFTU and its member-organizations have not stopped their anticolonial struggle and will continue the struggle until the last remnants of this shameful system disappear from the surface of the earth. The federation is consistently siding with the trade unions and the working people of Namibia in their struggle against the South African regime which is unlawfully occupying that country.

However, even after their liberation from colonial dependence, the working people of former colonies need the solidarity of the world trade union movement. They are now striving for their economic independence, against the plots of neocolonialism and the plundering by transnational corporations and the international financial capital, and for the new world economic system. The WFTU has devoted the most serious attention to the problem of the new world economic system especially in recent years. The Tenth World Trade Union Congress, held in Havana in 1982, cited this problem as being one of the highest-priority problems for the federation. The problem has also been further discussed at several sessions of the WFTU statutory organs after the congress. Because of its class-proletarian character, the federation is called upon and is able to give the world's trade unions the most consistent program on this problem, including the complete recognition of the rights of the peoples of developing countries to exploit natural and other resources in the interests of their own development, and a comprehensive solution for all problems connected with the overcoming of barriers standing in the way of socioeconomic progress. The WFTU points out that there already are positive examples of international economic relations between developed and developing countries which are based on equal rights. These examples are the relations between the socialist states and the so-called Third world. There is no doubt that the federation will continue to make a worthy contribution to the struggle for the establishment of the new world economic system.

At the same time the federation is by no means trying to "monopolize" this important sector of the anti-imperialist struggle. The federation and its member-organizations helped in every way possible to prepare and to hold the broadly based trade union conference of the countries of Asia and Oceania on the problem of the new world economic system, which was held in Delhi in February 1985, and welcomed its successful outcome. The Delhi conference in fact demonstrated the existence of a community of approach by trade unions of different orientations in relation to the problem of the new economic order. The same conclusion can also be reached by analyzing the positions on this problem of three world trade union associations--The World Federation of Labor, the ICFTU, and the World Confederation of Labor.

Solidarity with the trade unions of developing countries is also manifested in the fact that in recent years the WFTU has considerably intensified its work in training the trade union cadres of developing countries. In addition to conducting its own seminars for trade unions of the Asian, African, and Latin American countries and the countries of the Caribbean basin, the WFTU also coordinates the activities of its largest member-organizations including, first and foremost, the central trade union organizations of the socialist countries, the General Confederation of Labor of France, and the international trade union associations.

The WFTU also demonstrates a consistent solidarity with such large detachment of working people as the workers class of developed capitalist countries. It can be noted with satisfaction that, in the 40 years of its existence, the federation has not bypassed a single major action of the working people in the capitalist world. The latest example in this connection was the extensive and many-sided assistance to British miners during their 1984-1985 struggle. The WFTU and its member-organizations widely propagandized their strike, explaining its just and well-grounded character to the world public. It was at the WFTU's initiative that food supplies for the strikers and their families were shipped to Great Britain and that hundreds of the strike's participants and their heroic wives and young children were invited for vacations by trade unions of the socialist countries, member-organizations of the WFTU.

The deep crisis that has hit the capitalist world makes solidarity of the progressive trade union movement with the struggle of the working people of developed capitalist countries increasingly relevant. Support for their struggle not only for their vital interests but also in defense of their trade union rights against constant encroachments by capitalist monopolies and governments now occupies a prominent place. The pressure against them by state monopolist capital has particularly intensified in recent years.

The WFTU constantly keeps the problem of the working people's rights within the range of its attention. The Charter of Trade Union Rights adopted by the Ninth World Trade Union Congress in 1978 was of major importance in this connection. The federation extended its firm support to the American Trade Union of Air Traffic Controllers which was dissolved by the U.S. Administration. The WFTU lodged a complaint with the ILO in connection with the "employment ban" practice in the FRG. It has issued more than one protest statement in connection with the repressions against trade unions and their leaders in the capitalist countries. It strives to provide legal assistance to victims of legal reprisals, as was, for instance, the case with the Istanbul trial of leaders of the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Trade Unions of Turkey. The WFTU has resolutely denounced the provocative actions of the Italian judicial organs against Bulgarian citizen S. Antonov.

The solidarity of the world trade union movement is also important for the socialist countries. The WFTU has invariably adopted clear class positions on this question. It supports Cuba's rebuff to the provocations of American imperialism and the struggle of Vietnam and Laos against foreign intervention and in defense of their sovereignty as well as the struggle of the Korean people for peaceful and democratic unification of the country. The WFTU acted firmly on the side of the sound forces of the Polish workers class during the 1980-1981 crisis period. The correctness of the WFTU's line in relation to the events in Poland, a principled and truly proletarian line, is especially clear now when the new trade unions of the Polish People's Republic have taken their legitimate place in the ranks of the federation.

It is scarcely possible to find single national detachment of the world trade union movement which has not felt the beneficial effects of the WFTU's solidarity actions. Virtually the federation's entire work connected with socioeconomic questions--and this work has been on a large scale and

multifaceted--can with complete justification be counted among these actions. Here also belongs the branch activity that is mainly carried out through international trade union associations. Here also belong the regular actions in defense of the interests of individual categories of working people, women, young people, engineering and technical workers, and migrants. Here also belong the WFTU's charters and action programs on major problems, such as unemployment, inflation, and social insurance.

Finally, the orientation documents adopted by the world trade union congresses which are universal in their nature and have provided the battle program of the world trade union movement for a number of years are also of very great importance for the working people of the entire world.

III

Speaking about the problem of /trade union unity/ in connection with the WFTU's 40th anniversary, one wishes to avoid the copybook truths that unity is the reliable weapon of the workers class in the struggle against imperialism and monopoly, that from the moment of their creation the trade unions have represented the expression of the united interests of the working people in their common struggle against capital and have continued to be such an expression under the conditions of capitalism to this day, and that division represents the bourgeoisie's favorite method in its attempts to overcome the resistance of the workers class or, at least, to make it less dangerous and the trade unions more obedient to the will of the ruling class of the capitalist world. Although it is necessary now and then even today to keep explaining these ills to some figures of the trade union movement in the West, to us all this is axiomatic.

The 40-year history of the WFTU convincingly shows that trade union unity is possible and that it is necessary and relevant today as never before.

Trade union unity is /possible/. The history of the creation of the federation itself, its activity in the first years of its existence, and its efforts up to the present day eloquently attest to this. One might say that the WFTU was born with the word "unity" on its lips. This concept lay at the basis of the documents of the London conference at the beginning of 1945 which initiated the creation of the Federation, and of its founding conference. Let us recall that in that period the WFTU's ranks united almost all the national trade union centers which then existed. The American Federation of Labor ((AFL)), which even then stood on an anti-unitarian platform (the second constituent of the AFL-CIO, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, did join the WFTU) and also the Catholic trade unions, which were then in a state of grave crisis, did not join the WFTU. In those years they were not, however, hostile toward the WFTU, and representatives of some of them attended both the conference in London and the congress in Paris in the capacity of observers.

For more than 3 years the WFTU operated as a united organism, including trade union centers of both a class and a reformist orientation. The documents of this period show what an internal struggle--at times acute in nature--was

occurring within the depths of the united WFTU, but nevertheless common positions were invariably found, and not only were documents elaborated and the federation's political line determined but joint actions were also conducted in a spirit of unity. These actions included practical assistance in reviving democratic trade unions in Germany and Japan, and actions against the colonial terror in Southeast Asia.

The split in the world trade union movement was carried out at the beginning of 1949 by the reformist leaders of the trade union centers of the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, who could not stand the confrontation between their views and the trade unions of a class orientation within the framework of the WFTU. We do not note this because we would like to "settle accounts with them" today, more than 35 years later. Such is the historical truth which should not be forgotten even now, particularly by those who, in their discussions with us, want to load the blame for this split onto the class trade unions, which supposedly did not display sufficient flexibility for the sake of saving unity. No, it was not us who introduced elements of the "cold war" into the world workers movement, and it was not us who lowered across its ranks an "iron curtain" of bans on any contacts between trade union movements of different orientations.

But even after 1949 the WFTU far from ceased to follow a course of unity. And this is confirmed not only by the fact that it has used every opportunity to renew its appeals for unity, addressing them both to the ICFTU and to individual trade unions which are ICFTU members, but also--and primarily--by deeds and by practice.

Let us start from the fact that lasting cooperation had been established with the trade unions of developing countries. Some of them had been WFTU members since its creation, still in the colonial period, and remained in it after the split. It was precisely in the shape of the WFTU, in the shape of the class trade union movement, that they saw their natural ally in the struggle for national and social liberation. It was precisely WFTU policy, which was of an anti-imperialist and anticolonial orientation, that corresponded to the hopes of working people in countries which were fighting for freedom and which then won it.

For its part, the WFTU actively promoted close ties with trade unions in this zone of the world. It held the world's first conference of trade unions of countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean (Beijing, 1949). The federation contributed to the creation of the first association of trade unions of Africa, which was then almost completely colonial, and it permitted some of its member organizations to leave it in order to join the All-African Federation of Trade Unions, created in 1961. The WFTU supported the creation of a continental class organization in Latin America, the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Working People of Latin America, which was joined by the majority of members of the Confederation of Working People of Latin America, led for many years by WFTU Vice Chairman V. Lombardo Toledano.

The unity with the trade unions of countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which was established in the difficult years of the "cold war" is maintained today, too. It is manifest in the fact that approximately two-thirds of the

national centers which are members of the WFTU are trade union organizations of the liberated countries of three continents. It is also shown in the close friendly cooperation of the federation with regional and continental trade union associations: the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, and the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Working People of Latin America. Lastly, it is shown in the fact that the WFTU is the first of the world trade union centers to respond to everything that is happening in the trade union movement of "third world" countries. But it stands to reason that it is not only the trade unions of the developing countries that are the object of the WFTU's efforts aimed at trade union unity.

As is known, united efforts on a world scale achieved particular scope and success during the years of relaxation of international tension. From the end of the sixties, meetings of the secretariats of the WFTU and the Christian World Labor Confederation became regular, and in 1974 the first and so far, unfortunately, the only official meeting of the general secretaries of the WFTU, the ICFTU, and the World Labor Confederation was held in Geneva. A certain coordination of the international trade union centers was organized at the branch level, too. The teachers' movement has moved particularly far in this direction.

The WFTU welcomed efforts to convoke European trade union conferences and to create a single all-African trade union center, and also other unifying processes which occurred in the seventies.

The WFTU and the international trade union associations have found subject matter for their events which has vitally interested trade unions of the most diverse orientations. As a result, organizations which were not members of them have participated in their seminars, symposiums, meetings, and even their statutory congresses and conferences. And this is despite the still existing bans by the ICFTU on its members' participation in such events. Thus, at the last, 10th World Congress of Trade Unions, two-thirds of the 358 national organizations represented at it were not members of the WFTU.

Moreover, the system of work of the world congresses and branch conferences of trade unions is constructed in such a manner that in all questions discussed at them, except for the budget and elections, participants representing organizations which are not WFTU members have the same rights as members of the federation or corresponding international trade union associations. At the same 10th congress, for example, a delegate from a non-member organization headed one of the most important commissions, that on problems of peace and disarmament. It is impossible not to see a consistent aspiration for unity in all of this.

And so unity is possible. But it is also vitally /necessary/ to the workers class.

If we turn once again to the practice of the WFTU's work over 40 years we see that it has invariably derived from a recognition of this necessity. This was primarily manifest in the fact that the WFTU was the first to be able to

evaluate the threat to the workers class and its organizations posed by the growth in the power of international monopolies. The organizers of the events held in the mid-sixties in line with the policy of the WFTU and primarily of the international trade union associations strove to gather together the representatives of the trade union organizations of enterprises which were situated in different countries but which belonged to the same transnational corporation. The aim of such meetings was to exchange the experience of the struggle against "one's own transnational corporation, to elaborate, as far as possible, general demands on this corporation, and should there be a successful outcome, to form a unified organ within the framework of the transnational corporation which would unite trade union associations of different affiliation for joint resistance to the monopolies.

There is a direct bridge from that now distant period to the modern way, when the Permanent Commission of the WFTU on Transnational Corporations is successfully operating, headed by the Frenchman, A. Stern ((name as transliterated)), general secretary of the most powerful international trade union association, that of metalworkers. In recent years a number of trade unions in the West which are not affiliated to the WFTU have shown a truly serious interest in the activity of this commission. This is connected with the new method adopted by the commission: the conducting of concrete united actions aimed at a limited number of transnational corporations, that is, a policy not of the quantity of such actions but of the quality and intensity of the struggle.

Five large transnational corporations which the WFTU has in its sights (General Motor, Reno, United Brands, Ron-Pulek ((name as transliterated)), and DMS ((acronym as transliterated)), oppress a significant percentage of working people in the countries of capital, and for this reason trade unions which are sometimes distant from the WFTU in the organizational respect have an interest in joining the struggle against them in one form or another. Many international trade union movements have also adopted such a course. Thus, the association of working people of the textile, light, and tanning and footwear industries are successfully conducting similar such work with regard to the Batya ((name as transliterated)) monopoly, especially in Africa.

Of course, the struggle against the transnational would have far better results if it were conducted in conjunction with the ICFTU, the World Labor Confederation, and their branch organizations. Up until now the WFTU's appeals for united actions by trade unions against the transnational corporations have at best met with silence on their part. But this simply confirms the conclusion made by the WFTU as far back as the beginning of the seventies that in the conditions of the intensified struggle against transnational corporations, the rejection of trade union unity is an anachronism.

The need for international trade union unity is becoming even more /relevant/ in our day. The reason for this lies not only in the further growth in the internationalization of economics and in the increase in the role of transnational corporations and international associations of the "common market" type. Today we are dealing with an attempt at social revanche on a global scale by international capital. It is manifest in the sharp growth

in the aggressiveness of imperialism, primarily American imperialism, and in imperialism's vain attempts to undermine the military-strategic parity which has formed, to achieve superiority over the forces of socialism, and thus to turn back world development. The attempt at social revanche is also manifest in the economic policy of the present governments of leading capitalist states, the national varieties of which ("Reaganomics," "Thatcherism", and so on) essentially signify an aspiration by the most reactionary circles of state-monopolist capital to return capitalism to the domination of "private initiative", while simultaneously annulling many socioeconomic achievements of working people, particularly those connected with the regulating role of the state and the development of the state sector. And the monopolies' usurpation of the achievements of the present stage of the scientific-technical revolution has as its social consequence an unprecedented rise in unemployment, which again weakens the ability of the workers class to resist the massed offensive of the ruling class. This consequence is also manifest in the intensification of direct attacks by capital on trade union rights, examples of which are both the brutal reprisals against the striking British miners and American air-traffic controllers, and the new anti-trade union legislation in a number of developed capitalist countries, as well as the ideological attacks on the trade unions. And this entire anti-worker, anti-trade union strategy of state-monopolist capital makes the achievement of workers' and trade union unity, for which the WFTU has acted consistently for 40 years now, even more relevant.

The WFTU gave its reaction to the many new phenomena which have appeared in recent years at the 10th World Congress of Trade Unions, where a universal document entitled "Trade Unions and the Tasks of the Eighties" was adopted, which contains both an evaluation of these phenomena and a program for the struggle of working people for this entire decade. But life advances new problems. Here are just a few of them, which it will not be possible to solve in the interests of the workers class without united actions by trade unions.

In the second half of the seventies there appeared, for example, a new organ for coordinating the policy of the leading capitalist states, which was the summit conferences of the "seven". Taking into account the fact that at these conferences decisions are made which are of considerable importance to working people in the capitalist world, trade unions in the West have in recent years attempted to develop their own point of view, which they wanted the leaders of the "seven" to take into account. However, this did not happen. And one of the substantial reasons for such a disregard for the trade union's appeals on the part of the powerful of the world of capital was the fact that the trade unions had violated the principle of unity of action: from the very beginning, the range of trade union centers participating in the preparation of the appeals was consciously confined to reformist trade union centers, and only those of the "seven" countries. It can hardly be doubted that if the demands had been put forward by the entire world trade union movement, they would have been of a much more weighty nature and would have had a greater chance of success.

Among the levers for applying pressure on working people in the developing countries, the activity of the IMF is acquiring increasing importance. The channels of the IMF, which is led primarily by the agents of the financial

oligarchy of the United States and their closest allies, were those which helped imperialism to start the practice of interfering in the affairs of independent states, as a result of which an entire system of debts was created. Now the IMF is used to bring the young developing countries more tightly to the capitalist system and, at the same time, having enmeshed them in the chains of debt bondage, to deprive them of their economic independence. In essence, the activity of the IMF today is a kind of attempt by the American monopolies to implement "Reaganomics" on the scale of the entire capitalist world. The IMF provides credits primarily to support the private sector in the developing countries, to develop in them those branches of the economy which are most profitable to Western creditors, and finally, to implement such measures for "improving" the national economies of developing countries as mean the curtailing of social programs, which are declared to be "unprofitable," "wasteful," and "unreasonable."

And just as "Reaganomics" within a national framework means, in the opinion of the Americans themselves, that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, it is precisely the poor, that is, the working people in those countries where the IMF has a free hand, who are hardest hit by the "international Reaganomics" introduced by the IMF. For this reason, the working people of many countries come out against IMF dominance. In 1984 there was large-scale unrest in the Dominican Republic under the slogans of the struggle against the IMF. The events of 1985 in Sudan became, to all intents and purposes, a battle against the IMF. I am convinced that there are more such conflicts ahead.

The WFTU drew timely attention to the ruinous consequences for working people of the IMF's activity. This has been repeatedly mentioned in its documents of recent years. At a session of the Bureau of the Federation in April this year, the idea of conducting a broad international trade union conference on problems of indebtedness was advanced. It is a fact that a solution to this problem in the interests of the workers can be achieved only through combined efforts by trade unions of all orientations.

When speaking of the growing expansion of transnational corporations into the developing countries, it is impossible not to mention the "zones of handling export goods" or "free trade zones" which are being organized in them to an ever greater extent. For working people the appearance of such zones means that a proportion of hired workers (those employed in the zones) are removed from the sphere of trade union defense of their legal interests: after all, these zones are created in order that capital, and mainly foreign capital, has an opportunity to exploit a cheap workforce, and it will naturally not be cheap if a strong trade union movement is present in the zone.

Akin to this problem is the growth, particularly in recent years, of the "underground economy" and the "black" market of the workforce, primarily in many developed capitalist countries. Such a market is growing due to an increasing number of working people who are not covered by a legally formulated work contract, that is, migrant workers, women, young people, home-workers, and seasonal workers. As a rule, they remain outside the ranks of the trade unions, and the very existence of such strata of the population, which lack rights, undermines the fundamental principles to which the trade union movement has been and continues to be an adherent.

The WFTU, like the world trade union movement as a whole, has as yet only revealed its interest in these problems. But it is already possible to state that even the study of the above-mentioned phenomena, not to mention the struggle to solve the problems connected with them, require joint, united efforts.

From all that has been said above it seems to be possible to come to the conclusion that all the objective preconditions exist for trade union unity, and that with the passing of the years these preconditions are not weakening but are, on the contrary, being strengthened.

How do matters stand with the subjective factors? It must be admitted that the conditions here are far from being so favorable. Without wishing to accuse anyone, let us say directly that the years of the split and of the "cold war", the spirit of which has still not been completely overcome in the world trade union movement have left their traces in the minds of many leading figures of trade unions in the West. Even those of them who maintain bilateral ties with the majority of WFTU member organizations shun the Federation itself, thus obediently adhering to the bans imposed by the ICFTU on participation in multilateral events (it is true that they add "outside the framework of ILO) in which the WFTU is participating. And imperialism and the monopolies, which are interested in splitting the workers' ranks, use the obedient mass information media and individual, extremely reactionary figures in the ranks of the trade union movement itself--among these a particular role is played by certain AFL-CIO leaders--to inflame such attitudes, which are, unfortunately, peculiar not only to the top echelon of the trade union movement in the West.

For these purposes they sometimes make use of events, such as those in Poland, in the evaluation of which various detachments of the trade union movement sharply disagree. Let us recall at least the recent row in the ILO about "forced labor" in the construction of the gas pipeline from Urengoy to the Soviet border. Leaving aside the anti-Soviet cavemen of the AFL-CIO leadership (their views do not deserve serious analysis, if only because of their lack of any arguments), there remain two basic arguments against trade union unity which are cited both in ICFTU documents and in discussions with the leadership of its member organizations.

The first argument, which has, so to speak, a historical background, asserts that the reason which gave rise to the split in the WFTU in 1949 still hold. And the second, ideological argument is that the WFTU is under the leadership of communists and that it is thus impossible to cooperate with it.

But the first of these arguments simply does not stand up to solid, practical criticism. The world has changed unrecognizably since 1949: it suffices to name such epochal events as the creation of the world socialist system and the collapse of colonialism. The socioeconomic situation has changed; we shall again convince ourselves to mentioning such important factors in these changes as the scientific-technical revolution and the new trends in the development of state-monopolist capital, the transnational corporations, and the military-industrial complexes. The blizzard of "cold war" and the spring of detente have passed over the world and the present alarming and responsible stage has arrived.

The workers class has changed: the growth in its ranks and the changes in its composition as regards profession, sex, age, and qualifications speak of this. Its demands have changed: who in 1949 could have imagined, say, the mobile wage scale which the workers class in the industrially developed capitalist countries now defends? The forms of its struggle have changed: would it have been possible at that time to imagine the occupation of enterprises by working people in order to continue work at them? The trade unions, too, have changed, as has been demonstrated above, trade union centers of all orientations adhere to if not close then completely compatible positions on the majority of fundamental problems of the contemporary period.

And this is the best refutation of the pseudo-historical argument.

The second--ideological--argument does not stand up to verification by the facts, either. In actual fact, life proved long ago that cooperation between communists and representatives of other political tendencies within the trade union movement is not only completely possible but also fruitful. Such experience has been accumulated by the General Council of the British Trade Union Congress, of which British communists have been members for many years now. There is experience of this in France, too, where half of the secretariat of the largest trade union center--the General Confederation of Trade Unions--is composed of communists, and the other half is made up of representatives of other parties and political tendencies. For over 40 years Italian communists and socialists have been cooperating within the framework of a single Italian General Labor Confederation. And even the European Confederation of Trade Unions, which under anticommunist pretexts refuses to accept the progressive trade union centers of France, Spain and Portugal into its ranks, has had communists on the staff of its executive committee for many years now.

As far as the WFTU is concerned, communists really do occupy a prominent place in its leadership. But the Federation's strength lies in the fact that trade unions both of countries which are led by communist parties and of countries where there are no communist parties at all cooperate within it on an equal basis.

And it is in fact the conviction of the necessity and possibility of trade union unity for the best protection of the fundamental interests of the workers class that is one of the links which unite the sometimes fairly heterogeneous elements which make up a single organism, the WFTU.

The WFTU acts consistently for the unity of working people and for united actions by them. And whatever difficulties may arise on this road, the WFTU as a class and mass organization will undoubtedly defend trade union unity, as it has invariably done over the entire 40-years of its history.

As is known, Soviet trade unions are founder-members of the WFTU. They are numerically the largest of the national trade union centers which make up the WFTU. But this does not mean that they ever had or have claims to a special position within the framework of the federation. On the contrary, we are proud of the fact that there is nothing in the structure, traditions, or practice of the WFTU which would mark out any trade union center.

Representatives of the USSR trade unions participate in the work of the Federation's statutory organs and in the international meetings which it conducts, on an equal basis with the smallest member-organization of the WFTU.

The only "privilege" which Soviet trade unions have in the WFTU framework is that of the most active participation in implementing its actions, initiatives, and measures. We strive to make the maximum contribution to them together with other member organizations since we clearly understand that the WFTU is, like any international center, strong only insofar as its member organizations actively participate in it.

As we have attempted to show, in 40 years the WFTU has traversed a great and glorious road. There have been and still are difficulties and problems on this road, but we have avoided accentuating our attention on them not because these notes are of a jubilee nature or because we do not see them. No, it is our conviction that the problems faced by the federation are to be explained primarily by the natural difficulties of growth, and that there is no doubt that it will successfully overcome them.

The WFTU is today moving toward the regular 11th World Congress of Trade Unions, which it is planned to hold in Berlin in 1986. Briefly summing up the results of the WFTU's activity over 40 years, it is possible to say that the federation has become not only the largest trade union center, uniting over 200 million members, but also the only one which has trade unions of socialist, capitalist, and young liberated states in its ranks. It is also the most authoritative world trade union center, its influence extending far beyond the boundaries of the range of organizations which are members of it.

The WFTU has become a genuine expression of the hopes of the world workers class and of its aspiration for lasting peace, social progress, and for unity in its own ranks.

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TIES BETWEEN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, MASS ORGANIZATIONS DISCUSSED

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[Article by G.G. Diligenskiy: "Social Democracy and the Working Masses"]

[Text] A most important principle of the political influence of present-day social democracy is formed by its ties to the masses, to the mass organizations and movements operating in present-day capitalist society included.

It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of these ties for international social democracy and all its constituent parties. Social democrats could not share political power with the parties directly expressing the interests of the ruling class if they lacked support in the mass working people's strata. It has been precisely the social democratic parties' ties to the organized working class which have historically secured for them substantial positions in the party-political structure of many capitalist countries and prompted monopoly circles to regard them as an instrument of the "conciliation" of opposite class interests and introduction of the masses to bourgeois policy.

The ties of the social democratic and socialist parties to the masses at the same time condition the boundaries of their rapprochement with this policy. They cannot preserve and, even less, expand their political influence--in any event, in the more or less distant future--without defending to this extent or the other certain interests of the working people and without expressing their social aspirations in one way or another.

The nature and, particularly, the dynamics of the relations of the social democratic and socialist parties with the mass working people's strata are exerting a considerable influence on the evolution of their ideological-political course and the internal differentiation of social democracy. While playing the leading part in disseminating in the masses reformist ideology in its different--"right" and "left"--versions, these parties are at the same time displaying a relative flexibility and a readiness to adapt to the fluctuations in the moods of the mass electorate. As historical and contemporary experience shows, they are characterized by a quite significant range of fluctuations between opposite ideological-political persuasions, with which the particular depth of their internal differentiation (both between individual parties and within them) is connected. In the history of the workers movement of a number of capitalist countries there have been periods of effective cooperation between its reformist and revolutionary currents, there have also been periods when social democracy has formed a bloc with right-bourgeois forces.

Obviously, a process of the rapprochement of various socialist and social democratic parties and individual factions within social democracy with this antagonistic sociopolitical force or the other cannot be precluded in the future either. As is known, many communist parties of capitalist countries are proceeding from the actual possibility of an evolution of this current in the workers movement which will afford a prospect of its participation in the struggle for democratic and socialist transformations. The feasibility of the cooperation of communists and social democrats in preventing the threat of world thermonuclear war and struggling for the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations is becoming increasingly apparent under current conditions. As M.S. Gorbachev observed during his meeting with Socialist International Chairman W. Brandt, ideological differences "should not prevent the interaction of communists and social democrats on the main, most acute present-day problems."¹

Considering the "structural" singularities of the relations of social democratic and socialist parties with their mass base, it may be asserted that the direction of the ideological-political evolution of these parties and the stability, scale and "weight" of each of its characteristic trends will depend to a large extent on the social, psychological and ideological aspect of the masses to which they are tied. This imparts particular relevance to a study of such ties in their dynamics.

As for any major political force operating in the present-day capitalist world, these parties' feedforward to and feedback from the civil society are realized via many channels and form a quite complex system of interacting mechanisms. An important place in this system is occupied, naturally, by the parties' politically propagandist activity and the evaluation of its effectiveness per the data of the electoral behavior of different groups of the population.² In recent decades this mechanism of "party--voter" direct ties has expanded considerably and been made more complex thanks to the practice of mass public opinion polls making it possible to ascertain the nature and motives of the electorate's attitude toward the parties and their leaders and its preferences and to thus discover the "strong" and "weak" (from the viewpoint of strengthening and winning mass influence) aspects of party policy.

At the same time neither in the past nor under current conditions have parties pretending to mass influence been able to secure it by relying only on their direct relations with the unorganized electoral masses. Primarily because these relations are inadequate, as a rule, for imparting to the party's mass base a relatively stable character: they are extremely changeable and depend on a multitude of chance occurrences and market-related circumstances. This is all the more the case for social democratic parties in that they have, as a rule, far fewer opportunities for intensive propaganda activity than the bourgeois political forces which rely on the direct financial support of big capital and take advantage of the mass media which it controls. Under current conditions all political parties need more than ever before stable ties to the civil society effected via the mass nonparty organizations and movements functioning therein. The need for this is of a particularly acute nature for the "left," including the social democratic and socialist parties. Such ties not only strengthen their electoral influence but also form a very important

link in the system of their relations with the masses, are a most important channel of replenishment of the party ranks and the parties' activists and leading personnel and make them a truly mass political force.

Relations with the unions occupy a particularly important place in the system of the social democratic and socialist parties' mass ties. The unions represent the most populous organizations of working people; in the majority of capitalist countries, particularly in West Europe, a considerable proportion thereof is closely connected with social democracy. In some countries the social democratic parties emerged from the trade union movement directly, in others they played a leading part in its formation and development. In the capitalist countries of North and Northwest Europe the social democrats are predominant in the trade union movement, and in a number of other countries the socialists have considerable influence in the major trade union centers. The social democrats also have great significance in the ICFTU, which in the mid-1970's united trade union organizations with a membership of more than 50 million.³ And although in recent years contradictions and discord have frequently intensified between the social democratic parties and the trade unions connected with them, their relations, as Soviet scholars observe, remain "familial," as a whole. "The basis thereof are common ideological standpoints, a coincident class base to a considerable extent and, in many cases, personal union or the mutual interweaving of leadership."⁴

Such a state of affairs means that relations of interdependence between the parties and trade unions exist within the reformist current in the workers movement. On the one hand the party leadership influences by various means the positions of the unions linked with it, on the other, it experiences the influence of the political and social demands which arise within the framework of the trade union movement and express in one way or another its functions in the defense of the working people's interests. It is not fortuitous that activists and members of reformist parties, who work in the trade unions or are linked with them, frequently play a leading part in the intraparty currents which depart on many essential issues from the standpoints of the social democrats exercising predominantly "purely political" functions (in the state and party machinery, parliament and so forth).

For this reason the processes occurring in the reformist trade unions cannot in one way or another fail to be reflected in the situation in the social democratic parties: they influence both the struggle of different intraparty currents and trends and the general evolution of social democracy's ideological-political positions. All the more the attention merited by the problems which arise in their mutual relations as a consequence of changes in the position, interests and consciousness of the trade union masses and the demands and standpoints of the trade union organizations.

Throughout the long historical period encompassing the years between the two world wars and the first decades following WWII the mass influence of social democracy was based on a special type of social-political consciousness, which had become widespread in the working class of the developed capitalist countries. Even prior to the reformist degeneration of the majority of social democratic parties. V.I. Lenin had shown that the spontaneous development of the workers movement would inevitably give rise to a trade union consciousness and policy

expressing "the common endeavor of all workers to win for themselves from the state this measure or the other aimed against the calamities inherent in their situation, but not removing this situation, that is, not doing away with the subordination of labor to capital."⁵ The orientation toward the partial improvements possible within the framework of capitalist relations united the social democratic parties and the reformist trade unions and formed the basis of a certain "model" of relations between the masses and the trade unions and political organizations representing them.

This "model" may be defined as trade-unionist.⁶ An essential singularity thereof is an understanding of the working people's class interests which confines them basically to the sphere of distribution and reduces them to directly material requirements (wages, social security, employment), ignoring questions of power, ownership and relations of domination and subordination both in production and in society as a whole. Three main levels of functioning of this "model" may be distinguished. First, the mass level-- a social behavior of the masses which is determined by the trade-unionist, narrowly "economic" ideas of a considerable proportion of the working class. Second, the unions' defense of certain demands of the working class in the sphere of living standard. And, third, support for these demands by the social democratic parties and this measure or the other of their realization when the social democrats exercise political power.

Objective conditions took shape in the majority of capitalist countries in the 1950's-1960's conducive to the strengthening of the trade-unionist model. The high economic growth rate attained on the basis of the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution and state-monopoly regulation of the economy and big capital interest in the development of mass production and the consumer demand corresponding thereto increased the extent of the bourgeoisie's compliance with the working people's economic demands. This broadened to a considerable extent the trade unions' possibilities for raising the level of these demands and enabled the social democratic parties to take them into consideration more in their programs and political practice. At the same time, however, among the "mass" workers also the new possibilities of a rise in the material living standard and an improvement in consumption which had opened to them following the difficult, hungry war and first postwar years frequently became the leading factor of the formation of political views and preferences.⁷ Social democratic policy of partial redistribution of the growing national income in favor of the working people corresponded to such sentiments to a considerable extent and at the same time promoted a strengthening of the consensus between the reformist parties and the unions.

Granted the entire diversity of national situations in a number of West European countries in the first postwar decades, a common trend was observed: the strengthening of the influence of social democracy in the working class, primarily in the part thereof united by the reformist trade unions. Thus in the FRG in the period 1953-1972 the proportion of workers and employees who voted for the SPD increased from 35 to 50 percent, and the majority of union members voted for it, furthermore. In Great Britain, where the influence of the Labor Party among industrial workers grew in the 1950's and declined somewhat in the 1960's, it was approximately three times as high among trade union members as among unorganized workers. The influence of the Labor Party in the union-organized section of the commercial-office proletariat increased considerably.⁸

It is highly indicative that the highest level of "harmony" between a social democratic party and the unions was achieved in Sweden--a country where this party's protracted exercise of political power made it possible to realize a kind of exemplary model of social democratic reformism which many other parties of the Socialist International sought to equal.

At the same time, however, in the period of economic growth of the 1950's-mid-1970's the effect of factors which undermined the trade-unionist type of mutual relations between social democracy and the working masses intensified in the developed capitalist countries.

Changes in the social structure of capitalist society primarily pertain to these factors. The rapid growth in the composition of the working population of the proportion of employees and other categories of brain and nonphysical workers and the decline therein in the proportion of the "traditional" industrial proletariat largely changed the social characteristics of the electoral body. The winning over of the growing stratum of white-collar workers became the paramount political task for the social democrats.

The particular features of the mentality and consciousness of this stratum initially contributed to its attraction into the orbit of social reformist ideology and policy. Experiencing a process of proletarianization, many rank and file employees "turned to the left" and departed to this extent or the other from the bourgeois-conformist and conservative orientations most typical of them in the past. At the same time, however, the class traditions and collectivist, socialist ideals influencing in one way or another the consciousness of social democratic workers were alien to the majority of them. However, in terms of their political preferences they were disposed toward moderate, "cautious" reformism. Among the most skilled and educated part of wage workers of mental labor--particularly managers and the scientific and technical intelligentsia--considerable influence was acquired under the conditions of the intensive development of state-monopoly capitalism and the scientific-technical revolution by technocratic ideas and notions concerning the capacity of contemporary capitalist society for scientifically-rationally solving the problems confronting it and concerning the fact that the leading role in social development would switch to specialists and the "exponents of knowledge".

The social democratic parties' tendencies toward active assistance for the process of state-monopoly development, the "managerization" of all spheres of economic and political activity, the promotion of specialists to leading positions both in the parties themselves and in the machinery of state and the reorganization of social democratic ideology in a spirit of technocratism corresponded to all these sentiments. The endeavor of the majority of social democratic parties to appear in the political arena as the "parties for all" not connected with some one class corresponded to the type of group self-consciousness of many white-collar workers, who identified themselves, regardless of their objective--frequently proletarian or semiproletarian--position, with the so-called middle class.

The development of the social democrats' ties to this stratum was expressed in the growth of its relative significance in their electorate and, particularly, in the membership, activists and leadership of the parties themselves. For example, in the SPD the proportion of workers in the party declined from 45 percent in 1952 to 26 percent in 1973, and they constituted only 2 percent of its executive elements.⁹ In the Italian Socialist Party [PSI] the proportion of workers declined in the period 1945-1970 from 62 to 35 percent, while that of employees grew from 6 to 21 percent, and the first constituted in 1974 some 17.5, but the second 43 percent of its leading personnel.¹⁰ And even in such a traditionally "workers" party as the Labor Party representatives of the "middle" class constituted approximately half the activists of the local party organizations in the 1960's.¹¹ This meant a narrowing of such an important channel of the parties' ties to the organized industrial proletariat as the recruitment of their membership and activists from the ranks of the workers--union leaders and activists--was for them.

Of course, these changes in the ideology and social aspect of the social democratic parties did not in themselves destroy their traditional ties to the reformist-oriented section of the industrial working class and the unions representing it. The trade-unionist model remained and continues as the essential basis of social democracy's mass influence in a number of countries. However, this model has been unable to ensure the social democrats' stable mutual relations with the new detachments of the working class and mass groups of the new "middle" strata. Particularly because despite the relatively rapid growth as of the 1960's of the union organization of employees and other categories of workers of nonphysical labor, they lagged behind industrial workers considerably in terms of this indicator even by the end of the 1970's in the majority of West European countries.¹² But this is not the whole point. Social democracy's trade union ties are important in that they express and consolidate its implantation in a particular type of worker political culture: in the worker "bastions" of the social democratic parties voting for them at elections has the force of local and family tradition connected both with membership of a trade union and with the entire set of stable world-outlook notions of the given social environment; it expresses a certain, reformist-minded limited form of class mentality and consciousness. The new strata of real or potential supporters of the social democratic parties represented a different social environment and different cultural traditions which by no means predetermined their "left" political choice. It is significant that many of the newly emerged white-collar unions emphasized with particular insistence their "political neutralism" and lack of connection with any political parties. In the 1960's-1970's the majority of rank and file employees of capitalist countries supported bourgeois parties at elections.¹³ Therefore even in winning certain positions in this environment the social democrats were forced to think about methods of consolidating these positions and further expanding them.

As of the latter half of the 1960's and in the 1970's it was revealed increasingly clearly that the white-collar workers were introducing in social-political life aspirations and requirements which did not fit within the framework of the traditional trade-unionist consciousness. The relatively high educational level of some of these working people, the greater proximity

than among the workers of many of their representatives to the management machinery and at the same time the lowering of the social status of this stratum conditioned its interest in fundamental problems of the organization of social and production life: the content of labor functions and power-sharing and questions of the way of life and culture and domestic and foreign policy course of its countries and a broadening of democratic rights and liberties. As V.V. Peschanskiy observes in his book, the British employees' unions, "participating in the activity of the TUC, are promoting a broadening of the range of interests of the British trade union movement, calling its attention to various problems of culture, education, environmental protection, the development of science and so forth."¹⁴

The replenishment of the ranks of the proletariat with new detachments of working people and their increasingly pronounced role in the workers movement stimulated to a large extent processes of the broadening of the intellectual and social imagination of the entire proletarian mass and an elevation of its social requirements brought about by the general growth of its education and culture and its new experience in the bourgeois "consumer society".¹⁵ These processes shook the corporativist narrowness and pragmatism and enclosure of interests within the sphere of distribution and income which had traditionally fostered the trade-unionist consciousness and been enshrined by the influence of social-reformist ideology. The humanist, "anticonsumer" ideas and values put forward by the mass student movement which rolled over the capitalist countries on the eve and at the outset of the 1970's found an increasingly widespread response in the proletarian milieu. A new radical-democratic type of mass consciousness, whose exponents dissociated themselves from all "traditional" party-political currents, began to take shape in capitalist society under the influence of these ideas. In itself this phenomenon, which emerged in the "left" part of the political spectrum, represented a challenge to social democracy and its claim to the role of monopoly representative of the left-democratic trends of political life. It was confronted with the problem of "assimilating" the new interests and values, which had penetrated the mass consciousness increasingly extensively.

The urgency of this problem was intensified by the conditions of competition with other political forces, which had become increasingly complex for social democracy. Many of its opponents "from the right," particularly the new mass bourgeois parties which had been formed after the war in a number of countries (the CDU in the FRG, the Gaullists in France and the Christian Democratic Party in Italy), deprived the social democrats of the monopoly of reformist policy which had been their main trump card in the struggle for influence in the masses. To this extent and in this form or other the biggest bourgeois political forces adopted a policy of limited reforms in the sphere of distribution and modernization of capitalism and rectification of its flaws by way of the development of state socioeconomic regulation.¹⁶

Even in countries where the social democrats had the predominant positions in the workers movement this circumstance confronted them with the task of seeking out new sources of influence on the masses going beyond the framework of traditional reformism. The more so in that the ideas of this "going beyond" came to be put forward increasingly insistently as of the end of the 1960's-

start of the 1970's by the unions linked with them. The policy of class collaboration inherent in right reformism and the social democratic leadership's actual solidarity with bourgeois forces on a number of important political issues brought about increasingly active protest in the trade union movement. It was in this period that the "crisis of confidence" in relations between the trade unions and the Labor Party in Great Britain arose, the conflict between the SPD leadership and many West German trade unions in connection with the adoption of the antidemocratic "emergency laws" was exacerbated and the "economic democracy" platform was put forward in the Swedish trade unions. Relations between social democracy and the unions were affected by the general upsurge of the mass workers and democratic movement, which had intensified the left leanings in the reformist unions. This created for social democracy a "threat from the left" and signified an opportunity for the increased influence in the mass workers movement of the communists or left-radical currents.

Such problems confronted particularly acutely the socialist parties of countries in which they had performed a secondary role in the workers movement and were inferior in terms of their influence in the unions and the electorate to big mass communist parties. Such powerful militant protests of the working class as the May-June 1968 strike in France and the "hot autumn" of 1969 in Italy strengthened the new radical trends in the union movement, in the reformist unions included; there was an objective rapprochement of these trends with the antimonopoly and antibureaucratic sentiments of the students and the new "middle" strata.¹⁷ These changes expressed the growing polarization of the mass social-political consciousness--a process which afforded an opportunity for the growth of the influence of all parties of the left and at the same time, however, which confronted them sharply with the question of how to avail themselves of such opportunities. To have ignored them would have meant for the socialist parties of the corresponding countries a dangerous narrowing of "political space". They could only avoid such a prospect by making appreciable adjustments to their ideological-political platforms, appearing in this form or the other as the spokesmen for the new mood of the masses and their aspiration to profound social transformations and attempting to thus "outdo" the communists. And this presupposed a broadening of ties to the mass nonparty movements and the organizations which represented them.

The evolution of West European social democracy at the end of the 1960's--first half of the 1970's clearly expressed its search for a "new identity" and its aspiration to a more clear-cut definition of its own character and fundamental differences from strengthened bourgeois reformism. At the same time, however, it expressed the need to acquire this "identity" by way of the incorporation in its ideological-political arsenal of the demands of the mass workers and democratic movement cut in a reformist fashion. This search formed the basis of the so-called re-ideologization of the social democratic parties and the attempts to renew the system of their values and reference points. In the ideological constructions of the social democrats in the 1970's an important place was occupied by the "quality of life" and "new type of economic growth" themes and criticism of the "consumer society". Antimonopoly and anticapitalist tunes intensified in the platforms of certain parties. The latter, for the reasons mentioned above, was particularly characteristic of European socialist parties: formed on the ruins of the old SFIO, the new French

Socialist Party [PSF] proclaimed a "break" with capitalism and social democratism; the Italian socialists abandoned "center-leftism" (the practice of government cooperation with the Christian Democratic Party) and advanced the task of the elaboration of a "socialist alternative"; a shift to the left occurred in the Belgian Socialist Party also. The Spanish Socialist Workers Party, which had renewed its composition and platform under the conditions of the disintegration of the Franco regime and the process of the country's democratization, endeavored to impart to itself the appearance of a consistent anticapitalist force and at its 27th congress (1976) even proclaimed itself "Marxist" (this wording was removed from the party documents subsequently).¹⁸

The social democratic parties of Northwest and North Europe, which had operated in a different sociopolitical atmosphere and which were linked more firmly with moderate-reformist traditions, did not go so far along the path of a revision of the aims of the 1950's-1960's, although the same trends were manifested in them also, albeit in more limited forms. Thus the Labor Party put forward in 1973 a program which was, as Soviet scholars described it, the "most radical" of all those which it had adopted since 1945.¹⁹ The SPD came out at the end of the 1960's with slogans of "greater democracy and greater participation" in all spheres of socioeconomic and political life.

A trend toward determination of its own line in questions of war and peace was manifested increasingly distinctly in this period in the evolution of the majority of parties of the Socialist International. A most important foundation of the consensus between reactionary-bourgeois and social democratic foreign policy which had taken shape in the cold war period was undermined under the influence of the consistently peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, the growth of its military-political might and the strengthening of the peace-loving mood of the masses in the capitalist world. Social democracy proclaimed itself a supporter of detente and attempted to use the policy of peaceful coexistence as an important trump card in the struggle for political influence. A certain weakening of anticommunist motifs in its ideology and policy and, in some parties, a transition to direct cooperation with the communists even were connected with this.

By and large, it may be stated that up to approximately the mid-1970's-start of the 1980's (depending on the conditions of different countries) the social democratic and socialist parties had succeeded, in the main, in adapting to the changes which had occurred in the consciousness of the masses connected with them and in strengthening or developing their relations with mass organizations and movements, primarily with the unions. Of course, the nature of party-union ties within the reformist wing of the workers movement remained highly heterogeneous in different countries: from close cooperation and "role-sharing," as in Sweden and Austria, to highly limited and unstable, as in France. Nonetheless, the trend toward the search for a joint, concerted policy predominated everywhere. In countries with a reformist-oriented and organizationally united trade union movement (in the FRG, Great Britain, Sweden and others, for example) it was realized via an institutionalized mechanism of the coordination of socioeconomic policy and incorporation in the social democratic program and policy of the new trade union demands. In Italy

and Spain the socialists stimulated the ties to "their" trade union centers and attempted not without success to enhance their role in the trade union movement. In France they succeeded in drawing close to the country's second most significant trade union center--the French Democratic Labor Confederation [CFDT].

To this extent or the other social democracy consolidated its influence among the new "middle" strata and the proletarianizing groups of white-collar workers close to them in terms of type of consciousness. A certain role here was performed by the growth of the trade union organization of rank and file employees and a substantial proportion of the intelligentsia and their ties to trade unions close to the social democrats.

Social democracy was not capable, it is true, of formulating any in any way clear-cut and consistent positions in respect of the mass movements which expressed the specific aspirations of these strata: at first the student and subsequently the ecology and other so-called new social movements. With all the diversity of situations in different countries neither personal union nor organizational ties in any way reminiscent of a system of party-trade union relations emerged between these movements and the social democratic parties. This, however, did not mean that the new social movements and the pronounced growth of their role in social-political life and in the development of the mass consciousness altogether did not exert an appreciable influence on social democracy. To this extent or the other it integrated the ideological trends which they engendered, updating its platform accordingly. Even greater significance was attached to the influx into the social democratic and socialist parties of the direct exponents of these trends, which in the 1970's formed a substantial proportion of party activists and the apparatus. This intellectual social democratic youth became the connecting link, as it were, between the parties and the new social movements and frequently contributed to the strengthening of the left currents in social democracy, which performed in this period a considerable role in the evolution of its ideological platform.

The electoral victories gained in the first half of the 1970's by the social democratic parties of the major West European countries--the FRG and Great Britain--and the rapid growth of the influence of the socialists in France and subsequently in Spain showed that social democracy was proceeding along the path of formulation of a complex symbiosis between the "old," trade union-worker and "new" social ties, between reformist traditions and the impulses born of the upsurge of the workers and democratic movement and the struggle for peace and detente. However, such successes could not shield the infirmity of the foundations of this symbiosis and the new positions won by social democracy. First, the "renewal" of social democracy by no means removed the "structural" contradictoriness of its policy rooted in the dual nature of the functions of this policy in capitalist society. It was not fortuitous that the most pronounced electoral successes fell to the lot of the parties of the Socialist International which had been removed from political power for some time. Previously also in such situations the role of the social democrats as representatives of certain interests of the working people had naturally been paramount, and their ties to the trade unions and other mass organizations had been consolidated and invigorated. The assumption of office was usually

accompanied by a strengthening of their role as "administrator of capitalism," new concessions to the ruling class and, consequently, an exacerbation of the conflicts with these organizations. Such a "test of power" had to be undergone under the new historical conditions by the social democratic and socialist parties which won it in the 1970's--start of the 1980's. It inevitably had also to be a test of strength of the largely modified system of ties to the masses which had secured their electoral victory.

Second, the political influence of social democracy had been fed by highly diverse ideological, social-psychological and cultural sources. On the one hand the social democrats relied on the trade-unionist consciousness which was rooted in a considerable proportion of the working class with its inherent "economism" and narrowness of social goals and horizons. On the other, the younger, more intellectually developed generation of social democratic workers and employees and the left-oriented and socially active part of the intelligentsia brought to social democracy a fundamentally different political culture: an interest in the problems of the quality and way of life, the working people's participation in management, the ecology, assistance to the peoples of the developing countries and in the struggle to prevent nuclear war and frequently also radical protest against capitalist practices. A particularly prominent role in the formation of this political culture has been performed by the intelligentsia, which has in recent decades changed from a narrow social stratum to an appreciable component of the army of wage workers. It is displaying increasingly an endeavor to introduce in social-political life its own requirements and values reflecting the singularities of the current position and consciousness of this stratum--its protest against relations of social dependence, attention to the "nonmaterial" aspects of the way of life and predilection for utopian forms of ideological thinking. A certain part of the young workers, employees and union members and activists, even if not accepting the "anti-industrialist" and other utopian aims of the radicalism of the intelligentsia, nonetheless sees the humanist ideals which it is disseminating as an alternative to pragmatic reformist "economism".

The heterogeneousness of the characteristics determining the cultural-psychological aspect of the activists and the "base" of social democracy in the 1970's-1980's is being manifested increasingly distinctly in the contradictions arising within it on a number of urgent social-political problems. An indicative example is the extensive proportions which have been assumed in the West German, Swedish and a number of other social democratic and socialist parties by the struggle surrounding the question of the development of nuclear power. For some social democrats nuclear power stations are an efficient method of solving the energy problem contributing to the growth of production and employment, for others a new threat to human life and the environment and a source of increased power of the monopolies and state bureaucracy.

The atmosphere of the growth of the democratic aspirations of the masses characteristic of the end of the 1960's--start of the 1970's, which coincided with more or less favorable economic conditions, brought together and united to this extent or the other the different motives of their social activeness and imparted to these motives a general "left" thrust, which, on the whole, strengthened the positions of social democracy. The situation changed abruptly with the transition of capitalism to a period of crisis upheavals in

the economy. The major malfunctions in the seemingly well-oiled mechanism of state-monopoly capitalism which began as of the mid-1970's--the slumps in production and the braking of its growth rate, increased inflation and the exacerbation of the energy, currency-financial and a number of other economic problems--struck at the very foundations of social democratic reformism.²⁰ The insolvency of the carefully nursed social democratic system of technocratic state-monopoly regulation and its incapacity for ensuring the harmonious and stable development of the economy allegedly making capitalism a society of "universal prosperity" was revealed. The social consequences of the crisis--the growth of mass unemployment, the decline in the living standard of the broad working strata and the incapacity of the ruling social democratic parties for halting these processes--inevitably led to a drop in the influence of these parties in the masses. The latter half of the 1970's-start of the 1980's was a period of their major electoral defeats. Such defeats were also sustained by the biggest social democratic parties of West Europe: the Labor Party, the SPD and even Sweden's Social Democratic Workers Party, which had held the most firmly onto government office.

The events of the political life of the end of the 1970's-start of the 1980's showed that the electoral defeats of the social democrats did not amount in terms of their significance to a routine swing of the political pendulum and a purely situational change of power. These defeats were inflicted on them by rightwing-conservative forces operating from a platform openly hostile to the workers movement, including the aims and principles of social democratic reformism. The neoconservative principles are aimed against the socioeconomic gains of the working class, trade union rights and the mechanisms of state regulation alleviating material and social inequality and to a certain extent limiting the arbitrariness of private business. While in office the social democrats revealed an incapacity for consistently pursuing a socioeconomic policy championing the interests of the working people under crisis conditions. Their policy did not represent a genuine alternative to neoconservative policy--it proceeded essentially from the same imperatives of the curtailment of reforms and "strict economies" in the working people's living standard.

The impact of the crisis situation on social reformism led to a similar evolution being undergone by the socialist parties of Southwest Europe which, relying on the growth of mass social discontent with the consequences of the crisis, were able at the start of the 1980's to take political power away from the rightwing-bourgeois parties. Both the French PSF and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, having originally operated with left-reformist programs, are in the process of exercise of political power orienting their socioeconomic course increasingly toward "strict austerity" and concessions to monopoly capital. In these countries, as in Italy also, where Socialist Party leader B. Craxi heads a coalition government, the socialists have been unable to check the growth of unemployment and other crisis phenomena in the socioeconomic sphere. As a result the danger of a weakening of their influence in the masses is arising. Thus a manifest narrowing of the PSF's electoral base has been observed in France since 1983.

The system of West European social democracy's mass ties is weakening and its relations with the mass organizations are growing more complicated under the impact of the crisis. Not only the failures of the social democrats'

socioeconomic policy but also more profound reasons are reflected here. The crisis and the structural reorganization of the economy sharply intensified the processes of the social and socio-psychological differentiation of the working class and the other mass strata to which social democracy appeals. The differences in position and direct, immediate interests between the materially well-to-do new "middle" strata and the section of the working class suffering from a lowering of living standard, between the working people of the sectors and occupations in which unemployment is raging and those who are connected with growing sectors of production, who service and produce new equipment and who have steady incomes and jobs are intensifying.

Under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism the traditional competition between workers for a place in production, which intensifies at the time of crisis, is supplemented by competition for the part of the national income redistributed via the state tax-budget mechanism and the social security system. Conservative propaganda instills in the relatively well-to-do strata the idea that under the conditions of a decline in production and state revenue social payments and union demands threaten the stability of their economic situation for they are forcing them to maintain the army of the poor and unemployed. Under the influence of the crisis and the growing uncertainty as to the future and the ideological and political offensive of capital egotistic and corporativist sentiments and an orientation toward the defense of narrow-group interests strengthen in certain groups of working people and the sense of class solidarity weakens. The appeals of the conservatives for economic "recovery" by way of affording private capitalist enterprise "greater freedom" and removing the obstacles allegedly created for this by the burden of the state's social spending and concessions to the unions find a response in this environment. In the growing masses of so-called marginals--young people for whom jobs cannot be found, the long-term unemployed and working people lacking steady earnings and jobs and a modern vocational education and skills--there is a growing perception of social defenselessness and sentiments of despair and apathy fostering social-political passiveness and alienation from the workers movement and the parties connected with it. The general result of all these diverse socio-psychological trends was on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's a decline in a number of capitalist countries in union membership not only among the unemployed but among those working also, a certain growth of anti-union sentiments in the masses and the increased influence of rightwing-conservative forces both in the "middle" and proletarian strata.²¹

At the same time, however, in the sectors of the working class threatened most by the crisis and the capitalist modernization of production militant moods and a resolve to defend their rights and interests are strengthening. The powerful strike protests of the miners, metallurgists and metalworkers which unfolded in the 1980's in a number of West European countries testify to this. The exacerbation under the influence of the crisis of all the "painful" economic and social problems of capitalist society--ecological and housing, young people's and women's rights--has brought about a growth of new social movements, which, granted all the eclecticism and vagueness of their ideological-political platform, represent an opposition to monopoly domination, the socioeconomic policy of the ruling circles and their antidemocratic political practice. The composition and ideological-psychological aspect of these movements testifies to their connection with the

new "middle" strata, primarily with the part thereof which, while departing from the leftist "total rebellion" of the end of the 1960's-start of the 1970's, has taken from it the fervor of radical-democratic protest against bourgeois civilization and way of life and frequently (in any event, in theory) utopian "anti-industrial" and "anti-institutional" maximalism and defense of spontaneity. In line with the development of the new social movements and the broadening of the platform of their demands (their incorporation in the struggle against unemployment, for example), they are being joined increasingly often by the young workers also.

The development of these movements has become a most important source of the strong upsurge of the antiwar struggle in a number of West European countries. The growth of the military threat on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's and NATO's policy of the militarization of West Europe, which was expressed most fully in the deployment of the American missiles on its territory, sharply increased the masses' attention to the problem of war and peace. All the socially most active groups of the population sharing democratic ideas are participants in the new social movements, and union activists and members have joined in the antiwar struggle; the local activists of the social democratic parties have become involved in it to this extent or the other also.

As a whole, the latter half of the 1970's-1980's have been characterized by the increased polarization of mass social-political consciousness and behavior, the growth of its intrinsic contradictoriness and an exacerbation of the conflicts between its varidirectional trends. These processes could not have failed to have destabilized the system of relations between the masses, mass organizations and the social democratic parties--both its most traditional, settled components and those which only just began to take shape in the preceding period. The social democratic and socialist parties, which usually endeavor to "catch" swings in the mood of the electorate, have been confronted by the intensifying differentiation of this mood with the problem of to precisely which type of interests and orientations to give preference in political practice. Only a few parties (the PSI, for example) have made a clear-cut choice in favor of the most "prosperous" and corporatist-oriented groups of wage workers; in the majority of parties this problem has given rise to increased fluctuations and a struggle of intraparty currents.

The social consequences of the crisis have engendered a highly complex range of reactions in the reformist trade union movement. On the one hand the mood of the strata of wage workers least affected by these consequences and treasuring their relatively well-to-do position has fostered in union circles an inclination toward "cautious" behavior in relations between the classes and support for the conservative policy of modernization and the stimulation of economic activity at the expense of a curtailment of social spending. Of course, in the majority of cases this support could not have been unconditional and has been combined with protection of the corporative interests of the corresponding professional group, primarily protection of its living standard against the threat of inflation. Such a position--combination in this proportion or the other of class collaboration with the protection of immediate economic group interests--is a direct continuation of traditional trade-unionism, and its most consistent representative is the bureaucratized union upper stratum (the "worker bureaucracy," in Lenin's well-known expression).

On the other hand the unions representing the detachments of the working class suffering most from the consequences of the crisis have occupied positions of active rebuff of the policy of the monopolies and the state (a most striking example was the role of the mineworkers union in the celebrated strike in the British coal industry in 1984-1985). And the reformist trade union movement as a whole and its national executive bodies are recognizing increasingly clearly the scale and depth of the threat created for it by the current socioeconomic policy of monopoly capital aimed at the comminution ("fragmentation") of the army of wage workers and the subordination of the organizations representing it. They cannot fail to see the extent to which the crisis and the growing aggressiveness of capital are narrowing the traditional field of class agreements and compromise and cannot fail to understand that the "marginalization" of a growing section of the working class is undermining the social foundations of the union movement. "The big problem confronting the unions," (E. Mer), leader of the CFDT, observes, "is the fact that owing to the crisis it is no longer possible to seek a growth of the living standard... thanks to a rise in labor productivity." And at the same time, on the other hand, as the CFDT leadership believes, "the growth of unemployment entails the risk of social gangrene... and almost half the wage workers are unemployed, and also the unprotected working people performing temporary work or employed at small-scale enterprises do not identify either with parties of the left or of the right or with trade union organizations. This is a situation which is dangerous for the future."²²

The crisis processes and the major economic and social changes connected with them are prompting union activists to longer-term thinking and to a quest for solutions and projects capable of averting the threat looming over the working class. This quest cannot fail to go beyond the framework of the traditional "purely economic" trade-unionism (protection of wages and jobs) and is leading to reflection concerning an alternative "model" of all socioeconomic development. And at the same time, however, the strengthening of such trends in the reformist unions (frequently embodied by the younger and more educated and dynamic part of their leadership and activists) cannot fail to be reflected in their relations with social democracy.

The short-sighted and hopeless socioeconomic policy of the ruling social democratic parties, which amounts more often than not to a hope to live through the difficult times at a price of the curtailment of social reforms and "belt-tightening," has in the 1970's and 1980's been increasingly at odds with the line of the unions. The mechanisms created earlier of coordination of the policy of the parties and the unions are ceasing to function in a number of countries, and both the formal and informal ties between them are weakening. In 1977 the British trade unions renounced the "social contract" with the Labor government. In the latter half of the 1970's-start of the 1980's differences increased between the German Trade Unions Association (FRG) and the ruling SPD: the "concerted action" institution disintegrated, sharp disagreements were revealed on the problem of equal participation in the management of the major enterprises and in 1982 the unions switched to direct opposition to the policy of reduced social spending being pursued by the H. Schmidt government. In Sweden the social democratic leadership endeavored to emasculate the "worker funds" project advanced by the unions and aimed at changing ownership relations at the enterprises; this led in the mid-1970's to

a deterioration in relations between the Swedish Social Democratic Workers Party and the unions.

The cracks in the relations between the ruling socialist parties of Southwest Europe and the unions linked with them have been increasing in the 1980's. In France the socialist government's policy is being sharply criticized not only by the CGT but also by the reformist unions, including the CFDT, which is closest to the socialists. In Spain the unions of the General Union of Workers, which form the main link of the ties between the Spanish Socialist Workers Party and the mass workers movement, are opposing the socialist government's decisions on key questions of socioeconomic policy and are frequently participating in joint mass actions together with the Workers Commissions. The powerful general strike of Spanish working people in 1985 showed the increased depth of the differences between government policy and the mass workers movement.

It would be wrong to reduce the current contradictions between the reformist trade unions and parties to a difference between the usual policy of social democratic governments of an agreement with the bourgeoisie and the direct material interests of the working people. Such disagreements arose in the past also, however, they encompassed mainly merely the sphere of distribution and questions of the dynamics of the working people's living standard. The important singularity of the current situation is that the unions of a number of countries are putting forward a broad set of political demands--a program of reforms in the spheres of production management, the educational system, employment policy and the use of labor resources. They are being forced into this by the critical situation in which the working class is being put by the economic crisis and the technological and structural reorganization of the economy. At the same time, however, this phenomenon reflects the objective process of the strengthening of the independent political role of the unions stimulated by the change in the correlation between economics and politics under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism and the "politicization" of socioeconomic life typical thereof. As Soviet scholars rightly observe, "the state's assumption of a growing volume of socioeconomic regulation is prompting the unions not simply to make demands on state power and operate via 'their' parties but also to increase their own, direct influence on the components of the state where the main decision-making centers are concentrated, that is, on the executive authority and the system of consultations between government and business. They are having to formulate and defend their demands in respect of a considerably broader range of questions, justify these demands and tie them in with the general economic situation, frequently advancing their own socioeconomic alternative here...."²³

The deep-lying basis of the current contradictions between the reformist unions and parties is the fact that the first, in exercising their expanded and "politicized" functions, are forced to take into consideration the long-term socioeconomic interests of the working people, the second, on the other hand, while in office, sacrifice these interests to the demands of the economically ruling class and market considerations of "electoral arithmetic". It is social democracy's electoralism which prompts it at every step to take into consideration primarily the mood of the strata which in an atmosphere of crisis

experience fear in the face of any changes and succumb to the influence of conservative ideas. The polemic between the leadership of the PSF and the CFDT is highly indicative in this respect. Responding to the unions' demands that the interests of the working strata suffering most from the crisis be taken into consideration in socioeconomic policy, PSF First Secretary L. Jospin declared to (E. Mer) that the measures adopted in defense of these strata had not led to an expansion of the socialists' influence. "On the other hand, we risk losing the base among the wage workers who actively support us--those in the happiest position belonging to the middle classes."²⁴

Relations in the social democratic parties--unions--new social movements "triangle" also have been complicated considerably in the 1970's-1980's. As a whole, social democracy has proven unprepared for the upsurge of these movements. In a happier economic situation it could, if not incorporate them directly in the orbit of its influence, then, at least partially "appropriate" their slogans, broadening its reformist platform. Under the conditions of crisis and the curtailment of reforms this has become impossible, and disenchantment with social democracy is increasing among the participants in the new social movements and in the strata which they represent. For many social democratic parties the ecologists and the currents close to them have become, what is more, a serious political competitor. Regardless of the actual electoral weight of the Greens, which is very considerable and growing in some countries (primarily the FRG), very limited in the majority of others, by their sharp criticism of social democracy's class collaboration, bureaucratism and the "statism" of its ideology and practice they are inflicting telling blows on it and contributing to the shaking of its influence among the young people and in left-democratic public opinion in general.

Mistrust and even hostility toward the new social movements also exist in many links of the reformist trade unions. The aims and methods of action of these movements are incompatible with corporativist and class-collaborationist trade-unionism and the cast of mind of the "worker bureaucracy". But the "anti-industrialist" slogans of "zero growth" and a return to small-scale production put forward by the ecologists are frequently alien and incomprehensible also to the broader trade union masses suffering from the winding down of production and dismissals.

The development of relations between the workers movement and the new social movements does not, however, amount to growing mutual alienation. The expansion of the sphere of union activity, the radicalization of the social-political mood of some trade union and social democratic activists and the growth of their educational and cultural level--all this is strengthening the ideological and psychological ties between the worker organizations and democratic movements. As a result increasingly great significance is attached in the internal differentiation of a number of reformist parties and unions to the conflict between the supporters and opponents of their "renewal" by way of assimilation of the problems being advanced by these movements. In some parties, the SPD, for example, this conflict emerged at the start of the 1980's at party leadership level even: whereas its right section headed by H. Schmidt relied on the support of the unions which abided by trade-unionist traditions, W. Brandt, who opposed him, was connected both with left trade

union circles and the supporters of the new social movements. Subsequently the problem of relations with the Greens became a most serious and acute problem for the SPD's entire political life.

An essential factor of the rapprochement of the workers and new social movements is the upsurge of the mass antiwar struggle. Its goals are equally close to the working class and the intelligentsia, and it unites the socially active representatives of the most diverse strata and classes and people of different ideological views. The trade unions of the capitalist countries--both their rank and file and activists and whole national associations--actively joined in the antiwar movement in the 1980's.

The current mass antiwar movement is largely renewing the content of the problem of the mass influence of social democracy. It is significant that the social democratic and socialist parties which support the slogans of the antiwar movement to this extent or other have in recent years managed to achieve a certain strengthening or expansion of their mass base. The election victories of Spain's socialists and the Greek PASOK and the certain growth of the influence of the SPD and the British Labor Party were connected with this factor to a large extent. Of course, the foreign policy positions of the parties are far from the sole and often not the main factor of the dynamics of their mass influence. However, the exacerbation of the problem of the preservation of peace and its recognition by increasingly broad masses in the 1980's cannot be ignored by a single political force pretending to such influence. In West Europe, where a strong antiwar movement exists and is strengthening, the future of social democracy will depend to an enormous extent on the positions which it occupies on this problem and on its capacity for putting forward an alternative to the aggressive militarist policy of the United States and NATO.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 28 May 1985.
2. In Soviet literature this aspect of the mutual relations of party-political activity and mass political behavior has been illustrated in the work "The Worker Electorate in West European Countries," Moscow, 1980.
3. "The International Workers Movement. Questions of History and Theory," vol VI, Moscow, 1981, p 380.
4. "Contemporary Capitalism: Political Relations and Institutions of Power," Moscow, 1984, p 98.
5. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 6, p 42.
6. See for more detail G.G. Diligenskiy, "The Social Foundations of the Ideology and Policy of Contemporary Social Democracy" in "The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process. 1983," Moscow, 1983, p 72 and subsequently.

8. See "The Worker Electorate in West European Countries....," pp 329, 341, 386.
9. F. Wollner, "Representation Sozialer Gruppen in der Partei und ihren Gremien," NEUE GESELLSCHAFT No 6, 1975, pp 478-480.
10. "Il Partito socialista: struttura e organizzazione," Venice, 1975, pp 317, 318.
11. B. Hindess, "The Decline of Working Class Politics," London, 1971, p 60.
12. "The International Workers Movement," vol VI, p 369.
13. See "The Worker Electorate in West European Countries....," pp 107, 122, 196, 206, 276, 343, 386, 394.
14. V.V. Peschanskiy, "Employees in Bourgeois Society," Moscow, 1975, p 308.
15. "The Social Mentality of Classes....," pp 42-68.
16. See "Social Democratic and Bourgeois Reformism in the System of State-Monopoly Capitalism," Moscow, 1980.
17. See "The International Workers Movement," vol VI, pp 396-428; I.B. Levin, "The Workers Movement in Italy. 1966-1976," Moscow, 1983, chapters 2 and 3.
18. See for more detail I.V. Danilevich, "The Socialist Parties of Spain and Portugal," Moscow, 1984, pp 133, 134.
19. See "The International Workers Movement," vol VI, p 430.
20. A.A. Galkin, "Contemporary Social Democracy: Problems and Prospects" in "The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process," Moscow, 1985, p 93 and subsequently.
21. See for more detail "The Social Mentality of Classes....," p 111.
22. "La C.F.D.T. en questions," Paris, 1984, pp 29, 85.
23. See "Contemporary Capitalism: Political Relations and Institutions of Power....," p 94.
24. "La C.F.T.D. en questions," p 86.

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ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, INTENSIFICATION OF PRODUCTION IN CEMA

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 85 pp 45-54

[Article by B.I. Medvedev: "Economic Integration and Production Intensification in the CEMA Countries"]

[Text] The current stage of economic and social development has advanced in the majority of CEMA countries a number of new tasks in all spheres of the life of the working people. A most important prerequisite and principal reference point for their successful accomplishment is primarily implementation of profound qualitative changes in the economic development of the socialist community countries for the purpose of the intensification of social production and the mobilization of such factors of economic growth as an upsurge of labor productivity, a reduction in the capital, material and energy consumption of the product and an appreciable rise in its quality. Importance in the solution of these problems by the CEMA countries is attached to the strengthening of their economic and scientific-technical cooperation and the extension of socialist economic integration, which has become, as the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized, a factor without which "...it is now impossible to imagine the assured development of this socialist country or the other and its successful solution of such problems as, say, provision with energy resources and raw material and introduction of the latest achievements of science and technology."*

The closest connection of socialist economic integration with the solution of the economic problems of the building and further development of the socialist society was noted by the top-level CEMA economic conference, whose participants declared unanimously that they "fully confirmed the soundness and timeliness of the collectively formulated course toward an extension of cooperation and the development of socialist economic integration, which have become an important factor of the all-around progress of each fraternal country and the rapprochement of their economic development levels."** Simultaneously the conference called attention to the considerable potential for an expansion of mutual cooperation, a deepening of the specialization and cooperation of production, an increase in reciprocal trade in the interests of the more

* "Material of the 26th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1981, p 8.

** "Top-Level CEMA Economic Conference, 12-14 June 1984," Moscow, 1984, p 18.

efficient use of the fraternal countries' production and scientific-technical potential and a rise in their peoples' well-being. In determining the paths of the continued development of the economy and the mutual cooperation of the socialist community countries the conferees relied on the realistic, profoundly scientific analysis which had been made by the fraternal communist and workers parties of the economic and social processes occurring both within the world socialist system and on a world scale. This analysis showed that many new features had appeared in these processes in recent years brought about both by the increased degree of maturity of socialism in individual countries and the international system and by the rapidly changing internal and external conditions of reproduction.

The socialist community countries' advancement along the path of the building and development of the completed socialist society has been accompanied by the great constructive work of the communist and workers parties on strengthening its material-technical facilities, multiplying the economic potential of individual countries and the entire community as a whole and consolidating its positions in the world economy. Let us adduce certain statistical data characterizing the CEMA countries' economic development. With approximately 10 percent of the world's population they create more than 25 percent of the entire national income produced in the world and approximately one-third of the world industrial product. They have a sizable share of the production of the engineering product (34 percent of its world volume), chemical goods (32 percent), electric power (21 percent), steel (32 percent) and cement (22 percent) and of the production of oil (24 percent), coal (32 percent) and natural gas (35 percent). In addition, they occupy leading positions in the world in many spheres of science and technology and they concentrate approximately one-third of world scientific-technical potential.

The volume of industrial production in the CEMA countries is approximately double that of the EEC countries, and almost three times more industrial output per capita is produced on average than in the world as a whole. The CEMA region is provided with practically all types of production resources, which makes it possible to satisfy the majority of individual countries' needs for fuel, energy, raw material and many types of industrial product thanks to reciprocal exchange. The CEMA countries' reciprocal supplies cater for import needs in machinery and equipment 68 percent, coal 99 percent, natural gas 93 percent, oil 69 percent, iron ore 77 percent, industrial consumer goods 61 percent and food 46 percent.

The decisive role in these supplies is performed by the Soviet Union. In the period 1976-1980 alone the volume of the supplies of energy resources (in physical volume) from the USSR to the other fraternal countries grew 50 percent compared with the preceding 5-year plan and was 2.4 times in excess of the supplies in 1966-1970 period. In 1981-1983 the USSR exported to the CEMA countries 264 million tons of oil and petroleum products, 92 billion cubic meters of gas, 53 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power, 128 million tons of ferrous raw material and 19 million tons of mineral fertilizer. As a whole, the supplies of energy carriers from the USSR to the fraternal countries in the current 5-year plan are to increase 20 percent compared with the 1976-1980

period. This is undoubtedly an impressive contribution to the economy of the fraternal countries, particularly if it is considered that the contract prices for fuel-energy and raw material commodities remain considerably lower than world prices.

The top-level CEMA economic conference in Moscow naturally did not confine itself merely to attesting the socialist community countries' achievements. The fraternal countries' communist and workers parties are well aware of and are constantly analyzing the complexities and difficulties of the building and improvement of the socialist society, which the Moscow meeting demonstrated once again. The participants in the economic conference not only revealed here the main economic problems of the CEMA countries and their system of mutual cooperation but outlined specific ways to solve them.

The documents adopted by the economic conference and the 38th (special), held immediately following the conference, 39th (October 1984, Havana) and 40th (June 1985, Warsaw) meetings of the CEMA Session testify that the task of the transition of the national economy to the path predominantly of intensive development has now been put at the center of the attention of the communist and workers parties and countries of CEMA in the sphere of the development and deepening of economic integration.

Let us now dwell on the reasons for the need for such a transition. Revision of the strategy of economic development in the direction of an intensification of the action of intensive factors of growth is entirely natural and was brought about by the considerable changes in the internal and external conditions of reproduction which led in the latter half of the 1970's-start of the 1980's to the emergence of a number of unfavorable trends in the economy of the majority of socialist community countries. A decline in the economic growth rate had been observed in the 1970's and at the start of the next decade in a number of socialist community countries. The average annual growth rate of national income, which had constituted 6.7 percent in the period 1961-1970, had declined to 5.4 percent in the 1970's, and in the latter half of this period to 4.1 percent, what is more. In the first 2 years of the current 5-year plan the national income for the countries as a whole increased only 4 percent.

The main influence on the lowering of the rate of increase in national income had been exerted by the relative reduction in the average annual rate of increase in the gross product of industry and agriculture and also capital investments characteristic of all the CEMA countries. From the viewpoint of the internal conditions of reproduction such dynamics of the basic indicators of economic growth had been brought about primarily by the relative exhaustion in the majority of CEMA countries of extensive sources of development accompanied by an insufficiently high rate of increase in social production. In all the European CEMA countries the increase in the able-bodied population had declined, practically all the land suitable for agriculture had been enlisted in the economic turnover, the possibilities of obtaining an additional quantity of fuel, energy and many types of raw material had declined sharply and these resources themselves had become far more costly. The main reason, however, was, nonetheless, the insufficiently rapid growth

of social production efficiency since, in accordance with world development trends, "the growth of the consumption of primary resources, particularly under current conditions, cannot be regarded as the 'total' source of economic growth."*

Recent years have been characterized by the rapid growth of expenditure on the modernization of many sectors of the national economy, the financing of scientific-technical progress and the transition of agriculture to an industrial footing. In individual countries the priority of the fulfillment of social programs has been reflected in a decline in accumulation's share of the national income, and, furthermore, a considerable proportion of capital investments has had to be diverted into environmental protection and maintaining the due level of the socialist community's defense capability.

As far as the factors pertaining to the CEMA countries' participation in the international division of labor are concerned, their influence has been perceived to a large extent by the states whose economy is considerably dependent on foreign trade. Thus, for example, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, where economic growth is determined to a considerable extent by an expansion of exports, in which the bulk of the product of many sectors of material production is realized, while imports satisfy a considerable proportion of production and personal consumption, reacted very noticeably to the considerable deterioration in external market conditions observed in the 1970's. To this extent or the other the consequences of the sharp increase in the price of fuel, energy carriers and raw material (in accordance with the price-forming principles adopted in the reciprocal trade market,** this also brought about a gradual increase in prices in this sphere also, although, as already mentioned, these prices remained considerably below the world prices) were experienced by all the socialist community countries. As far as the USSR, which is not a major importer of fuel-energy and raw material commodities, is concerned, it encountered the problem of a sharp increase in current and capital expenditure on the production and transportation of many types of minerals.***

A pronounced influence on the economy of individual countries has been exerted by the inordinately extensive development in a number of cases of their foreign economic relations with capitalist states, which have attempted to take advantage of the artificial difficulties in trade and credit relations which they

* Yu.S. Shiryayev, "The World Economy: New Technological and Socioeconomic Factors of Development," Moscow, 1984, pp 139-140.

** Since 1975 base prices in the CEMA countries' reciprocal trade have been calculated on the basis of the world prices in accordance with the method of a sliding average calculated for the 5-year period directly preceding the year for which the contract prices are determined. For example, at the start of the 1980's the price of oil imported by the CEMA countries from the USSR was approximately half that of the world capitalist market.

*** Thus, for example, unit expenditure merely on obtaining oil in the period 1981-1985 in connection with the relocation of the main oil-producing centers to remote, sparsely populated parts of the country which are difficult of access is to increase almost threefold.

themselves created for the purpose of political blackmail and pressure on the socialist countries. Under the conditions of the boycotting of commercial deals on the part of the United States and a number of other NATO states the CEMA countries were forced to put the main emphasis on the need for the speediest liquidation of credit which had been obtained earlier. There arose the question of the need for the establishment in the CEMA countries on the basis of mutual cooperation of the production of certain types of machinery and equipment which it was impossible or economically unprofitable to obtain in the West.*

The sum total of the said problems was, as already mentioned, the subject of profoundly scientific analysis at the top-level CEMA economic conference, which adopted carefully considered, realistic and constructive decisions. Far-reaching preparatory work, which was built on the firm foundation of the conclusions and propositions of recent congresses of the fraternal communist and workers parties and their central committee plenums, contributed to a considerable extent to the formulation of these decisions, which essentially represent the strategy of the CEMA countries' cooperation through the end of the present century.

The documents of the CEMA countries' communist and workers parties and the socialist community and the conference material outline a general course toward overcoming the above-mentioned difficulties of economic development which consists of ensuring conditions (both on a national basis and in unison) for the consistent transition of the economy of the majority of countries to a path of predominantly intensive development.

The statement of the participants in the economic conference on the main directions of the further development and deepening of the CEMA countries' economic and scientific-technical cooperation noted that a most important task in the sphere of the economy and mutual cooperation is "the accelerated transition of the economy to an intensive path and its increased efficiency thanks to an improvement in the structure of social production, the rational and economical use of existing material and labor resources and the better use of fixed capital and scientific-technical potential."**

The intensification of the economy is a multifaceted problem. But were we to attempt to distinguish the main condition of its solution, such would undoubtedly be a radical acceleration of scientific-technical progress and a qualitative transformation on the basis of fundamentally (which is particularly important) new equipment and technology of the key sectors and processes and the technical base of the nonproduction sphere. It is clear even now that the arterial path of scientific-technical progress lies not so much in the plane of an improvement in the old equipment and technology (although the need for this is not denied) as in the search for and introduction in practice of qualitatively new scientific-technical solutions.

* "Business Cooperation in the Interests of Peace and Progress," Moscow, 1984, pp 56-57.

** "CEMA Economic Conference," p 19.

The cooperation strategy outlined for the 1980's-1990's, which is oriented toward the multiplication of collective efforts aimed at securing the conditions for an increase in labor productivity, a consistent reduction in the energy- and material-intensiveness of production, a rise in the technical level and quality of the manufactured product and the optimization and increased degree of complementariness of the national economy structures, corresponds in full to the task of a sharp increase in the contribution of socialist economic integration to the intensification of the fraternal countries' economies. It is here that opportunities are afforded for the economical and comprehensive use of all national economic resources, secondary included, and economic growth with relatively less expenditure of labor, material resources and capital investments is secured.

Together with the commissioning of internal factors of intensification a most important part in its speediest development is played by socialist economic integration and the adoption and implementation of joint decisions for the purpose of the development of such most important sectors of the national economy as extractive industry, engineering, agriculture, transport and consumer goods production.

Proceeding from the enumerated tasks, the main link of the CEMA countries' economic strategy is the acceleration of scientific-technical progress. The main line of the connection of integration and intensification in this sphere is realized via scientific-technical cooperation making it possible on the one hand to unite the scientific-technical potentials of the socialist community countries for the solution of the most important national economic problems and, on the other, to accelerate the "science--technology--production" cycle or, in other words, to increase the promptitude of the use of the achievements of science and technology in practice.

The increased impact of integration on the intensification of the economy demands certain changes in the forms and methods of the CEMA countries' cooperation and gives rise to the need for an expansion of the number of objects and spheres of mutual cooperation and also the concentration of the attention of the socialist community countries on the collective accomplishment of priority tasks in assimilating the achievements of scientific-technical progress, in other words, improving the economic mechanism of socialist integration. The use of the possibilities of integration in the sphere of an acceleration of scientific-technical progress is all the more important in that a colossal growth in the cost of scientific-technical developments is being observed today, the need for highly skilled specialists both in the sphere of the fundamental and applied sciences is increasing and the tasks confronting the CEMA countries pertaining to the search for this scientific solution or the other are frequently uniform.

An analysis of the development of scientific-technical cooperation at the start of the 1980's makes it possible to draw the conclusion concerning an increase in its role in increasing individual countries' production efficiency and creating the material-technical prerequisites of intensification. Questions of the development and extensive use in the national economy of microprocessor equipment, a single standardized series of industrial robots, electronic

equipment and so forth are being solved on the basis of cooperation. Realization of the comprehensive agreements which have been concluded in this sphere and which provide for joint scientific research and planning-design developments and the organization of the specialized production of automatic production engineering complexes, machinery, instruments and control systems equipped with the latest means of electronics is affording an opportunity for the transition from individual automated control systems to the mass automation of production processes.

In the interests of the further concentration of forces in the most important, most promising areas of science and technology it was decided at the economic conference to jointly draw up a comprehensive program of scientific-technical progress for 15-20 years which would make it possible to pursue a concerted and, in some sectors, uniform scientific-technical policy. This work has already begun on the basis of national programs of scientific-technical progress. The comprehensive program of scientific-technical progress highlights five priority areas--electronics, comprehensive automation, nuclear power, new types of materials and techniques and biotechnology. General agreements and cooperation programs already exist in respect of some of them providing for the close interaction of the scientific, design and production collectives, and, as the 39th meeting of the CEMA Session observed, it is now necessary to prepare such agreements more energetically for the other leading areas also, for the creation of flexible automated processes and automated design systems included.*

When examining the influence of socialist economic integration on an intensification of social production it is necessary to highlight particularly the role of their cooperation in the sphere of material production and, mainly, the significance of international production specialization and cooperation (IPSC), where tremendous opportunities are opening for the fraternal countries in realization of the advantages of the international socialist division of labor. It is a question, in particular, of the fact that the development of IPSC permits all the countries participating therein, regardless of their economic dimensions, availability of natural resources, size of population, home market capacity and so forth, to create large-scale modern works furnished with progressive equipment and appreciably reduce production costs, the level of which, according to certain calculations, could, given mass production, be 2.5 times lower than in small-series production. For example, more than 120 multilateral and over 1,000 bilateral production specialization and cooperation agreements are being realized currently, the volume of annual supplies in connection with which has reached approximately R25 billion, and exports of specialized engineering products are growing particularly intensively, furthermore. In 1983 alone reciprocal supplies of specialized engineering products increased almost 24 percent, and their share of total reciprocal exports of engineering products amounted to 41 percent.

The realization of the agreements in the sphere of IPSC is contributing to the more rational location of production in the socialist community countries and concentration of the manufacture of specialized products in a limited number

* PRAVDA, 30 October 1984.

of countries. Thus in accordance with multilateral agreements which have been concluded, it is planned manufacturing approximately 75 percent of engineering products in no more than two countries, including 45 percent in one country. As a result a number of countries with a limited home market have acquired an opportunity for the development of modern large-series production steadily oriented toward participation in the international socialist division of labor—for example, 60 percent of all motorized and storage-battery trucks manufactured in the community are being produced in Bulgaria, approximately 80 percent of buses in the USSR and Hungary,* more than 75 percent of railroad passenger cars in the GDR and the USSR, 90 percent of locomotives in the CSSR and the USSR and so forth.

Such concentration of production is characteristic not only of the manufacture of the optimum (or approaching the optimum) series of end products but also of individual components, parts and units, which makes it possible to produce them at less cost than at nonspecialized enterprises. Thus integration in engineering--the key sector of material production--is becoming to an increasingly great extent a catalyst of the intensification process inasmuch as it is on the level of development of engineering, which supplies all the remaining sectors of the national economy with producer goods, that the level of development of the production forces of any country ultimately depends.

Proceeding from this, the further development of cooperation in the sphere of engineering is oriented toward the production of energy-, material and labor-saving equipment and means of automation and mechanization based on the latest achievements of scientific-technical progress. It is important to mention here also the improvement in the organizational forms of cooperation, particularly the active use of such a new organizational form of cooperation as direct relations between enterprises and associations of the CEMA countries. The significance of direct relations, which represent the direct interaction of the enterprises and associations of the fraternal countries for the purpose of production cooperation, joint research and planning and so forth, is that on the basis of such close and constant contacts the partners may promptly exchange the necessary information concerning the possibilities of production, its qualitative and quantitative requirements, the areas of scientific research and investment policy and thereby acquire new impetus for the mutually profitable development of scientific-technical cooperation and IPSC.

A big contribution to the intensification of social production is being made by socialist economic integration along the lines of the collective solution of fuel-energy and raw material problems. It is well known that it was precisely participation in the international socialist division of labor which afforded the CEMA countries the opportunity to achieve practically complete self-sufficiency in the most important fuel-energy and raw material resources. At the same time the change in the conditions of reproduction raised with all seriousness the question of a new strategy of resource consumption, making

* It is interesting to note that the Hungarian "Ikarus" Enterprise has become one of the most powerful in Europe in terms of the manufacture of buses--more than 10,000 annually--whereas the biggest West European company--Daimler-Benz (FRG)--manufactures 6,000 buses of the same category.

the cornerstone not its extensive growth but rationalization, which, in turn, also required a certain revision of the areas of cooperation in this sphere.

The economic conference deemed it essential for the solution of the raw material and fuel-energy problems by way of the mobilization of intrinsic resources and increased mutual cooperation to implement a set of measures aimed primarily at the economical and rational use of energy carriers and raw material, a reduction in the energy- and material-intensiveness of production and a change in the structure of the production and consumption of raw material and energy carriers. Simultaneously the CEMA countries will adopt the appropriate measures for the development of cooperation in the sphere of the production and reciprocal supplies of fuel, energy and raw material.

This will not be performed in a void inasmuch as certain experience has already been accumulated, in realization of the long-term goal-oriented program of cooperation (DTsPS) in the sphere of raw material, fuel and energy for example. Measures for an improvement in the existing and the creation of new highly efficient processes of the treatment of copper raw material with regard for its comprehensive use and environmental protection, a search for rational technical decisions pertaining to the comprehensive conversion of nonbauxite raw material into aluminum, the economical and rational use of fuel and energy in nonferrous metallurgy and the organization of the specialized production of materials for industrial rubber and electronics industry have been realized within the framework of this program. The more profound treatment and increased degree of recovery from primary resources of useful components contain a very important reserve of an intensification of the economy. Considering this fact, the CEMA countries concluded a general agreement on cooperation in increasing the depth of petroleum refining by way of the introduction of more modern technology based on the specialization and cooperation of the production of installations and equipment for secondary petroleum-refining processes.

In 1983 the 37th meeting of the CEMA Session (Berlin) examined and approved the main directions of cooperation for the economical and rational use of fuel-energy and raw material resources, particularly the development of cooperation in the production of energy- and resource-saving equipment, instrumentation and apparatus for the automatic regulation of energy consumption. An important place in the documents examined by the session was assigned measures aimed at a reduction in nonproduction losses and the efficient use of secondary resources.

Considerable results are expected from the long-term comprehensive measures for cooperation in the sphere of energy, fuel and raw material for the period up to 1990 and the longer term which were approved by the 39th meeting of the CEMA Session. The construction on USSR territory of the Krivoy Rog Mining-Concentrating Works, the Yamburg-USSR western border main gas pipeline and Yamburg gas deposit facilities is provided for and the joint development of coal deposits and the modernization of the by-product coke industry of Poland, the creation of capacity for the production and treatment of magnesite in the CSSR and nickel-cobalt-containing products in the Republic of Cuba and cooperation in the development of deposits of nonferrous metals in Mongolia, Vietnam and the Republic of Cuba, bauxites in Vietnam and phosphorites in Mongolia are outlined in accordance with this document.

An integral part of the CEMA countries' integration strikingly demonstrating the social thrust of this process is the intensification and improvement of cooperation in the agrarian-industrial sphere, the provision of agriculture with modern equipment, fertilizer and seed stocks and the introduction of the latest techniques and agrotechnical methods. The socialist community countries are paying great attention to the solution of the food problem, which still exists in the majority of them, and the extension of the international socialist division of labor is playing an increasingly important part here, what is more. Thus the agrarian-industrial complex is one further sphere where socialist economic integration is exerting a positive influence on the intensification of production.

The CEMA countries' efforts for the development of cooperation in the sphere of the intensification of agriculture are illustrated by the data on the joint measures aimed at its increased efficiency. During the time of realization of the comprehensive program the CEMA countries have signed nine agreements (providing, inter alia, for the creation of coordination centers) on the most important problems of agriculture, including selection of the basic cereals, the selection of corn, the chemicalization of agriculture, the use of computers, the development of animal husbandry on an industrial footing, the prevention of and effective struggle against foot and mouth disease, the mechanization, electrification and automation of agriculture, the comprehensive mechanization of agricultural operations and on the creation of new plant-protection agents. More than 400 joint projects, whose results have been proposed for introduction in agricultural production and for use in scientific research, have been completed. Twentysix plans for the construction of large-scale animal husbandry complexes for production on an industrial basis are being introduced within the framework of the cooperation of the CEMA countries' scientific research organizations.

In recent years the CEMA countries have concluded an agreement on the international specialization and mutual use of the gene stocks of 12 breeds of cattle for meat, 11 breeds of dairy and combined-purpose cattle, 20 breeds of hogs, 29 breeds of sheep, 4 breeds of goats and 16 types of fresh-water fish. Such cooperation has already had tangible effects. For example, the use in the USSR of gene stocks of hogs of increased productiveness has increased the country's hybrid head 10-20 percent, while in Hungary Soviet hog breeds have increased considerably the fecundity of the local head and replaced less productive breeds. In Mongolia the crossing of local cow breeds with Soviet breeds has produced descendants 25-30 percent more productive on average than the local breeds.

An urgent problem of the food complex is the removal of unjustified losses of raw material and finished products. A considerable proportion of the product which has been produced is still being lost currently owing to the lack of the necessary conditions for high-quality processing and storage in agriculture, in food industry, in transport and in the trade network. At the same time calculations show that expenditure on new production in agriculture and food industry is 8-10 times higher than expenditure on ensuring the corresponding conditions for the processing and storage of food and raw material. The solution of this problem, which is of a comprehensive nature, provides for

the mechanization and automation of harvesting, handling and transport operations and organization of rational systems of the shipment and acceptance of the raw material from the combine harvester through the processing enterprise or warehouse-repository. All this was taken into consideration upon the conclusion within the framework of the corresponding DTsPS of a multilateral agreement of the countries concerned on the creation of new production engineering processes and highly productive equipment for comprehensively mechanized and automated enterprises for the storage and processing of fruit and vegetables.

Attaching great significance to the impact of integration on an intensification of agricultural production, in the course of the 37th meeting of the CEMA Session the CEMA countries approved a set of measures considerably supplementing and expanding the DTsPS which had been adopted earlier in the sphere of agriculture and the food industry. These measures provide for an increase in the production and reciprocal supplies of vegetables and fruit and cooperation in providing agriculture and the food industry with progressive equipment and in the fuller and more rational use of agricultural raw material. The countries concerned also came to an understanding on the elaboration of measures for the economic stimulation of agricultural production for the purpose of an increase in reciprocal food supplies.

The successful realization of the outlined comprehensive measures will be of great national economic significance for the CEMA countries, which will be able to make more efficient use of their scientific-technical and production potential for the purpose of an increase in the production and a rise in the quality of products, an improvement in the structure of the diet and an expansion of the selection of products. It may be assumed that the impact of integration on an intensification of agricultural production will grow also, although it should be noted that the integration of the CEMA countries in the agrarian-industrial sphere will, as before, continue to develop more slowly than in other spheres of material production.

The CEMA countries' integration cooperation in the sphere of the organization of the joint production of producer goods for various sectors of the national economy is producing considerable results for the intensification of the national economy. The cooperation of a number of socialist community countries in the production of technically intricate equipment for nuclear power stations considerably reducing the time taken to build nuclear power stations may serve as a striking example illustrating what has been said. Realization of the corresponding multilateral agreement concluded in this sphere in 1979 enabled Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, USSR and CSSR by the end of 1983 to have increased installed nuclear power station capacity to 25 million kilowatts. By 1990 it will have risen to almost 100 million kilowatts, which is the equivalent of an annual saving of approximately 200 million tons of standard fuel. Preparatory work on the construction of nuclear power stations is being performed on Cuba and in Poland and Romania.

A further important area of the impact of integration on the process of the intensification of social production is its stimulating role in accelerating labor productivity growth. Integration performs this function more often than

not indirectly, and for this reason it is difficult to make a quantitative evaluation of the interconnection of integration and the intensification of production. However, there is no doubt, for example, about the effect produced for labor productivity growth by the coordinated and joint performance of scientific research, the mutual exchange of scientific information, the introduction in practice of the results obtained in the course of scientific-technical cooperation and so forth. The international exchange of experience and information in the sphere of the scientific organization of labor and the increase in the standard of production, the possibility of which is brought about by the unity of principles of the organization of labor and management in all countries, also acts as an integration factor here.

Big potential for an increase in labor productivity is contained, as already mentioned, in the continued development of IPSC making it possible to use not only the countries' comparative advantages in the sphere of the material prerequisites and conditions of production but also in production experience and traditions, the qualifications of the work force and so forth. Mention should also be made here of the increasingly intensive cooperation in such a sphere demanding increasingly large material and financial outlays as the training of highly skilled specialists.

It would certainly be premature to claim that all the problems of the use of the opportunities afforded by socialist economic integration for the intensification of social production have already been resolved. But the growth of the influence of this integration and its significance in ensuring a constant process of the CEMA countries' expanded reproduction in the transition of their economies to a path of predominantly intensive development are not now in doubt. This is indicated by the results which have been achieved in realization of the economic strategy of the CEMA countries' communist and workers parties which they drew up on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's.

A favorable trend in the dynamics of the most important indicators of economic growth was discerned in the majority of CEMA countries in 1983 even--produced national income grew 3.8 percent compared with the preceding year, and industrial output increased 4.2 percent. The increase in the gross agricultural product in 1983 constituted approximately 3 percent. A large part of the industrial product in a number of countries was obtained thanks to increased labor productivity, and unit consumption of energy and other material resources declined. Thus, for example, in Hungary the production increase occurred given an absolute decline in the consumption of energy resources, and in the GDR the increase in produced national income of 4.4 percent was achieved without an increase in the consumption of fuel and energy and given a reduction in unit consumption of the most important types of energy carriers, raw material and intermediate products of 7 percent. Considerable successes in the rationalization of resource consumption were achieved in Romania, where as a result of a reduction in the consumption norm of fuel-energy and other resources in industry savings totaling 7 billion lei were obtained in 1983, which corresponds to more than 1 percent of the country's national income; 2.5 million tons of standard fuel were saved in Czechoslovakia.

The positive results which had been established in the preceding year were consolidated in 1984, and the CEMA countries, guided by the decisions of the economic conference and approaching congresses of their communist and workers parties, took a new step forward in the transition of the economies to a predominantly intensive path of development.

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GREATER SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL INTERACTION URGED

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[Article by Yu.S. Novopashin: "Political Relations of the Socialist Countries"]

[Text] Only four decades separate us from the time when, in the first postwar years, the world socialist system was conceived and the formation of the socialist community began. This is not much time on a historical scale, but all the more distinctly visible are the achievements of the fraternal peoples, who in these decades have scored tremendous successes in all spheres of economic, political and spiritual life and taken their countries into the ranks of developed states, having thereby demonstrated the inexhaustible potential contained in the new social system. The victory over fascist Germany and militarist Japan was the historical starting line from which not only the advancement along the path of revolutionary transformations of a number of countries of Europe, Asia and, later, the American continent (Cuba), which had opted for a socialist path, but also the formation of their internationalist alliance began. "The alliance of socialist community countries is a particular kind of alliance," a ceremonial meeting in Sofia devoted to the 40th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria emphasized, "it represents the new, socialist type of international relations of sovereign, equal states welded together by community of fundamental interests and goals and the single Marxist-Leninist ideology and coupled by ties of comradely solidarity and mutual assistance. Mutually enriching ties between the fraternal countries permeate all spheres of social life and are realized both along party and state lines and at enterprise and labor collective level."¹

The entire 40-year history of the development of these ties is testimony to profound fidelity to the ideas of scientific communism and the permanent relevance of Lenin's instructions concerning the fundamental principles of the cooperation of nations which have cast off the yoke of capitalism. The victory of socialist revolution, as Lenin observed, "demands the most complete trust, the closest fraternal alliance and the greatest possible unity of the revolutionary actions of the working class of all progressive countries."² Proceeding from the conclusion concerning the impossibility of the victory of socialism simultaneously in all countries and the objective inevitability of the prolonged coexistence of the two opposite socioeconomic systems, Lenin emphasized the paramount importance primarily of the military-political cohesion of the revolutionary peoples.³ The communist and workers parties and the peoples of the countries which have embarked on socialist building after

WWII have been guided by this proposition of Lenin's when implementing measures to ensure their security and establish cooperation with the Soviet Union and mutual relations along party and state lines, on defense issues and so forth. Even in the initial period of the formation of the system of interstate relations of the new type over 35 bilateral treaties and agreements were signed, which politically and legally enshrined the aspiration to the consolidation of these countries and, primarily, to close alliance with the land of soviets.

The conclusion at that time of bilateral treaties and agreements initiated the formation of a stable structure of the socialist countries' political cooperation and the purposeful development of their internationalist mutual relations. However, as already noted in scientific literature, "none of these bilateral treaties and agreements were directly interconnected and did not represent a single defensive alliance of the countries subscribing to them. The said treaties did not provide for the formation of any common organs of political and military leadership and joint armed forces."⁴

When, in the first postwar decade, imperialism embarked on the creation of aggressive imperialist bloc and international tension increased sharply, the socialist states were confronted by the question of the conclusion of a multilateral treaty which would afford an opportunity for the simultaneous determination by all its subscribers of the nature of the situation, the necessary measures of self-defense and the implementation of collective actions against aggressors. Such a friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaty was signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955 between Albania,⁵ Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The 30 years which have elapsed since these socialist states' political-legal structuring of their multilateral allied relations have shown convincingly the tremendous importance of their alliance for ensuring the internationalist unity of these states and for the communist and workers parties' solution of diverse questions of foreign policy and international cooperation.

It is truly difficult to exaggerate the role of the communist and workers parties in the formation of international relations of the new type. Historically the cooperation of these parties, which in the postwar period headed socialist building in a number of European and Asian countries, preceded all other forms of cooperation inasmuch as within the framework of the communist movement it existed even prior to the appearance of the world socialist system. With its emergence interparty cooperation became and remains today the pivot of all forms of the socialist states' interaction: in the sphere of politics and economics, ideology and culture.

In the socialist countries Marxist-Leninist parties are the ruling parties, that is, no one in any way important question of the development of socialism both of the social system and of the world system is solved without their leading participation. Interparty cooperation is for this reason the nucleus of international political relations, whose subjects are primarily the ruling parties in the person of representatives of party or state bodies. Thus heads of the communist and workers parties and governments of the socialist community take part, as a rule, in meetings of the Warsaw Pact's highest political body--the Political Consultative Committee (PCC). The activity of the PCC is important for the deepening of the interparty and foreign policy

cooperation of the Warsaw Pact states and for the strengthening of the international positions of socialism and the consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world. These meetings elaborate the strategy of joint actions on the most important questions of contemporary politics.

The practical experience of the cooperation of the socialist countries in the Warsaw Pact acquired in three decades is extraordinarily valuable. The forms of multilateral relations and the coordination of foreign policy efforts formulated by these countries' joint efforts have stood the test of time. For 30 years the Warsaw Pact has reliably served and continues to serve the development and strengthening of the all-around cooperation of the subscriber-states, sovereignty, security and the indissolubility of their borders and the elaboration and implementation of a peace-loving, concerted foreign policy course and has performed an outstanding role in the preservation and consolidation of peace in Europe and throughout the world. As supporters of equal and mutually profitable all-around cooperation, the subscriber-states have always advocated and continue to advocate the simultaneous dissolution of their alliance and the North Atlantic bloc and, as a first step, their military organizations. But as long as the NATO military bloc exists and the threat to European and general peace continues, the socialist states will strengthen their defensive alliance, at the same time stepping up the struggle for disarmament and peace and for overcoming military blocs. The unanimous decision adopted at the meeting of the top party figures and statesmen of the Warsaw Pact countries on 26 April 1985 in Warsaw to extend the Warsaw Pact was dictated by the need to ensure the dependable security of the allied countries and their close interaction in international affairs.⁶

Meetings of central committee secretaries of the socialist countries' fraternal parties have been a form of multilateral political interaction for more than 10 years now. Nine such meetings were held in 1983 and 1984 alone at which there was an exchange of opinions on questions of the situation in the world arena and international relations, ideological and organizational-party work, economic cooperation, party building and work with the youth.

Bilateral relations also continue to play a big part in the practice of the socialist states' political interaction. The friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaties concluded for a new period, particularly the Soviet Union's treaties with Poland (8 April 1965), Bulgaria (12 May 1967), Hungary (7 September 1967), Czechoslovakia (6 May 1970), Romania (7 July 1970) and the GDR (7 October 1975), serve to strengthen them. They create a dependable legal basis for a constant deepening of bilateral relations in various spheres of social life and multiply the possibilities of joint struggle for the establishment in international life of the principles of peaceful coexistence, good-neighborliness and mutually profitable cooperation.

The most mass form of political relations are the relations along local party and state authority lines. Hundreds of thousands of persons from 120 republics, krais, oblasts and cities participate in these relations in the Soviet Union; their partners in the relations represent 189 administrative territorial units of the fraternal countries. The main content of the contacts along these lines is an exchange of experience of socialist building and party work. Soviet

communists endeavor to make active use of efficient methods of management, display an interest in an improvement in the political system and its democratization and familiarize themselves with the experience accumulated in these spheres by other countries of the community. "International experience," the above-mentioned meeting in Sofia observed, "has enriched considerably our ideas concerning the socialist world, its general regularities and the singularities of the methods and forms of socialist building corresponding to the conditions and traditions of individual countries."⁷

Thus a ramified mechanism of bilateral and multilateral political relations of the socialist countries has been formed and is operating successfully within the framework of the socialist community. The basis thereof is the community of socioeconomic foundations and goals, ideological unity and the comradely mutual assistance of countries helping one another in the creation of a new society. Interparty ties have become firmly established and are constantly being enriched with new content, foreign policy is being coordinated, economic integration is deepening and the exchange of cultural values has assumed extensive proportions. In other words, Lenin's behest concerning the close consolidation and all-around cooperation of peoples which have opted for the path of socialism is embodied in practice visibly.

The experience of these relations confirms convincingly and graphically that an essential condition of their development is the practical realization of such a most important behest of Lenin's as the most consistent democratism in the discussion, adoption and implementation of all joint decisions on the establishment and extension of fraternal inter-nation, interstate cooperation. V.I. Lenin fought most emphatically against any hegemonist pretensions, constantly castigated the least manifestations of national nihilism and resolutely opposed in 1922 the plan for the so-called autonomization of the previously oppressed outlying areas of the former tsarist empire, which underestimated the securing of their complete equality and self-sufficiency. He understood full well that international cooperation may develop only on a voluntary basis and that the unity of socialist nations is not imposed from above and that it cannot be "decreed," just as the "cancellation" of national prejudices and antipathies cannot be decreed. Calling for "the peoples to be drawn together and united not by the force of the ruble, not by the force of the cudgel and not by coercion but by the voluntary consent and solidarity of the working people against the exploiters," Lenin pointed out that overcoming inter-nation discord was possible "only after the victory of socialism and after the final establishment of an entirely democratic relationship between the nations."⁸

The entire complex of the fraternal states' relations has been transformed fundamentally in the time of the existence of the world socialist system. If it is considered that only four decades have elapsed since the time when there began the formation of the socialist community of countries between which in the past there had been wars, whose borders had been recarved and moved and whose population had often been raised in a nationalist spirit, the huge successes in the establishment of relations of friendship and internationalist cooperation between them becomes absolutely obvious.

With reference to the world socialist system and the community of socialist states the main proposition of our ideological adversaries has been the assertion concerning the inevitability--under the influence of the "ubiquitous growth" of nationalism--of a weakening of the unity of these states and the division of their community into "national communisms" opposed to one another.

Western theorists should understand that no "ubiquitous growth" of nationalism in the socialist community is occurring, although individual manifestations of nationalist sentiments and national exclusiveness still make themselves known, of course. The experience of the four postwar decades testifies that nationalism may parasitize on the progressive process of the improvement of independent economic complexes, the growth of national self-awareness and the development of the statehood and strengthening of the sovereignty of the socialist countries and speculate on legitimate feelings of national dignity and national pride. For this reason resolute struggle against any manifestations of nationalist sentiments, as, equally, great-power ambitions, in whatever subtle and disguised forms they are expressed, remains an urgent task of the domestic and foreign policy activity of the socialist community countries' communist and workers parties aimed at an intensification of these countries' all-around cooperation, which "will accelerate the growth of the economic potential and strengthen the defense capability of the Warsaw Pact countries and contribute to the increased well-being of the peoples and the development of culture and science."⁹

The common interests of the fraternal states in the successful solution of key problems of the development of the socialist community and the strengthening of its role and authority in the world arena is enhancing the significance of these states' joint work for the increasingly full realization in the international relations of the new type of the legitimate interests and requirements of each participant. "The strengthening of democratism in these relations and the establishment of socialist partnership," the all-union scientific-practical conference devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR said, "this, evidently, is the predominant trend which will show its worth increasingly persistently in the 1980's."¹⁰

It should be emphasized that, as distinct from the elements of partnership characteristic of other types of international relations, communists are speaking about socialist partnership, putting the stress on the first word of this concept and the attribute "socialist," which in the given context is a synonym for internationalist. The current period of the internationalist interaction of the socialist countries is characterized by an intensification of the role of the national-state interests of these countries, primarily the interests of the increased efficiency of the national economy, including foreign economic relations. A concept of long-term cooperation, accepted by all members of our community, which proceeds from a consideration of the dissimilar possibilities and the distinctiveness of national-state interests of individual countries and which best integrates them in itself corresponds to this situation. This is an essential condition inasmuch as the socialist countries differ from one another in terms of size of territory, natural resources, language, national customs and traditions, presocialist past,

level of productive forces and production relations, social structure and forms of political organization, that is, are objectively in a state of natural-historical inequality, so to speak.

Thus socialist partnership in general form may be characterized as a form of international relations based not only on comradely solidarity and mutual assistance but also on the actual equality of the interacting countries or, in other words, on equal rights and duties, which has to be secured within the framework of these countries' growing community, but given, under socialist conditions, continuing elements of their objective inequality.

The experience of the socialist countries' partnership interaction shows that its establishment as the dominating form of these countries' international, interstate relations has its difficulties. They are caused, in particular, by the fact that the accomplishment by each socialist country individually of the task of an increase in its public ownership (the interaction of the national-state forms of which constitutes the material basis of the new type of international relations) does not always agree with the accomplishment of similar tasks by other countries.¹¹ In the sphere of ideology this fact engenders concepts of internationalism in which national interests are formulated necessarily in a form geared to their international recognition, and attempts to essentially "nationalize" internationalism are observed. In other words, each new step along the path of a strengthening of democratism and an extension of socialist partnership in the practice of relations between socialist countries is connected with the formulation and solution of many special questions and with counteracting manifestations of national egotism on the one hand and great-power ambitions on the other, which by no means disappear at the waving of a magic wand.

In a correct understanding and the practical realization in the interstate cooperation of the fraternal countries of the principles of socialist partnership considerable significance is attached to a clear recognition of the fact that democratic principles are established and perfected in this sphere in different forms than in the intrastate sphere. It is well known that the reliable reference point of the development of the entire system of social relations under the conditions of the new system is democratic centralism. But the correctness of this assertion is confined to an intrasocial framework. In the sphere of the socialist countries' interstate relations, on the other hand, democratic centralism does not determine the nature and prospects of these relations.

Of course, without reliance on this principle ensuring the democratic functioning and development of interstate relations as a particular sphere of socialist social relations is not that simple since in the overwhelming majority of cases it is essential to seek the consent of all the participants in these relations on the essence of this question or the other of mutual cooperation and all international life. The role of preliminary comradely consultations is extraordinarily great and growing constantly in such cases. Considerable significance is attached here to questions of the culture of international communication, in particular, to the ability to come to terms with different, sometimes alternative, positions and an ability to show tolerance of those which do not coincide with one's own position.

The principle of democratic centralism as a regulator of intrasocial relations presupposes not only broad democratism in the phase of the elaboration and preparation of this decision or the other but also a certain hierarchy and system of seniority in the right to adopt these decisions and monitor their fulfillment. In the sphere of the socialist countries' interstate relations things are different to a large extent: these states, as principal participants in the given relations, are sovereign and equal to an identical extent, and there can be no hierarchy and no system of seniority among them in the right of the adoption of joint decisions and their fulfillment. For this reason, incidentally, attempts to characterize the essence of socialist internationalism in categories of seniority and to assert, for example, that the principle of respect for the sovereignty of the socialist countries is subordinate to another, higher principle of their mutual relations--the principle of unity--would seem dubious. To speak thus is not to see or to ignore the processes occurring in the world socialist system and international relations of the new type demanding a harmonious and not hierarchical combination of national and international aspects in the development of the socialist countries and, even more, in their interaction.

An appreciable shortcoming here, it would seem, consists of the still frequent attempts to "solve" problems of the correlation of the national and international in the world socialist system dogmatically, that is, by means of the advancement as arguments of individual quotations from the works of the classics of scientific communism, particularly Lenin's pronouncements (for example: "the part must conform to the whole, and not the reverse";¹² if "a small part is contrary to the general, it should be rejected";¹³ "the interests of socialism, the interests of world socialism are higher than national interests, higher than state interests"¹⁴). Such quoting substitutes for an analysis of the problem.

The actual historical paths of the formation of the system of the international interaction of the socialist nations and countries did not in all respects run just as the founders of our revolutionary theory anticipated. At the base level Lenin conceived of the arterial direction of these nations' and peoples' internationalist cooperation and rapprochement in the form of a single world cooperative where the economy would be managed in accordance with a common plan. "What is merely needed now," he said at the Third Workers' Cooperatives Congress on 9 December 1981, "is that there be a unanimous aspiration to enter this single world cooperative with open heart."¹⁵ Lenin pointed in the theses on the national and colonial questions for the Second Comintern Congress, which became part of its decisions virtually unchanged, to "the trend toward the creation of a single worldwide economy as a whole regulated in accordance with a common plan by the proletariat of all nations, which trend has been revealed perfectly manifestly under capitalism even and which will undoubtedly enjoy further development and final completion in full under socialism."¹⁶

At the superstructural level Lenin saw as the arterial direction of the internationalist cooperation and rapprochement of the socialist nations and countries their federal association. Opening the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 18 January 1918, he declared: "The Finnish workers and peasants, for example, had only to seize power for them to address us with an expression

of a sense of loyalty to the world proletarian revolution and with words of greeting in which can be seen their unshakable resolve to proceed together with us along the path of the International. Here is the basis of our federation, and I am profoundly convinced that various individual federations of free nations will group increasingly around revolutionary Russia. This federation will grow absolutely voluntarily, without lies and iron, and it will be indestructible."¹⁷ In the above-mentioned theses for the Second Comintern Congress Lenin recorded: "While recognizing the federation as a form transitional to complete unity it is essential to strive for an increasingly close federative union, bearing in mind, first, the impossibility of defending the existence of the soviet republics, which are surrounded by the militarily incomparably more powerful imperialist powers of the whole world, without the closest alliance of the soviet republics; second, the need for the close economic alliance of the soviet republics, without which restoration of the productive forces and securing the well-being of the working people are impracticable...."¹⁸

In the manifesto of the Second Comintern Congress these ideas of Lenin's were reflected in the following formula: "On the basis of the experience of Soviet Russia the peoples of Central Europe, the Balkan Southeast, Great Britain's possessions, all oppressed nations and tribes, Egyptians and Turks, Indians and Persians and Irish and Bulgarians are convinced that the amicable cooperation of all national parts of mankind is practicable only via the mediation of the federation of Soviet republics."¹⁹ These same ideas were also recorded in the Comintern Program confirmed by its sixth congress (summer 1928), which emphasized, inter alia, that "the newly formed proletarian republics are entering into a federative connection with those which already exist, while the network of these federative associations is growing, incorporating also the colonies liberated from the yoke of imperialism; while the federation of such republics is ultimately becoming a union of soviet socialist republics of the world."²⁰

Such in their basic outlines were Lenin's theoretical ideas concerning the arterial direction of the cooperation and rapprochement of the socialist nations and countries, and it is understandable that the seniority or hierarchical principle of the correlation of national and international factors is perfectly inscribed within the framework of this concept inasmuch as in the economic aspect it was after all a question of a single economy of the socialist nations and countries regulated in accordance with a single plan and, in the political aspect, of a federative association of these nations and countries also with its central control authorities, with the help of which interests of general significance and of paramount importance for all are realized.

However, this direction of inter-nation cooperation and rapprochement, which has justified itself on the basis of the experience of the creation and 60-year-plus development of the Soviet Union, has not as yet moved beyond the confines of the USSR. The international interaction of free nations has proceeded along the path of the formation of a community of independent socialist states--the world socialist system--the idea of whose development is absent in Lenin, although he was aware of the length of the existence under the conditions of the new system of fundamental national differences and for this reason emphatically defended the principle of the complete sovereignty of the Soviet

national republics as far as the right to leave their voluntary federative association. It was for this reason, incidentally, that the need arose in the postwar period for the creative application, taking account of these facts, of the propositions of the classics of Marxism-Leninism concerning inter-nation, international relations under socialism in the sphere of interstate relations. These conceptual propositions naturally needed the corresponding theoretical reinterpretation. After all, whereas in the elaboration of the theory of the national question the principle of respect for the sovereign rights of all nations and nationalities in the system of state or international relations had been pivotal, here it was not the nation (or nationality) as such which was paramount in the sphere of international relations in general and socialist relations in particular but the national and multinational state and its interests and sovereign rights.

V.I. Lenin believed that for socialist peoples national existence would be clothed in state form only for the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which would need the state only for a while. "We," he emphasized, "by no means differ with the anarchists on the question of the abolition of the state as a goal. We assert that to achieve this goal the temporary use of the guns, resources and methods of state power against the exploiters is necessary, as the temporary dictatorship of the oppressed class is necessary for the extirpation of classes. Marx chooses the sharpest and clearest formulation of the question against anarchists, casting off the yoke of the capitalists, of whether the workers should 'lay down their arms' or use them against the capitalists in order to break their resistance. While the systematic use of weapons by one class against another class, what is this if not a 'transitory form' of state?"²¹

Lenin went considerably deeper into and amplified his views on the content of socialist statehood and its forms in the post-October period, but he spoke repeatedly of the direct dependence of the interval of time throughout which national existence under socialism would be clothed in a "transitory" state form on the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In particular, the corresponding ideas of Lenin's became a part of the Comintern platform adopted by its first congress. "As," it observes, "the resistance of the bourgeoisie is broken, it is expropriated and it gradually becomes a working stratum of society, the dictatorship of the proletariat will disappear and the state will wither away and, together with it, society's division into classes."²² In practice socialist statehood has proven "more state" in the direct meaning of this word than could have been foreseen by the classics of scientific communism, which had characterized the socialist state as no longer "a state in the proper sense" and as a "quasistate," referring to its increasingly great rapprochement and merger with society.²³ Thus in the postwar years, in the period of formation of the world socialist system, the peoples of the socialist countries and their communist and workers parties were confronted by a whole number of new questions which neither the revolutionary movement nor Marxist-Leninist theory had encountered previously. These were questions about how to combine national singularities and the interests of independent and sovereign states connected with them with the international interests of their international community and how to coordinate, in particular, the requirements of the national economic development of individual socialist countries different from one another in terms of the level of development of the productive forces

and production relations and other macroeconomic parameters and by no means constituting a single economy. They were also questions of the general approach to the new type of international relations, including their essential singularities, regularities and development prospects for the historically foreseeable period, from the viewpoint of a realistic understanding of the nature of the unity of all the participants in these relations and its possible and necessary forms included. And it should be said plainly that it was by no means simultaneously and at once that the correct answers standing the test of time were found to such questions.

For example, at the initial stage of the formation of the system of socialist interstate relations many people sincerely believed that as key tasks of the revolutionary transformation of social relations in the fraternal countries were gradually accomplished, the significance of the differences between them in the ways and forms of the said transformations would gradually be reduced to nothing, while their socialist development would become increasingly uniform, as a consequence of which the sphere of the joint actions and unity of these countries would broaden, while the complexity of the problem of strengthening unity would constantly diminish. But life made its adjustments. As the CPSU Central Committee June (1983) Plenum observed, "the past two decades have enriched our ideas about the socialist world and shown graphically how diverse and complex it is. Between individual socialist countries there are big differences in the economy, culture and ways and methods of tackling tasks of socialist development. This is natural, even if it once seemed to us that it would be more uniform."²⁴

The increasingly full consideration in our internationalist policy of the sometimes very appreciable differences and contradictions which exist between the socialist countries connected with their dissimilar socioeconomic level, the distinctiveness of the conditions of socialist building and the different historical experience of national-state and cultural life is a command of the times. The need for this is dictated by the fact that the new society is developing and will in the foreseeable future continue to develop along the path of the contradictory interaction of the increasingly influential trends toward the internationalization of production and all social life on the one hand and the trends toward the strengthening of the sovereign socialist states and the all-around burgeoning of the nations and nationalities under socialism on the other.

Thus the current period and that foreseeable from today's positions will be characterized by the fact that the state form of the socialist countries' national (multinational) existence will evidently continue for a long time to come, at least, for the life of a number of generations of builders of socialism and communism. Whence it follows that the forms of cooperation of the socialist states which have today become firmly established as the predominant forms in these states' mutual relations and for which the rule is not the hierarchical but harmonious combination of national interests between themselves and common, international interests demand the constant attention of both Marxist social scientists and practical workers of our countries.

The CPSU's long-term foreign policy strategy is being constructed with regard for this prospect and is aimed not only at a further extension of cooperation, integration included, with the socialist community states but presupposes a strengthening of equal and mutually profitable friendly relations with all countries of the world socialist system without exception. Thus, touching on this problem, the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) Plenum pointed to the fact that "mutual good will, respect for one another's legitimate interests and common concern for the interests of socialism and peace should suggest correct solutions even where for various reasons the necessary trust and mutual understanding are lacking."²⁵

The broadening of the exchange of experience of party and state work and interaction in the sphere of international activity are inseparable from the process of the increasingly harmonious combination of national and international aspects in the development of the socialist countries and the relations between them and from the process of an intensification of internationalist policy. Extraordinarily important are the efforts of the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties for an improvement in the existing system of multilateral and bilateral fraternal cooperation and the gradual addition thereto of forms which would afford an opportunity for all the participants in this participation to constantly study a broad range of interparty and interstate questions and simultaneously determine the nature of this situation or the other requiring a prompt mutually acceptable decision and joint measures. The need for such stable and at the same time flexible forms of our countries' cooperation is increasing inasmuch as the dynamism of interstate relations is growing, their role in the life of the peoples is increasing and, consequently, the scale of the tasks which can and must be tackled on the paths of internationalist policy, as a result of the joint efforts of all countries of the world socialist system, is growing.

An interpretation of the correlation of national and international aspects in the development of this system of socialist international relations is sometimes encountered which essentially represents their counterpoise and, as a rule, an absolutization of the principles of the self-sufficiency and independence of the nations and states which have opted for the socialist path. In addition, the proposition is being advanced to the effect that the entire modern era is altogether the era of independence, that societal progress in general does not have as its nucleus social progress but is achieved primarily via the progress of each nation and state and that the degree of self-sufficiency is the main criterion of the progressive character of all countries.

Such assertions appear no more tenable than the proposition concerning the "subordination" of the national to the international. The conditions of the socialist states' internal development and the situation worldwide, which had become more complicated by the start of the 1980's, insistently demand the increasingly great unification of these states' efforts and the broadening of their internationalist interaction. This is the main condition which will determine the further progress of the new type of international, interstate relations. Without real steps along the path of a deepening of internationalist policy it will be very much more difficult to solve such most important problems for the current decade as an intensification of socialist economic

integration, coordination of the fraternal countries' national economic policy, an improvement in the structure of their cooperation in tackling urgent social and political tasks, including the contradictions and conflict situations which exist between them, optimization of the mechanism of the formulation of concerted decisions and coordination of foreign policy steps, deepening of the socialist states' interaction in the sphere of science and technology and the solution of questions connected with the requirements of the gradual rapprochement of their rational cultures, broadening of the exchange of information and the creation of increasingly favorable conditions for the international intercourse of the population of different countries within the framework of the socialist community.

World socialism has every opportunity to give a timely and fitting response to the "challenge of the present day"²⁶ and the demands advanced by life for an appreciable improvement in the entire system of social relations, including such a sphere thereof as international relations. There is no doubt that the socialist states are mobilizing not only internal sources of growth but also the potential of internationalist cooperation, thanks to which the further development of real socialism both as a social formation and as a world system will be secured.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 9 September 1984.
2. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 38, p 88.
3. See *ibid.*, vol 40, p 98.
4. A.S. Bakhov, "The Warsaw Pact (Legal Aspects)," Moscow, 1971, p 10.
5. Albania had not participated in the activity of the Warsaw Pact since 1962 and in September 1968 officially announced its withdrawal from it.
6. See PRAVDA, 27 April 1985.
7. *Ibid.*, 9 September 1984.
8. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 30, pp 51, 73-74.
9. "The Warsaw Pact. Documents and Material. 1955-1980," Moscow, 1980, pp 180-181.
10. "Socialist Internationalism in Action. From the Material of the All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference 'The Development of National Relations Under the Conditions of Mature Socialism. Experience and Problems of Patriotic and International Education' (Riga, 28-30 June 1982)," Moscow, 1982, p 11.

11. "If we take, for example, the economic aspect of national interests," an editorial of the journal *KOMMUNIST* observed, "stock has to be taken of the fact that each socialist state, as the sovereign owner of its resources, endeavors to obtain in the course of economic cooperation the maximum results. And the very structure of national economic interest is of a complex nature. An aspect connected with satisfaction of current, "momentary" requirements and an aspect aimed at satisfaction of long-term requirements may be distinguished therein. This could be a source of different approaches to certain problems affecting several problems. After all, the endeavor to satisfy requirements of the present day, as they say, frequently prompts the adoption of decisions different from those which are needed from the viewpoint of the long term" ("*Our Strength Lies in Unity*," *KOMMUNIST* No 15, 1983, p 7).
12. V.I. Lenin, "*Complete Works*," vol 15, p 362.
13. *Ibid.*, vol 30, p 39.
14. *Ibid.*, vol 36, pp 341-342.
15. *Ibid.*, vol 37, p 347.
16. *Ibid.*, vol 41, p 164.
17. *Ibid.*, vol 35, p 288.
18. *Ibid.*, vol 41, p 164. See also "*The Comintern in Documents. 1919-1932*," Moscow, 1933, p 127.
19. "*The Comintern in Documents*," p 151.
20. *Ibid.*, p 18.
21. V.I. Lenin, "*Complete Works*," vol 33, pp 60-61.
22. "*The Comintern in Documents*," p 63.
23. "Questions of the Influence of Real Socialism on the World Revolutionary Process (Material of an International Symposium)," Moscow, 1982, p 140. This had been discussed somewhat earlier at a symposium of scholars of the CEMA countries by the Hungarian philosopher Artur (Kush): "Sixty years ago V.I. Lenin wrote in the work "*State and Revolution*" that the state is an armed people and that the state would be built such that the armed people could select representatives and subordinate them to itself, with the opportunity of replacing or removing them at any time. The state which has arisen in the course of the revolution has for many decades departed for various historical reasons from this proposition. It is, it may be said, more state than foreseen by the classics of Marxism-Leninism" ("*Problems of the Development of the Political System of Socialism*" Material of an International Symposium in Two Parts," Moscow, 1978, part II, p 65).

24. "Material of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 14-15 June 1983," Moscow, 1983, pp 20-21.
25. Ibid., 22 November 1982," Moscow, 1982, p 19.
26. See "Top-Level CEMA Economic Conference, 12-14 June 1984. Documents and Material," Moscow, 1984, p 14.

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LEFTIST LEANINGS IN AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT DISCUSSED

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[Article by I.L. Andreyev: "Leftist Trends in the African Liberation Movement"]

[Text] How to explain the tenacity, strength and many-sidedness of the leftist syndrome in Africa? By the specifics of the thinking insisted on by the "father" of negritude, Leopold Senghor, former president of Senegal and present chairman of the African Socialist International?¹ By the excessive emotionalism of the Africans and the failure of the cast of mind to correspond to coarsely rational reality, about which much is written by the supporters of the notorious African ethno-philosophy?² Or by the actual contradictions of social existence naturally reproduced at different stages of the struggle of the broad people's masses against the horrors of capitalist exploitation and oppression and against inequality, poverty, ignorance and social injustice?

In scientific literature in recent years there has been a marked increase in attention to an investigation of various aspects of leftist ultrarevolutionariness not only in the developed capitalist countries (E. Genri, K. Myalo, A. Galkin, A. Batalov and others) but also in various regions of the developing world. However, it is as yet a question mainly of Asian states (A. Levkovskiy, R. Kosolapov, L. Demin and others). The corresponding trends of political life and ideological processes on the African continent have been studied to a lesser extent. In addition, the few publications directly on this subject (of Ye. Smirnov and others) take insufficient account as yet, seemingly, of the methodological aspect of this problem. Yet such approaches thereto were outlined in the summary works of A. Gromyko, G. Starushenko, V. Krylov, L. Yablochkov, I. Sledzevskiy and other Africanists. The trend toward an examination of the events occurring on the continent in the context of the regularities of the world revolutionary process and from the angle of class analysis elaborated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism is strengthening in the African political thought (even left-radical) of our day.

Combination of the national liberation movement with the ideology of scientific socialism, introduction to the consciousness of the masses of Marxist-Leninist theory and the creation of political vanguard organizations which rely thereon in their activity are closely connected with overcoming the trends not only of "prudent" reformism³ but also the romantically dangerous illusions which (by analogy with V.I. Lenin's universally known book) may be called the infantile disorder of "leftism" in the African liberation movement.

In this article the author, relying mainly on material on Tropical Africa, poses the task of ascertaining the dialectical interconnection of the social, ideological and political aspects of leftist spontaneity in the national liberation movement.

The Socio-Class Base of Leftism in Africa

From the methodological viewpoint it would appear important to emphasize the thought that the social roots of leftism are in principle dual. But this should not mask delineations of the basic and secondary and main and subsidiary sources thereof which lie in the depths of the socioeconomic structure of a bourgeois or precapitalist society which has found itself pulled into the orbit of the capitalist economic system.

The lumpenproletarian asocial soil of leftist extremism was revealed in the well-known work "The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon," in which Marx distinctly counterposed the lumpenproletariat to the working proletariat.⁴ Lumpen leftism found its ideologists and heroes in such people as Frantz Fanon, who were sincere, selfless and who gave themselves absolutely wholly to the cause of the revolution. Their reactionary "shadow" were political adventurers of the Nechayev type and also Pol Pot in Cambodia and Idi Amin in Uganda.

Another form of manifestation of leftism is the petty bourgeois, who in a state of desperation approaches lumpenism in terms of his political behavior.

At one time in West Europe it was precisely the petty bourgeoisie which was the social (nutrient) medium of leftism. In the Africa of our day things are appreciably different (by virtue of the specific features of the socioeconomic structure and the trends of its historical evolution). A distinctive regularity is traced particularly clearly under the conditions of the capitalist orientation of development. As a consequence of the intensification of social-property differentiation, the raging of market spontaneity and the inconsistent policy of pro-bourgeois regimes there is together with the reinforcement (thanks to purposeful policy) of the stratum of the petty bourgeois a strengthening of the opposite trend--their diminishing significance and thereby de-bourgeoisification essentially, which engenders an absolute and relative growth of the pauper-lumpen masses.⁵

Accordingly, the petty bourgeois type of leftism appears practically throughout the national liberation zone as subsidiary, secondary and subordinate. However, the tradition ofgnoseological stereotypes which evolved upon an interpretation of the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary situations of the European history of past eras still causes the transfer to qualitatively new objects and to fundamentally new conditions not only of the world-outlook and methodological principles formulated on the basis of classic-reader historical material but also the specific-particular (regional-temporal included) details, features and aspects which are closely connected and which have coalesced with them, as it were, of socioeconomic structures and situations which are not of a universal nature and which for this reason prevent an adequate reflection of what is occurring and a mental projection of the future.⁶

This phenomenon has a specific gnoseological aspect. Thus A.N. Moseyko notes as a reason for the said phenomenon the assimilation of the theoretical principles of Marxism outpacing the possibilities of their practical realization. "In other words," she writes, "progressive leaders of Africa have adopted Marxist propositions before the conditions for their combination with the class struggle in specific countries have taken shape. In this connection Marxism is frequently regarded as a 'ready-made' ideology which must be implemented exactly and not as a methodology for the cognition of African reality."

The latter observation applies in full to the present state of the elaboration of the problem of definition of the socio-class nature of leftism in the emergent countries. After all, in situations of a confrontation of the forces of revolution and counterrevolution regarded as classic-reader situations the main source of leftism was the petty bourgeoisie. This prompts a significant proportion of orientalist scholars adhering to Marxist-Leninist positions of class analysis and endeavoring to oppose bourgeois ideologists' attempts to overemphasize the specifics of the emergent countries to traditionally superimpose the given gnoseological outline on inadequate (and in this sense alien to it) specific-political material. As mentioned above, the petty bourgeoisie is particularly often proclaimed the source of any leftism, reactionary primarily. Such a viewpoint would seem metaphysically one-sided, leading off in the search for the deep-lying causes of leftist adventurism into the channel not of its main but subsidiary, secondary branch.

The formulation of the question concerning the actual and potential, political and psychological declassé condition as the common basis of the leftism of both the said social groups would seem legitimate. True, the declassé condition of the pauper-lumpen strata appears in the manifest, naked, unconcealed aspect of asociality, outsiderism, poverty, displacement beyond normal life and descent to its "bottom". In the petty bourgeois milieu, on the other hand, the declassé condition is manifested not so much as a result as a frightening prospect, as a turbulently emotional rejection of bourgeois ideals and hopes, as psychological "compensation" by negative means of collapsed positive goals and as an extremist perception of the world and the borrowing of the asocial behavioral stereotypes characteristic of the lumpen environment.

"Maddened" by the horrors of capitalism or neocolonialism, the petty bourgeois breaks away in panic desperation from the private enterprise system and from the vicious closed circle of debilitating "rat races" for eternally elusive profit. He behaves in a certain sense as an antibourgeois, as one breaking with "his" bourgeois class, as a bourgeois-declassé subject. The fervor of petty bourgeois-romantic-illusory and at the same time "negativist"--revolutionary character representing an odd synthesis of individualism, existentialism and also the absence of one's own political orientation and perspective was strikingly expressed by Régis Debray. He gave the book he wrote in a Bolivian jail the eloquent title "Testament of a Petty Bourgeois Between Two Fires and Four Walls".⁸

It is precisely the absence or imprecision of one's own class positions in the sphere of the basis (ownership of the means of production primarily) and the institutional superstructure (organs of power) which materialistically explains the phenomenon of the absence in both groups of leftists of any integral

conceptual ideology. They fill in the existing "voids" in their world outlook quite randomly with what "comes to hand" and is somehow consonant with their moods in a given period, in other words, a fragmentary mosaic of the most heterogeneous ideas "of others" reflecting and expressing the interests of both progressive and reactionary socio-class groups.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the philistine petty bourgeoisie and the mentally crushed part of the lumpen which is affiliated to it in this respect and which has abandoned any struggle accept renunciation of class confrontation comparatively easily and rapidly. The bulk of the pauper-lumpen strata, on the other hand, driven to despair and spontaneous, impulsive anger, and also groups of the petty bourgeoisie which in their radicalism have reached the point of anarchism are inclined to worship and absolutize in Marxism (about which they know, as already mentioned, usually by hearsay) precisely the class struggle. And, what is more, primarily struggle, in order, to, taking risks (according to the principle: better a horrible end than endless horror), to change their situation, and only subsequently (this "subsequently" often remains on the periphery of the leftist consciousness) class struggle.

It may be added to this that generally polar-opposite factors prompt the outwardly similar, analogous forms of social and political behavior (activity or inactivity) of the lumpen and the petty bourgeois. Their economic determination is different also. The petty bourgeois who is being ruined or has in a crisis situation found himself faced with the threat of ruin differs appreciably from the lumpen who is already ruined and who usually has no chance of emerging from this condition. The petty bourgeois has something to lose, the lumpen nothing. For this reason the socio-psychological leitmotiv of the first is the fear of being ruined and losing everything in an instant. Envy of those who have everything (or, at least, something) is more characteristics of the second. Besides, the petty bourgeois wants and knows how to use, preserve and multiply the means of livelihood, property and money at his disposal and has a certain economic gumption. The lumpen, on the other hand, is incapable of using even property passing to him by inheritance and grants which he has been allocated other than by way of direct and immediate consumption.

As distinct from the European pauper, the African pauper is characterized by ingenuousness and a considerable "localness" of perception of the social environment. At the customarily visible images level the orientation of consciousness and behavior is targeted to a greater extent toward the process of vital activity (in the spirit of the traditional mythological world outlook) than its result and tasks and goals formulated in advance. The lumpen consciousness is also characterized by the predominance in behavior motivation of socio-psychological features (moods, enthusiasms and so forth) over generalized-mature moral-ideological outlines.

Approaches to the important question of the difference between the African leftist and the European leftist can be traced here. Both social types are the product and victim of capitalism: in Europe mainly its "own," intrinsic, local capitalism, in Tropical Africa primarily, "others'," external, overseas capitalism. In Europe the leftist elements are city dwellers, in the main, the Africans predominantly newcomers from the countryside. The individualism of the European leftists is a distorted reflection in the declassé environment of

competition as the leitmotiv of relations within the bourgeois class concentrated around private ownership and penetrating other strata of capitalist society. On the other hand, the crowd as a surrogate for a collective approach among the African lumpen is a reflexive transfer to the new social conditions of the traditional ethnic-tribal stereotypes of social connections and relations. European leftists have not counted, as a rule, in the confrontation of revolution and counterrevolution on the continent. The African "left" has a very broad social and, even more, psychological base.

The gnoseological paradigm of ultraleftists (as far as seditious-putschist) voluntarism is, as a rule, primitive-spontaneous positivism with its captious opposition of the individual to the general, the specific to the abstract, fact to regularity, sensual experience to rational theory, element to "system" and outsider to "society" and also sophistry as a method of the arbitrary manipulation of fragments of topical political slogans of the era torn from the actual class-historical context and frequently transformed into its--sometimes tragically ludicrous--opposite.

As distinct from existentialism, which is oriented "inside" the individual and the arbitrarily subjective "combination" of opposites inherent in eclecticism, in positivism (particularly with reference to politics) the emphasis is put on the external aspect of processes, trends and phenomena, while sophistry (sophistic manipulations of concepts) is characterized to a greater extent by a "separation" than combination of opposites.

In positivism, as a current of philosophical thought, the semblance, to a greater extent than the essence, of social existence is the subject of reflection. In West Europe the main reason for the perception of reality in the spirit of the cybernetic "black box" principles was the rapidly increased need to draw a veil over of the exploiter essence of capitalism. In present-day African countries things are different. Natural-primary forms of social agnosticism objectively inherent in the spiritual relics of the primitive-commune system predominate here. The specific proximity of positivism to the empirical-sensual, metaphorical-figurative "picture" cognition and construction of reality which is a typical feature of the traditional-primitive consciousness of the peasant masses of the emergent countries of Africa can be traced from this angle.

Sophistry as a kind of quasi-wisdom (pseudophilosophy) is characterized by a situation where words no longer perform the role of abstract-logical concepts. They appear more in the form of emotionally actualized signs of reality. Juggling with the latter has caused the "necessary" conclusion for the consciousness in need of comfort to be obtained. Weakness, K. Marx said, has always saved itself by a belief in miracles. This applies to the greatest extent to the conditions of the sharp growth of the role of the extra-individual mainsprings of social action hidden from the consciousness of the ordinary member of society. In this sense the recherche-intricate virtuosity of classical sophistry on the gnoseological mechanism of the reflection and projection of actual processes is consonant with the free combination and free "reading" of symbols characteristic of the primitive myth and the mythological consciousness which survives it.

Another important gnoseological aspect of this problem is the similarity of fanaticism, with its apartness from the inner mechanism of action producing the

expected (and, even more, unexpected) result on the one hand, and the method of reasoning inherent in primitive magic on the other. This is correctly pointed out by the Hungarian philosopher Eva (Anchel). We may read in her book the following: "Fanaticism is essentially a kind of ideological-sensual variant of magic and illusory supplement to reality by way of the exaggeration and absolutization of actual forces, primarily inner subjective forces."⁹

It has to be recalled in this connection that it was precisely fanaticism and a belief in miracles as the psychological leitmotiv of lumpen "leaders" and "theorists" (together with their predilection for conspiratorial tactics and attributes) which K. Marx noted in the book "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon". Describing the Paris of the eve of the 1848 revolution, Marx accurately recorded this as a very noticeable trend of the said period.¹⁰

Revealing the features of similarity of fanaticism and magic as forms of world outlook helps us understand why positivism and sophistry, as products of the long development of philosophical thought, are so easily apprehended (in their own way, it is true!) by broad circles of the population of the emergent countries (particularly the pauper-lumpen strata), being superimposed on its customary psychological structures of folklore-mythological consciousness. A materialist answer to Senghor's idealization of magic as the fatal, in his assertion of long standing, leitmotiv of intrasocietal relations among Africans may be found here. "If the traditional Negro African society is analyzed in depth," he believes, "we will undoubtedly see that the fabric of social relations which exists among Negro Africans is based on magic relations."¹¹ Dialectical materialism enables us to see in the statement of this fact not only the metaphorical nature of exposition and politically pointed exaggeration of the specifics of the social consciousness of the African masses but also the registering of a socio-psychological phenomenon naturally characteristic of a certain phase of the world-historical process and capable of surviving the latter as a relic thereof. Such an approach helps us understand and explain the historically new variant of pauper-lumpen leftism which has been strikingly manifested for the first time in Afro-Asian countries of our day and which is based genetically on the unnaturally rapid decomposition of the family-tribal, communal and so forth ties which for centuries determined relations in traditional African society. In other words, the possibility of correlating the fanaticism inherent in developed forms of anarcho-extremism with social behavior outwardly reminiscent thereof based on the relics of the primitive-magical world outlook appears.

Returning to the problem of the ascertainment of the genesis and paths of development of leftism in the socio-psychological plane, it should be mentioned that, like any other metaphysical system, it contains the enzyme of the transformation of its "methodological" prerequisites into its own opposite. A paradox of the phenomenon of leftism is the fact that the positivism forming its gnoseological foundation becomes, when addressing practical activity, negativism, while the subjectivism connected with sophistry switches to a subjectless belief in miracles. Seemingly maximally "grounded" practicalness develops into utopianism. Spontaneous social protest grows into political adventurism, egotistic individualism into corporative "herdism". Absolutization of miraculous means capable of leading to the utopian goal results--being refracted via moods of impatience typical of leftists--in a "bare" goal without adequate paths thereto. The other extreme is the use of too "strong" means capable of destroying the goal itself or

the jesuitical principle of the justification of any means and the conversion thereby of a goal, "free" of adequate paths thereto into an abstract-idealistic end in itself.

Concepts of Revolutionary Radicalism: F. Fanon, K. Nkrumah, A. Cabral

In Africa the concept of revolutionary radicalism was strikingly expressed in the work of the heroic fighter for the independence of Algeria and native of the Caribbean island of Martinique--Frantz Fanon (1925-1961). According to researchers into his life and work, Fanon was not directly familiar with the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Nonetheless, the endeavor to find the African analogue of the European proletariat as the driving force of revolution in peasant countries indicates that he had some notion of his own (albeit indirect) refracted via the experience of an African revolutionary concerning Marxism and harbored no antipathy toward it. True, as distinct from the ideologists of reformism and revisionism, Fanon did not swear hypocritical esteem for Marx and did not "spare" him for the fact that the latter had not known Africa and for this reason had allegedly in evaluating the latter blindly followed Hegel, who had left the African peoples (apart from Egypt) outside of the history of mankind proper.¹² But this characterizes Fanon as a person who sincerely sought the truth and was not disposed to speculating with the names of authorities.

Not long before his death, terminally ill and fully aware of this, Fanon in 10 weeks wrote a book which became his political testament whose title was the words of the proletarian hymn of Eugene Pottier, the "International"--"Wretched of the Earth".

This book is an impassioned indictment of colonialism, which oppresses mankind not only economically but also emotionally. A psychiatrist-physician by education, Fanon "ran" virtually all the problems which he touched on through the prism of the psychological factor of the national liberation movement, analyzing moods (despair, in particular) as the impetus to the action of the masses being pulled into the revolution.

This book is an impassioned call to a struggle in which the oppressed is forced to borrow weapons used by the oppressor, answering colonial, reactionary violence with revolutionary, "antiviolent" violence interpreted as a necessary form of mass popular action and as a spontaneous growth of the peasant uprising--the jacquerie--into an insurgent war--guerrilla.

This book is an anxious alarm signal and sagacious warning of the danger of the formation in the former colonies of local capitalism, primarily a specific variety thereof--the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which aspired, reducing political independence to a change of flags and anthems, to occupy the warm seats of the former colonial officials and businessmen. Incidentally, it was precisely the part of the local intelligentsia and pro-bourgeois elements, imitating the "colonizers", so-called évolués, which subsequently joined the ranks of the national bourgeoisie which F. Fanon had caustically mocked in the book "Black Skin, White Masks" (Paris, 1952).

The book "Wretched of the Earth" is a hymn of the revolutionary character of the peasantry, which could have performed in Algeria, Fanon believed, the role which

Marxism had assigned the working class in Europe. According to Fanon, it was precisely the destitute peasants on the verge of poverty and also the paupers and lumpen, who truly had "nothing to lose," who were in principle capable of performing the function of the revolutionary transformation of the colonial society into a society of social justice, equality and the harmonious development of production and culture.

Of the Marxist concept of the economic substantiation of the historical mission of the proletariat as the gravedigger of the bourgeois society of exploitation and oppression Fanon was struck by just one, and far from the main, outward indication, what is more, expressed in the "proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains" metaphor. At the same time, however, such a factor as the objective place and historical significance of the proletariat in the system of social production and an analysis of contemporary trends of the development of the world and regional productive forces were essentially completely ignored by F. Fanon.

This is how Fanon imagined the scenario of a spontaneous rebellion grown into an anticolonial victorious revolution: "The uprising, begun in rural areas, will filter into the cities via the part of the peasant population which is huddled in the outskirts of the cities and which has not yet found a cushy number in the colonial system. Men whom growing overpopulation in the countryside and the colonialists' expropriation of land have forced to leave their family allotments are constantly to be found around various cities. They are hoping that one fine day they will be allowed to settle in them. It is in these human masses, in these inhabitants of urban slums, in the lumpenproletariat that the uprising will find its urban vanguard. For the lumpenproletariat, this horde of hungry people uprooted from their tribe and clan, constitutes a most spontaneous and radical revolutionary force of the colony." Being "pushed from behind," these elements, "all these hopeless rejects of humanity, all who are on the verge of suicide or insanity, will find themselves and will once again advance and march proudly in the ranks of the grand procession of an awoken nation."¹³

Life has shown the impracticability of such outlines and ideas. As the British scholar of Fanon's work, the Marxist Jack Woddis, correctly stated, "in no African country following its achievement of independence has there been a revolution according to the scenario spelled out by Fanon."¹⁴

After all, it was not only in Algeria but also in the former Portuguese colonies, where political independence was won to a considerable extent as a result of prolonged armed guerrilla struggle, that the pauper-lumpen elements were by no means its heroes and, even less, leaders and moving spirits. On the contrary, an inclination on the part of the African lumpen to be led by reaction and counterrevolution was manifested distinctly. Thus even in the period of anti-colonial struggle in Guinea-Bissau "those who might have been called the lumpen-proletariat, had a real proletariat existed," helped the Portuguese police and were its informers.¹⁵ In Mozambique the declassé elements, particularly the professional criminals, were used by the secret police as spies who endeavored to undermine FRELIMO from within and compromise it by way of carefully prepared provocations. The nutrient medium of these antisocial groups was the presence of "vast masses of the unemployed and not fully employed population, with whose help big capital maintained the lowest wage level and the highest level of

exploitation."¹⁶ While attesting the participation of the lumpenproletariat of the cities in the anticolonial struggle, the Angolan leaders at the same time call attention fully to the incapacity of the lumpen for independent revolutionary actions and also the increasingly tangible harm he causes the cause of revolution by his extremism, lack of organization and misunderstanding and distortion of the party's slogans.¹⁷

As far as Fanon's proposition concerning desperation as the inner psychological leitmotiv (which, incidentally, had an echo and enjoyed certain development in the "black consciousness" and "black pride" concepts of Stokely Carmichael, Charles Hamilton and other American negro leaders)¹⁸ is concerned, this is a special subject. "...If desperation follows its inner logic, it dies away of its own accord, and if its initial phase still contains protest and represents opposition, it shortly switches to a state of conciliation," Eva (Anchel) writes, going on to explain that "a sense of anxiety, protest and anger still exists in desperation, but the desperate person does not find a method of applying them to anything and converting them into action. It is for this reason that desperation dies away."¹⁹

Fanon was not familiar with the Marxist-Leninist methodology of class analysis of capitalism and colonialism. He did not perceive the revolutionary possibilities of the working class taking shape in Africa, the less so in that this process is even now very far from completion. In addition, Fanon manifestly underestimated the very contradictory political potential of the pauper-lumpen strata and viewed the African peasantry as an undifferentiated whole, although processes of its property stratification, particularly in Algeria, where Fanon lived, fought and died, had gone quite far even then.

Fanon died in 1961, which was symbolically named Africa Year in honor of the declaration of independence by 17 countries of the continent. But the end of the 1960's were marked by the publication of a number of books by Kwame Nkrumah devoted to propaganda of armed (including guerrilla) struggle in Africa.

The former British colony of the Gold Coast, to which was returned the name of the local original civilization--Ghana--like other countries (Guinea and Mali, which had cast off the French yoke), the first in Africa to opt for a noncapitalist development path, gained political independence peacefully. As acknowledged by a number of African ideologists of that time, this engendered among part of the young people, who were thirsting for romance and exploits, barricades and guerrilla warfare, a specific inferiority complex. At the same time the outward tractability of the metropolises, which endeavored to leave "quietly" in order to preserve their economic positions in the former colonies, stood in the way at this stage of the political-ideological and, partially, socioeconomic differentiation of the population, which fostered illusions of the unity of interests of all the main strata and social groups. The collapse of these utopias under the pressure of objective processes was the underlying motive for both the ouster of K. Nkrumah and the abrupt change in the political views of the latter. The phenomenon of the transition of such a major political figure from populist-reformist views to the positions of "socialist" ultrarevolutionary character undoubtedly merits special examination.

Having become president of the just-proclaimed Republic of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) was the first in Africa to appeal to his people to be guided by the principles of scientific socialism and for the creation of a vanguard workers party. And although the social concept of Nkrumahism and its nucleus--the philosophy of consciousness--was in many of its aspects quite far from Marxism-Leninism, as a whole Nkrumah's world outlook evolved in the direction of a rapprochement with scientific socialism. This process was difficult and complex for it reflected the acute contradictions objectively inherent in the initial stage of a socialist orientation and the broad palette of heterogeneous social forces--these on which it relied and those whom it was forced to oppose. It was not surprising that Nkrumah's activity and views sometimes curiously combined "the democratism of the leader of the masses of the period of the liberation movement and power methods borrowed from the medieval traditions of the African tribal system, an attraction toward socialism and crude nationalist prejudice, an aspiration to honestly serve the interests of the people and inordinate personal ambition and reformist Labor Party-type illusions and leftist radicalism."²⁰

A certain similarity with the views of Mahatma Gandhi can be traced in Nkrumah's early works. Evidently, the achievement of political independence with the help of peaceful means of struggle created the psychological prerequisites for exaggeration of the role of popular traditions in progressive development. Nkrumah believed, for example, that they would open to Africa the possibility of a transition to socialism by the evolutionary path. A confused identification of revolution with civil war and of socialism with egalitarian relics of the peasant commune was sensed in his views of this period. Nkrumah saw the main danger to the progressive development of young states in the intrigues of imperialism. He endeavored to counterpose thereto the unity of all (mainly small) African countries. Evidently extending the principles of communal collectivism to the interstate relations of the former colonies which were taking shape, Nkrumah warmly defended the idea of the unification of Africa, a partial embodiment of which was the creation of the OAU.

The abrupt change in Nkrumah's views coincided in the time with the reactionary coup in Ghana (1966). A person who previously had persistently claimed that there were no classes in Africa and that for this reason its way toward socialism lay via growing unity, solidarity and mutual consciousness of the different groups of the population by way of smooth, calm, peaceful evolution was writing books whose titles eloquently speak for themselves: "Handbook of Revolutionary War" (1969), and "Class Struggle in Africa" (1970). In them Nkrumah called for immediate socialist revolution throughout Africa, proclaiming war the sole means of accomplishing it and absolutizing precisely the trends which he had previously denied.

Many of the questions raised by Fanon and left unattended by K. Nkrumah were given fundamentally different answers by the outstanding theorist of the African liberation movement, leader of the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonizers in Guinea-Bissau and founder of the PAIGC Party--Amílcar Cabral (1924-1973). An important place in Cabral's theoretical legacy is occupied by an analysis from the standpoints of a dialectical-materialist understanding of history of the socioeconomic structure of the colonial countries and the problem of the alignment of class forces at different stages of the national liberation struggle. Cabral did not accept Fanon's idea concerning the peasantry as the

main, leading revolutionary force in the national liberation zone. He did not share Fanon's skepticism and, even less, his avowed nihilism in respect of the "embryonic" African proletariat. Contrary to Fanon, Cabral considered illegitimate the idealization of the social homogeneity of the African peasantry, among which class antagonisms inevitably mature, while he regarded the unfolding of a national working class as a process creating an increasingly firm foundation of revolutionary struggle in the national liberation zone. Cabral formulated the proposition concerning the revolutionary possibilities of the local "pseudobourgeoisie" being confined to anticolonial tasks and was the first of the national liberation movement leaders to conclude that under the conditions of the absence of an evolved working class its historical function of leadership of the revolutionary process could be assumed temporarily by the patriotic intelligentsia acting in this case the part of "ideal proletariat". Cabral was convinced that these specific weaknesses of the national liberation movement had to be and could be compensated by the party's intensive ideological, political and organizational activity in the masses and a flexible combination of different forms of revolutionary struggle. In particular, new principles of the organization of social relations were established and energetic political-educational work was initiated in the areas of Guinea-Bissau which had been liberated by the patriots even in Cabral's lifetime.

A. Cabral's thought concerning the possibility in principle of the temporary performance of the political role of an as yet unevolved national working class by its "ideal" temporary "deputy" struggling in the sphere of the superstructure in defense of the interests of the latter was consonant with the discussion which was unfolding precisely at that time in Marxist scientific literature. The reason for it were the increased doubts as to the revolutionary potential of the national bourgeoisie which had taken shape in Africa. Thus discussing the question of the possibility of the unfolding in a number of former colonies of states of national democracy, A.I. Sobolev specially emphasized in 1963 that "in certain countries the leading force could be the intelligentsia, including the revolutionary officer body."²¹ J. Woddis wrote at that time about the patriotic intelligentsia as the social stratum and about revolutionary democracy as the political community capable by virtue of the objective logic of the struggle for their countries' genuine independence of arriving at the ideas of scientific socialism and also an alliance with the international working class and the national working class which was springing up.²²

True, at one time A. Cabral had not drawn a precise class line between the intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie. In addition, speaking in 1964 in the Fanon Center in Milan, he put himself and F. Castro among representatives of the petty bourgeoisie,²³ although it is perfectly obvious that in this case, whatever the case elsewhere, he should have spoken about his and F. Castro's membership of the "ideal proletariat" and the most selfless, farsighted and energetic part of the patriotic intelligentsia of the colonial and dependent countries.

A. Cabral's position differed fundamentally from that of Fanon. According to the outlines of many left-radical ideologists, including F. Fanon and K. Nkrumah, the nonproletarian working masses (petty proprietors, petty bourgeois and others) and the nonworking pauper-lumpen strata of the population of the emergent countries appear in the political arena in place of the national working class which is taking shape and not together with it, not under its leadership, as follows from

K. Marx's teaching. Somewhere here there come together extremes: right reformism with its declaration of all those in work as workers and the leftist "transfer" of the functions and tasks of the working class in the revolution to the peasantry which is being ruined and the pauper-lumpen masses. However, this analogy with European history is superficial and wrong. Sight must not be lost, A. Cabral emphasized, of the methodologically important fact that the political role of a national working class under the conditions of the modern age may be assumed by an "ideal proletariat," that is, the best representatives of the patriotic intelligentsia who have taken positions of scientific socialism. But this ideological, essentially class function of an as yet unevolved national working class could not and cannot in principle be assumed (even temporarily) by the materially and spiritually declassé pauper-lumpen strata of the emergent countries, however destitute they may be and however great the extent of their desperation.

The Reactionary Assertiveness of the Ultraleft and Ways of Neutralizing It

The political practice of African countries of a socialist orientation confirms particularly convincingly the thoughts expressed above concerning the natural conditionality of the phenomenon of political leftism primarily by the pressure of the pauper-lumpen and, secondarily, part of the petty bourgeois strata. Historical experience testifies to the objectively reactionary behavior of leftists precisely at turning points in the development of the revolutionary process in Africa. Earlier they impeded the armed struggle for political independence, although they frequently participated therein. Later they repeatedly jeopardized the policy of progressive transformations and a socialist orientation, disorienting the masses with "revolutionary hysterics," which is particularly dangerous under the conditions of an absence of profound traditions of political activity and the practically total illiteracy of the population.

The reactionary forces (external and internal) made intensive use of the leftist chaos for the purpose of discrediting and frustrating African states' socialist orientation. Thus in Mali a mood of impatience and political adventurism fostered mainly by the pauper-lumpen environment penetrated the leadership of the country in the mid-1960's and seriously deformed the strategy of progressive transformations. The stage of an abrupt tilt "to the left" of the noncapitalist path of the development of the Republic of Mali which had been chosen at the start of the 1960's began with the manifestly premature announcement in the country of a "period of socialist revolution". In the economic plane a manifestation of this leftist racing ahead was the hasty nationalization of all retail trade. In the political sphere it developed into a routine congress of the Sudanese Union-RDA Party not being convened and its Politburo being abolished. The system of executive authority which had taken shape was replaced by "defense of the revolution committees". In particular, the functions of the democratically elected National Assembly were assumed by the National Committee for Defense of the Revolution, which was appointed from "above".²⁴ As a counterweight to the army, whose command staff did not share the new trends, "people's militia" subunits and "vigilance brigades" were created. They, as L.M. Sadovskaya observed, "were formed predominantly from the illiterate unemployed youth, among whom ultrarevolutionary ideas of the Maoist model were in extensive circulation."²⁵ All this ended, as is known, in the removal from office in 1968 of M. Keita, who had tilted significantly toward leftism.

In the People's Republic of Congo leftist groupings made themselves known in the 1960's. Shortly after the constituent congress of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) reaction organized in Brazzaville demonstrations by the unemployed. Right at that time ETUMBA, the central organ of the PCT, carried an editorial which revealed the psychological position of the lumpen in respect of the policy outlined by the party congress of the plan-oriented creation of the prerequisites for the subsequent transition to the building of socialism. "For some time," ETUMBA wrote at that time, "we have been hearing: enough talk, let us devote ourselves to the economy. It is wished by this slogan to incite the masses of the unemployed lumpenproletariat against the revolution. Truly, the lumpen-proletarians want to find work not tomorrow but today. They are destitute, and this being taken advantage of, it is being whispered to them: these people are working and eating and forgetting about you. The purpose of such speeches is clear. It is wished by them to lead the revolution to economism and not to economic policy. It is wished by them to reduce the revolution to the disorderly, unplanned creation of new enterprises in order to provide people only with work."²⁶

Reflecting its pressure on authority, the lumpen chaos was taken as the basis in the organization of the leftist putsch in the capital in February 1972 by A. Diawara, former member of the PCT Central Committee Politburo and a Trotskyite in his views, who 14 months after this was fighting at the head of a detachment of his supporters against government troops.

The sole practicable path of an economically substantiated and humane solution of the problem of the lumpen and the removal thereby of the social base of leftism is that of fundamental social transformations, primarily the creation of a balanced and profitable system of the national economy, including a national industry, in the course of accomplishment of the tasks of a socialist orientation. The Third PCT Congress (1984) dealt within the framework of discussion of the question of an increase in the party's leading role and the strengthening of its ties to the masses with the acceleration of the formation of the Congolese working class, consolidation for the state of the commanding heights in the economy, the strengthening therein of planning principles, the work of the public sector and the achievement of profitability by all its enterprises. After all, the creation of 55,000 new jobs, mainly in industry and the agrarian complexes, had been planned for the first 5-year plan (1982-1986). A new detachment of the Congolese working class is being created on the basis of the development of oil production, the level of which is approaching 8 million tons a year.²⁷

For the purpose of strengthening the party's role in Congolese society and enhancing the principle of collegiality in it the third congress increased the number of PCT Central Committee members from 60 to 75 (24 persons were elected to the Central Committee for the first time). The Politburo now has 13 members, and not 10, as prior to the third congress.

Leftist trends flared up in the political arena in Angola literally from the very outset of the organized anticolonial struggle. It is significant that the comprehension of the causes of the failure in 1961 of the putschist tactics of the armed overthrow of the Portuguese yoke and the seizure of power in Angola by

progressive forces (the February uprising in Luanda against the Salazar fascist dictatorship) led to the expulsion from the MPLA at the first national conference in December 1962 of Viriate da Cruz, member of the MPLA leadership, and his leftist grouping, which had endeavored "to isolate the MPLA from the socialist community countries and the international communist movement" from positions of the essentially racist platform of distrust of all mulattoes and Portuguese and also "demanded fundamental concessions to tribalist organizations pretending to the role of vanguard of the national liberation struggle."²⁸

The preparations for the creation of a vanguard party upholding the ideological platform of scientific socialism pushed the leftist opposition which had taken shape in the Angolan leadership following proclamation of the People's Republic of Angola onto the path of charging A. Neto and his supporters with a retreat from Marxism-Leninism, insufficient revolutionary spirit and a petty bourgeois character. The factionists demanded the immediate creation not of a vanguard party of the working people with the prospect of its development into a higher form of political organization but a party of the working class, which had not yet taken shape not only as a "class for itself" but even as a "class in itself". Nonetheless, the opposition insisted on the consistent pursuit in policy precisely of a "proletarian line," referring essentially not so much to the working proletariat as the 'umpenproletariat. This was confirmed by subsequent events. Not having obtained support, the leftist group headed by N. Alves, former member of the MPLA Central Committee Politburo, attempted on 27 May 1977 by way of an armed revolt to replace the leadership and adventuristically spur on the course of the Angolan revolution. The conspirators were crushed the same day.

The participation in the leftist putsch by a part of the capital's population is difficult to explain solely by its social composition--a substantial proportion of pauper-lumpen elements. It is important also to take into consideration the underdeveloped state of political consciousness at that time both among the working masses and their even recently guerrilla vanguard. It was precisely in Angola at party document level that the specific gnoseological phenomenon of a belief in Marxism-Leninism preceding an understanding of its elementary theoretical principles was recorded at that time. Thus the theses issued on the eve of the first congress, which proclaimed (on the basis of the MPLA movement) in December 1977 the creation of the MPLA-Labor Party, stated that "thousands of MPLA members do not have the opportunity to master dialectical and historical materialism. Their adherence to scientific socialism is of an empirical nature and is based on the trust which they show the MPLA."²⁹ This circumstance afforded an opportunity by way of simple sophistic manipulations for substituting for class principles of an evaluation of the political situation a racial, ethnic, tribal approach. Evidently taking this factor into consideration, the leftist clique shifted the accent in its demands and slogans from the political-ideological to the racial-ethnic factor, flavoring them with ultrarevolutionary phraseology. In particular, the leading nucleus of the MPLA, which had rallied around A. Neto, the leader of the Angolan revolution, was artificially counterposed as "mulatto" (and, by virtue of this, petty bourgeois), as a whole, to the "African" MPLA. Having analyzed the activity of the splitters, the MPLA Central Committee Politburo noted that they were "using leftist terminology," guided by "ill-concealed racism" and advocating tribalism, regionalism and racism.³⁰

The imprint of leftism and its inherent political adventurism mark the development of the revolutionary process in other African states also. A certain consonance in the slogan-demands and the nature of the political behavior of the leftists can be traced, furthermore.

In Ethiopia, one of Africa's poorest countries, the pressure of powerful lumpen-proletarian spontaneity on progressive circles of the military was manifested very distinctly. Just 3 days following the ouster of Emperor Haile Selassie reactionary leftist elements from the notorious Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), who had infiltrated the leadership of the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU), passed at their special congress a provocative extremist resolution demanding the removal from power of the military and the immediate creation of a "provisional popular government," which would have meant under those conditions essentially a breakdown of the revolution which had just begun.

When, for the first time in Ethiopia's history, the Supreme Military-Administrative Council (SMAC) called on the working class to celebrate May Day, anarchists from the EPRP unleashed terror and in September 1975 called on the working class for a general strike, once again advancing the provocative demand for the immediate transfer of state power to some "provisional popular government". Somewhat later the EPRP, playing on the immaturity of the country's young and small working class, began to back up the slogan of the removal of the military from state power with the need for its transfer to a party of the working class. When, however, the question arose as to where all at once such a party was to come from in a backward agrarian country, the EPRP leaders hypocritically pointed to the confederation of trade unions, whose leadership they had at that time temporarily captured. Thus an attempt was made to substitute for a proletarian party "economist" trade unions. At the same time, however, the EPRP was sabotaging with might and main the worker law 64/73, which it had earlier turbulently demanded and which "provided for the socialist organization of the workers and their full participation in the revolution for the defense of their rights and the growth of production".³¹ It is significant that Ethiopian Marxist-Leninists themselves called the EPRP a "Trotskyite organization".³²

Later, having been defeated in the elections for the leadership of sectorial trade unions, the EPRP finally and openly switched to the camp of counter-revolution, having become its main force essentially. Chairmen of the All-Ethiopian Trade Union Teodoros Bekele and Temeslin Medeba and Treasurer Kebede Gebremikael were casualties of the white terror of hired assassins. Employing extremist-bandit methods and cooperating with the CIA, members of the EPRP undertook the organization of attempts on the lives of SMAC leaders, robbed banks, set fire to public buildings, conducted economic sabotage and disseminated counterrevolutionary pamphlets.³³ As G.L. Galperin rightly observed, the EPRP found the most favorable soil among the immature student youth and urban lumpen. Leftist elements attempted to expropriate petty private property and put out anarchist slogans about equalization.³⁴

In other bastion of leftism was the clamorously self-styled Marxist-Leninist All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) organization, which was largely similar to the EPRP, particularly in that it also was attempting to capture the leadership

in the All-Ethiopian Organization of Trade Unions, which had come to replace the CETU. Having joined the General Front of Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Organizations, MELSON attempted to usurp therein the key positions. At the most critical time of the Somali aggression its leaders were propagandizing as an ultimatum to the government the "Democratic Rights Immediately!" slogan,³⁵ which was reactionary for that time, and then in the full sense of the word ran to the camp of the counterrevolutionary forces. According to A.S. Shin, "some so-called Marxist-Leninists held left-extremist positions, demanding the departure from power of the military and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat"; others, on the other hand, adhered to right-opportunist positions, demanding the creation of a "mass decentralized party".³⁶

MESKEREM, the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist journal which we have already quoted, emphasized the connection between internal leftist trends and their intensive incitement from outside. Whence the conclusion was drawn concerning the need for the pseudo-Marxist line of the "new left" to be resolutely combated: the theoretical distortion of Marxism by the leftist mass media was influencing considerably the "delay in development and the crystallization of serious socialist thought in Ethiopia". For this reason "true Ethiopian Marxists must not only combat the distortion of Marxism, which emanates both from Anglo-American pseudo-Marxist journals and other revisionist circles, but also introduce the genuine theory of scientific socialism to the Ethiopian workers movement".³⁷

Delivering the report of the COPWE (Commission for Organizing the Ethiopian Workers Party) Central Committee at the constituent congress of the Ethiopian Workers Party (WPE), Mengistu Haile Mariam emphasized specially that the Ethiopian revolution, which is an inalienable component of the world revolutionary process, was occurring in a society which previously lacked a wealth of political traditions and in an atmosphere of increasing threat on the part of imperialism. Under these conditions the form of the ouster of the monarchy and the seizure of power was a people's uprising carried out by servicemen, the majority of whom coming from the working strata of the population.³⁸ For 3 months a 300,000-strong people's militia was trained for defense of the revolution at the critical time of the Somali aggression.³⁹ The party is organizing its work with the population via mass organizations--the All-Ethiopian Trade Union, All-Ethiopian Peasants Association, Association of Youth of Revolutionary Ethiopia, Association of Women of Revolutionary Ethiopia, urban residents associations, worker control committees and various professional organizations. The social energy and constructive initiative of all groups of the country's working population are thereby acquiring an opportunity to realize in the process of creation the principles of socialism under the leadership of a vanguard party which adheres to positions of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

A trend toward an increase in the collegial nature of leadership, which, apart from all else, increases the guarantees of the prevention in the future of the relapses into leftism which occurred in the not-too-distant past, can be traced in the process of party building. The growth of the number of members of the WPE Central Committee to 136 compared with the 91 in the COPWE Central Committee should contribute to a strengthening of this trend. A Politburo of 11 members and 6 candidates, including 2 and 5 civilians respectively, has been created. A Central Committee Secretariat of 9 persons and Central Auditing and Central Control commissions (28 and 21 persons) have been formed.

Anarchist trends of political life rooted primarily in the pauper-lumpen environment are also strong on Madagascar. The tremendous degree of pauperization and lumpenization (85 percent of the island's inhabitants) and the spontaneous attraction of the peasants, who for decades had been oppressed and suppressed by the central authorities, toward customary, visible forms of just community living based on direct communication have also been reflected in the program document of the country's revolutionary forces. The Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution contains, *inter alia*, the proposition that "our socialism is a socialism of the poor," and the traditional peasant community--the *fokonolona*--and the local institutions of peasant democracy derived therefrom figure as the main cell of economic-organizing, cultural-mass and ideological-educational work.

The 10th congress of the Congress Party for Malagasy Independence (AKFM), which is a part of the government, held in November 1983, made a profoundly scientific analysis of the reasons for the deterioration in the socioeconomic and socio-psychological situation in the country. In particular, the congress observed that the incapacity of the central authority for ensuring reliable security in the countryside and putting an end to instances of intercommunal hostility, mistakes in the methods of managing enterprises of the public sector, the underload of even the few industrial enterprises, the growth of unemployment, economic difficulties of the working population against a background of the enrichment of speculators, government officials and other extortioners, attempts to discredit the course of a socialist orientation and spread antisocialist ideas in the society--all this was favorable soil for the tenacity of leftist sentiments, which affected even the foundation of the country's political life--the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution (NFDR).

Of the seven parties incorporated therein at the present time, at least two have been seriously infected by leftist trends. One is the MFM-MFT ("Power to the Ordinary People--the Defenders of the Revolution!"). Its nucleus consists of the members of three organizations with very eloquent names: General Committee of Demonstrators, Militant Student Youth and Association of the Unemployed.⁴¹ This party demands abolition of the government and the prefectures, elimination of the civil service and the transfer of power to the poor, who would exercise it via people's assemblies spontaneously created in each village. Such goals are undoubtedly anarchist, and the "class" struggle against other parties participating in the NFDR, for which this party's leadership essentially called at one time, is threatening to undermine national unity and the course of progressive revolutionary-democratic transformations which have been implemented in the country under the slogan of the Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution, which was approved by an overwhelming number of votes at a nationwide referendum in 1975.

The other left-extremist party, which is also part of the NFDR--MONIMA (National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar)--parasitizing on the peasantry's elemental attraction toward the restoration of traditional forms of life, calls itself the party of peasant solidarity and resistance to the central authority, that is, also operates with an essentially anarchist platform. It is not surprising, therefore, that following the defeat of its leader, Jaona, at the presidential election at the end of 1982 MONIMA functionaries organized in Antananarivo illegal demonstrations accompanied by street disturbances, pogroms and arson, bandit attacks and even the seizure of the capital's radio, over which

was read out an appeal to the nation for a general strike and the demand for new elections for the head of state. The nucleus of this party's election campaign was the nationalist slogan "Madagascar for the Malagasy!"

As a result, in the estimation of AKFM General Secretary (Zh. Rabeskhala), national unity "was considerably shaken by the election actions of individual parties of the NFDR. Particularly by the Socialist Organization MONIMA Party's nomination of its own presidential candidate with a program which had, to put it mildly, little in common with the goals of the Charter of the Socialist Revolution."⁴² In this connection the 10th AKFM Congress proposed henceforward that any party engaging in actions incompatible with the front's goals be expelled from the NFDR.

At the same time the impression should not be created that leftism is an inevitable trend of the development of the revolutionary process merely in the most backward agrarian countries where there is practically no industry and the overwhelming proportion of the population lives below the "poverty line" or somewhere near it.

In the Republic of Zimbabwe--economically the most developed of the "frontline" states which is pursuing a firm policy of the cooperation of the representatives of the black and white races--some figures who had succumbed to leftist influence proposed the accelerated implementation of the principles of the socialist organization of society and production without any preliminary preparation of the economic, political and ideological prerequisites essential for this. Rejecting such an extremist-hasty approach to social transformations, R. Mugabe emphasized: "Although we are opposed to capitalism, we have to come to terms with the realities of life and the capitalist system which we have inherited. Until we have implemented the necessary changes, we must recognize the private sector as a factor of economic development. It is for this reason that private enterprises will remain an element of Zimbabwe's economy for some time yet. There is as yet not much that is socialist in our reality. We must use our political power to acquire economic power."⁴³ The program of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF), which was adopted by its second congress (August 1984), sets the task of the building of a socialist state in Zimbabwe. It emphasizes that it must rely on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and be based on universal suffrage and leadership on the part of a vanguard of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia. The reorganization of the national economy, such that it ensure the victory of socialism over capitalism is proclaimed the goal of the new state.⁴⁴

In a word, in African countries of a socialist orientation the danger of the pauper-lumpen strata and the radical part of the petty bourgeoisie psychologically associated with them slipping from the ideological and political control of the revolutionary forces is relatively great. To a certain extent this applies to African countries of a capitalist orientation also, where the scale of lumpenization is growing and the opportunities of the ruling regimes for using the lumpen as a counterrevolutionary counterweight to the assertiveness of the progressive forces are relatively great.

This problem was reflected in the summary document of history's first meeting of a number of African communist and workers, which took place in the summer of

1978. It said, in particular: "On the agenda in the majority of African countries today is not socialist but national-democratic revolution. All progressive forces must defend it against imperialism and reaction. At the same time, however, it is essential to resolutely oppose the ultraleftist outpacing of events, the 'infantile disorder' of the leaping of historically necessary stages and a disregard for priority democratic tasks, whose accomplishment constitutes the essence of the present-day African revolution and the natural transitional stage en route to socialist revolution."⁴⁵

It was difficult right away to evaluate to the proper extent the scale, nature and specifics of the manifestation of the leftist syndrome in Africa's political life, the more so in that the danger thereof 15-20 years ago even was in no appreciable way perceptible. At the same time, time has shown that the use of European ideological cliches prevents an adequate understanding of the objective trends of the African liberation movement. Methodological approaches and methods of analysis dialectically combining universal-general regularities of the behavior of different social strata (groups) and their historical-specific place, significance and spectrum of political "roles" in the specific socio-class structure of contemporary African countries were needed for this.

It should be noted that Marxist-Leninists' critical-constructive attitude toward the views of leftist ideologists by no means contains an appeal for political compromise with imperialism, neocolonialism, local reaction and racism. It is sufficient to refer to the long armed struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa, which is being conducted jointly, within the framework of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) united military organization, the ANC and the South African Communist Party. Incidentally, such now ruling parties as the MPLA-Labor Party, the PRELIMO Party, the Algerian National Liberation Front and ZANU-PF grew, as is known, out of partisan-insurgent-type fighting movements.

In countries of a socialist orientation defense of the revolution and its gains against local reaction and the intrigues of international imperialism is a most important form of the activity of the vanguard ruling parties relying on Marxist-Leninist ideology. In socialist Ethiopia, which has survived Somali aggression and is struggling against separatist-nationalist movements inspired by imperialism, general conscription, a system of military registration and enlistment offices and a territorial people's militia have been introduced for the more effective defense of revolutionary gains.

In a word, Marxist-Leninists are by no means opposed to the use under the appropriate specific-historical and political conditions of arms for the purpose of ousting exploiters and oppressors, in a struggle for national independence and social justice and, even less, for the defense of revolutionary gains. But they are against the anarchist-extremist absolutization of armed violence as allegedly the sole effective, universal, swift means of revolutionary struggle rendering all others unnecessary.

FOOTNOTES

1. See L.S. Senghor, "Pour la relecture africaine de Marx et d'Engels," Abidjan, 1976.
2. For a critique of these propositions see P.-J. Hountonji, "Sur la 'Philosophie africaine'," Paris, 1977.
3. See I.L. Andreyev, "Afrosocialism--Variety of Reformism" in "Problems of the World Revolutionary Process," 4th inst., Moscow, 1984.
4. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 8, p 203: "The French bourgeoisie opposed the domination of the working proletariat--it gave power to the lumpenproletariat."
5. See I. Andreyev, "Africa: Socio-Class Changes" in KOMMUNIST No 18, 1982, pp 98-101; *ibid.*, "The Petty Bourgeois and Pauper-Lumpen Strata in the Liberation Movement of African Countries" in VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 3, 1983, pp 94-106.
6. For the methodological aspect of this problem see also V.V. Krylev "The Capitalistically Oriented Form of Social Development of the Emergent Countries (Methodology of Marxist Investigation)" in RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNY MIR (RK 1 SM) No 2, 1983; I.K. Pantin, "'Russian Topics' in K. Marx's Work: History and the Present Day" in VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 5, 1983; and other works.
7. A. Moseyko, "Marxist Trends in African Philosophical Thought" in AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 6, 1983, p 3.
8. R. Debray, "Journal d'un petit bourgeois entre deux feux et quatre murs," Paris, 1976.
9. E. (Anchel), "Myths of a Shaken Consciousness," Moscow, 1979, p 166.
10. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 8, pp 115-117.
11. See PRESENCE AFRICAINE Nos 24-25, 1959, vol 11, p 267.
12. See Hegel, "Philosophy of History," "Works," vol VIII, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, pp 87-94.
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SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF OIL-EXPORTING PERSIAN GULF

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[Article by A.A. Maksimov: "Singularities of the Socioeconomic Development of the Oil-Exporting Countries of the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] In recent years the process of the social and economic development of the so-called surplus-capital countries, to which the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf and Libya pertain, has attracted the close attention of Soviet and foreign scholars. The formal grounds for putting Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar and Libya in a separate group is their capacity for the mass export of capital. Whereas in 1973 the overseas assets of Saudi Arabia amounted to \$4.2 billion, of Kuwait \$3.7 billion and the UAE \$500 million, by 1981 they had increased to \$163.4 billion, \$80.7 billion and \$40.7 billion respectively; in Qatar these assets constituted approximately \$14 billion by the start of 1984.¹ The attention to the problems of the development of the said countries is not fortuitous and is explained by the following factors. The specific nature of the modernization of backward socioeconomic structures given extraordinarily favorable financial conditions is of interest. The latter circumstance is reason for a number of Western economists to assert that "the Near and Middle East countries will simply repeat in the shortest possible time the path of capitalism in the West and will in the not-too-distant future associate and merge with it as an integral, albeit peripheral, part thereof."²

Attention should also be paid to the fact that Soviet and foreign studies more often than not examine the range of problems connected with the penetration and spread of capitalist relations in the group of surplus-capital countries and pay attention to a considerably lesser extent to the specific features of the development of these relations, particularly the limited nature of the forms of development of capitalism and the social limitedness of the process of the accumulation of capital.

These countries also perform the role of a kind of buffer of the world oil market: in the event of a cardinal change in demand, the balance of production and consumption is restored mainly thanks to them. By virtue of this, an evaluation of the singularities and prospects of the socioeconomic development of the countries in question is of importance for forecasting their oil policy and the general situation on the world oil market.

In the 1970's these countries managed to achieve a relatively high rate of economic development. In the period 1973-1979 the growth rate of their gross domestic product in comparable prices constituted 7.5 percent compared with the 5.1 percent for all the remaining developing countries.³ Changes occurred in the 1970's in the sectorial structure of their gross domestic product, and the rapid growth of a number of indicators characterizing the development of the economy, education and health care was observed. Thus in the period 1970-1982 in Saudi Arabia capital investments in machinery, equipment and construction grew 46-fold, power generation increased 27-fold, water desalination 30-fold and cement production more than 10-fold.⁴

However, it is necessary to approach an evaluation of the general indicators of economic development in the oil-producing and, particularly, in the oil-exporting countries with care and to distinguish between real growth and "expansion" born of the expenditure of nonrenewable mineral resources. The "rapid" economic growth was secured mainly either by an increase in appropriate oil revenues or their redistribution. An analysis of national accounts shows that the high gross domestic product growth rate, as, equally, the diversification of the sectorial structure of the economy in the 1970's, was achieved mainly thanks to an increase in oil production, the real growth of the price of oil and a considerable increase in the volume of construction, incomplete primarily. Extractive industry, construction and the services sector in all the surplus-capital countries without exception accounted for approximately 75-80 percent of the increase in the gross domestic product in the 1970's.⁵

The reproduction proportions in the surplus-capital oil-exporting countries were balanced in the 1970's thanks to imports of all the necessary investment and consumer commodities and direct and indirect official subsidies. I. Bashmakov rightly notes that "oil is to a considerable extent replacing subdivisions I and II in the economy of this group of oil-exporting countries, and liquid fuel exports, given the internal production disproportions, cater for the ultimate proportions of social consumption, making it possible to import all the necessary commodities. For this reason the question of the correlation of the growth rates of the supply of products of subdivisions I and II is decided not in the production sphere here but in the foreign trade sphere."⁶

In the 1970's the level of oil-export revenues necessary for the state to realize the national reproduction process increased constantly. This is explained by a number of factors. A mechanism of direct and indirect official subsidizing of the national reproduction process was created in this period. Under the conditions of the inadequate development of the transport, production and financial infrastructure, the manpower shortage and the need to import from abroad practically all investment and consumer commodities the construction of practically any enterprise or facility of the infrastructure in this region costs twice as much as in the developed capitalist countries. As a result the state assumes a considerable proportion of the costs, awarding contracts on particularly favorable terms and granting preferential credit and subsidizing the bulk of current costs, that is, the prices of the power, water and raw material and fuel which are used. The state frequently resorts to direct subsidizing of the prices of the manufactured products, particularly if they are intended for export.

The absence of full-fledged statistics makes the determination of the overall amounts of the state subsidizing of the reproduction process in the surplus-capital countries difficult. However, even fragmentary data provide an idea of the huge and growing dimensions of this phenomenon. Thus, for example, in Saudi Arabia the price of electric power for industrial consumers constitutes 0.05 rials per kilowatt-hour given costs of 0.2-0.5 rials. State subsidies to local power companies nonetheless make it possible to regularly pay the stockholders mandatory 15-percent dividends. The official purchase price of wheat is several times higher than the world price level, while the price of fuel for industrial consumers is four-five times lower than the world price level.⁷ In Saudi Arabia official credit institutions in the period from 1975 through 1979 granted subsidies and preferential credit for the development of agriculture, industry and construction to the tune of 60 billion rials and in the period 1980-1985 to the tune of approximately 50 billion rials (estimated in 1979-1980 prices).⁸

As a result of the population's assimilation of the Western model of consumption the state has been forced to maintain a considerably higher, artificially raised, living standard than previously which does not correspond to the growth of national income. The selection of foodstuffs consumed by the local population has grown and expanded, mainly thanks to products which are nontraditional for these countries. The population's purchases of automobiles, home electrical equipment, furniture and other durables are growing rapidly. This demand both for foodstuffs and industrial commodities is being met thanks to imports to a considerable extent. Some 11.9 billion rials were spent in the period 1975-1982 in Saudi Arabia on direct price subsidies for basic food products imported from abroad alone. Of total preferential official credit, 27 percent was channeled into the construction of 220,000 apartment houses in more than 1,000 cities and villages.⁹ The price subsidies for electric power in the period 1975-1982 constituted 6.5 billion rials. In a number of cases the subsidizing of consumer spending is leading to an inordinate expansion of consumption. Thus Riyadh, with a population of 1.2 million, consumes more electric power than London with 6.5 million inhabitants, while the demand for electric power in Saudi Arabia is increasing by approximately 20 percent annually.¹⁰

In the 1970's the surplus-capital countries tied themselves to the realization of large-scale, frequently ambitious, national development programs. The completion of the construction of large-scale oil refineries and petrochemical complexes and major enterprises in other sectors of industry is constantly demanding a new and considerable influx of capital investments.

The income side of the budget in these countries came to depend on oil to an even greater extent than before. Under the conditions of "oil prosperity" the governments of the surplus-capital countries actually lost the tax base of their budgets. The proportion of tax proceeds in Kuwait's budget declined from 36 to 4 percent in the period 1974-1981 and from 11 to 2 percent in 1977-1982 in Saudi Arabia,¹¹ and in 1979 taxes were abolished altogether in the UAE.

And, finally, in the 1970's the surplus-capital oil-exporting countries found themselves pulled into the arms race and were forced to maintain military spending at a high level. Thus in Saudi Arabia arms spending in 1982-1984 constituted roughly one-third of the expenditure side of the budget.¹²

The accelerated economic growth of the 1970's did not in practice lead to serious structural changes in these countries' economy. Their economy represents not to a lesser but greater extent than before an economy of the distribution and consumption of the oil revenues created in the world capitalist economy and income from the capital invested on the world credit markets. The appropriation of oil revenues here is leading essentially to increased dependence on the world capitalist market inasmuch as on the one hand the expansion of the dimension of the consumer economy is demanding a constant increase in financial proceeds, but, on the other, the surplus-capital oil exporters lack the opportunity to control the amount of the oil revenues.

Nonetheless, these countries' dependence on oil exports would be even more significant were it not for the growth of receipts from overseas assets. In Saudi Arabia the income from foreign assets grew from \$6.4 billion in 1978 to \$12.5 billion in 1980; in Qatar it amounts to \$1-1.5 billion annually; in Kuwait, according to some estimates, it exceeded the income from oil exports in 1982.¹³

The social processes occurring in the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf are also distinguished by considerable distinctiveness. L. Friedman and P. (Andrukovich) note pronounced changes in the sphere of wage labor, in the sectorial structure of employment and in the scale and pace of urbanization and conclude that in terms of these indicators they have reached the middle level of development of capitalism.¹⁴

Working with the most general indicators, there are considerable grounds for such conclusions. Thus the proportion of wage workers constitutes from 55 percent in Saudi Arabia to 90 percent in Kuwait and Qatar, the proportion of the urban population from 52 percent in Libya to 88 percent in Kuwait and the proportion of those employed in agriculture from 33 percent in Saudi Arabia to 2 percent in Kuwait.¹⁵ These figures would seem to indicate the rapid development of capitalism in the surplus-capital oil-exporting countries and that the expanded reproduction of the capitalists and wage workers has become the main direction of the social changes in society. However, the particular conditions of the development of capitalism in the countries in question--the capacity for assimilating oil revenues in considerable amounts and the endeavor of the ruling feudal-monarchical upper stratum to preserve, modifying merely, the former social structure of society--have led to the expansion of the sphere of the application of wage labor having its specific singularities. The wage labor market in the surplus-capital countries is formed both from the local population and foreign manpower, and the conditions of the existence of both categories of those employed in the labor market differ from one another considerably.

The overwhelming proportion of the local population working for wages is employed mainly in the civil service or administrative machinery and in the army and the police. Many positions in the civil service are of a fictitious nature here: the state is moving consciously to expand its machinery in order to afford broad strata of the local population a chance to participate in distribution of the oil revenues. Thus, for example, in 1975 even in Kuwait 70 percent of all those employed among the local population were in the service of the state, whereas 2.5 percent were employed in manufacturing industry and 2 percent in construction.¹⁶ In other words, the attitude toward hiring is determined not by the mechanism of the capitalist labor market but the logic of the revenues themselves: the

purpose of the representative of the local population is not the sale of his commodity--manpower for its subsequent consumption--but to have a job, making it possible to participate in income distribution. The extent of participation in the distribution of the oil revenues here frequently depends to a considerable extent on extra-economic factors: tribal membership, family ties and proximity to state power. As a number of Western specialists puts it, a "bureaucratic-tribal jobs market" exists in these countries.

In the historical process of the decomposition of the production mode preceding the capitalist mode, K. Marx writes, "the masses of live labor forces, first, found themselves cast out onto the labor market, masses which were free in a dual sense--free from the old relations of clientele or relations of serf dependence and feudal obedience--and, second, free of any personal property and any objective material form of existence, free of any ownership: the sole source of existence of these masses of people remained either sale of their manpower or begging, vagrancy and robbery."¹⁸ In the surplus-capital oil-exporting countries we encounter an extremely contradictory form of the release of manpower from the means of production: first, these masses of labor forces pushed out of the precapitalist sectors of social production are by no means freed entirely from family-tribal and feudal dependence; second, there appears for these masses of labor forces deprived of the former work conditions proper a new source of existence alternative to the sale of manpower--participation in the distribution of the oil revenues on the basis of extra-economic factors--family-tribal allegiance.

At the same time, however, there is also a hereditary national proletariat, which has been freed from some forms of extra-economic dependence. It was conceived back in the 1940's-1950's in the oil industry of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In the 1960's-1970's this sector was joined by a significant number of foreign workers, nonetheless, the national proletariat has not disappeared entirely, and it was by its efforts that the first and sole trade union association in this group of countries--the Kuwait Workers Federation--was created even.

The level of wages of the local workers is considerably higher than the level of pay of foreigners, although the gap in the oil sector is less than in other sectors. In Kuwait the average wage of the foreign worker constituted 38 dinars in 1967 and that of the Kuwait worker 72 dinars, in 1974 some 50 and 200 dinars respectively. At the same time, however, in extractive industry the average wage constituted 77 and 79 dinars in 1967 and 133 and 207 dinars respectively in 1974.¹⁹ Prior to the Shi'a disturbances of the end of the 1970's a certain exception to this had been Saudi Arabia, where the gap in the wage level of the foreign and Saudi worker was relatively slight. But Saudi Arabia's example cannot be considered typical of the group of countries in question since the local proletariat, which is employed here in the oil sector, consists overwhelmingly of Shi'ites, that is, people belonging to the community which lives in the most unfavorable conditions and enjoys to the least extent the social benefits and results of the redistribution of the oil revenues.

The considerable discrepancy in the price of the manpower of the local and foreign worker is holding back the attraction of the local population to the productive sectors of the economy. Employers deliberately do not hire local

inhabitants inasmuch as labor laws extend to the latter in accordance with which they have to be guaranteed a minimum wage, a mosque has to be built and so forth.²⁰

On the other hand, the substantial amounts of income from various forms of state subsidy (for example, broad access to preferential loans, for consumer spending included, free education and medical services and subsidized food, power and other prices) are converting the income from the labor activity of the representative of the local population into a simple additional source of income. The status of salaried employee is becoming an additional characteristic of the status of the individual and his position in society. This field of the activity of the state assumes odious forms at times.

As a result the local manpower shortage is often artificial to a large extent and is at least being intensified by incomplete use of the manpower available here.

In Kuwait in 1980 the level of employment of males 15 and over constituted 64 percent among Kuwaitis and 92.5 percent among foreigners and among women 9.4 and 29.1 percent respectively.²¹ The local manpower shortage under the conditions of the realization of large-scale national development programs led to the dependence on imports of foreign workers not only not diminishing in the 1970's but constantly increasing right up to 1983-1984, after which it stabilized as a result of a curtailment of construction. In Saudi Arabia and Libya foreigners constitute approximately half of those in work, almost 80 percent in Kuwait and over 80 percent in the UAE and Qatar. The proportion of local inhabitants in the total number of those in work is least in such sectors as manufacturing industry and construction: in Saudi Arabia in 1975 some 19 and 15 percent and in Kuwait in 1980 some 7 and 1 percent respectively.²²

The capitalist labor market in the surplus-capital countries undoubtedly exists and is expanding, but in practice amounts basically to a foreign manpower market. The appearance thereon of foreign workers is conditioned by their prior obtaining of labor contracts. Only the Yemenis may immigrate and circulate freely without a prior contract on the labor markets of Saudi Arabia. Another exception is Dubai, a UAE principality, which adheres to the principle of the free movement of manpower--without contracts and any official authorization. Basically, however, the enterprises are forced to take on workers either upon the mediation of hiring agents or by employing their own channels. A South Korean contractor-firm brings in South Korean workers, a Pakistani Pakistanis and so forth.

A semilegal manpower trade has flourished in the soil of mass immigration. For example, in Kuwait the government accords its citizens the right to recruit foreign manpower abroad. Anyone may obtain permits to import up to several hundred workers. These permits become the subject of speculation. The permit holder sells them to the local hiring agent, and he forwards them to his agent operating in the Asian countries. These transactions produce a sizable income inasmuch as on the one hand the contractor pays \$250 per recruited worker, on the other, the agent receives from those wishing to leave for work in the emirates for a visa and travel up to \$2,000.²³

The foreign workers who have concluded temporary contracts live in work camps, have practically no contact with the local population and lack political and

civil rights. The immigrant workers' living and work conditions are extremely hard. They are installed on the outskirts of the cities, frequently directly in the desert, in ghettos consisting of temporary structures made out of corrugated iron which are overpopulated and which lack elementary conveniences. Foreigners do not have the right to take part in strikes or join trade unions. The employer who has taken on the immigrants keeps their passports and, if necessary, can deport them from the country in 24 hours. There are frequent instances of employers' violating the contracts.

The price of foreign manpower in the surplus-capital countries is determined not on the local labor markets but by the conditions of manpower reproduction in the countries whence the immigrants have come. This explains the significance of national origin upon determination of the amount of the wage. Special publications in the surplus-capital countries periodically publish wage tables depending on the nationality of the immigrants and their qualifications. The wage may change here, given equal qualifications, by a factor of 2-3 depending on nationality. From time to time workers of one nationality are replaced by those of another who appeared on the manpower market later and who are cheaper. Egyptians replaced Yemenis, Filipinos are competing with Koreans, Indian engineers are gradually taking the place of Lebanese and the representatives of Arab nationalities are being replaced increasingly by inhabitants of Asian countries. Thus, for example, in 1980 Indians and Pakistanis constituted more than 50 percent of the foreign workers who arrived in Kuwait. The proportion of Arab foreign workers declined to 38.3 percent compared with 63.7 percent in 1977. The government intends reducing it to 20 percent.²⁴ This is ultimately leading to the stratification of the foreign working class, which consists mainly of numerous factions of different nationalities with weak ties among themselves and which have a limited time frame for their stay in the country.

Under these conditions the governments of the surplus-capital countries are managing relatively easily to neutralize the foreign workers' social protest. In the latter half of the 1970's there were individual instances of foreign workers' organized protest. A strike was conducted by Pakistani workers in the UAE in 1977. In Saudi Arabia there were disturbances among Turkish and Pakistani workers in 1976 and among South Korean workers in 1977. The authorities consented to certain concessions, but subsequently deported from their countries all the strike organizers. There have been no such demonstrations since then. Recently repression of the immigrant workers has intensified even. In Kuwait, which considers itself a country with relatively liberal legislation in respect of immigrants, the security services have recently been deporting from the country approximately 200 foreign workers monthly merely on suspicion of political discontent.²⁵

The specific forms of the activity of national capital and the singularities of the formation of the national bourgeoisie are of considerable interest. The size and influence of the latter, in turn, do not entirely legitimately determine the dynamics of the number of national companies, which have grown rapidly in recent years. In fact the majority of local entrepreneurs are "dummy" capitalists who are either content with a middleman role between the state and foreign entrepreneurs or who lead a parasitical way of life and live on the income from capital or on the existing sponsorship institution. The latter amounts to the following.

A foreign investor wishing to set up base in a Persian Gulf country may do so only given the backing of a citizen of the given country. The latter assumes moral and legal responsibility for him before the law. The foreigner cannot own land, buildings or means of production. Everything has to be drawn up in the name of the sponsor. Undoubtedly, all these transactions are performed for a certain compensation.

The foreign company is forced more often than not to amalgamate with a national company, which has to own more than 50 percent of the capital. Frequently all 100 percent of the capital is declared the property of the local citizen, even if part of the capital or the entire capital has been deposited by the foreigner, who more often than not performs the duties of general director and receives an official wage. The local "capitalists," on the other hand, are content, as a rule, with the income from the capital and the income from sponsorship. The amount of the compensation is determined by the position of the sponsor and his possibilities of obtaining contracts on the most favorable terms possible. The same principle operates both in cottage industry and at transnational corporation enterprises. In the first case the sponsor is a petty employee, in the second a member of the reigning family or a high official close to this family. There is actually a hierarchy of sponsors parallel to the hierarchy of entrepreneurs. The sponsor of the businessman is, as a rule, the sponsor of his workers also.

At the same time together with the parasitical, fictitious bourgeoisie in these countries there are also modern businessmen who have been educated in Western universities. They begin their careers by working for wages in the public sector, but after some time, as a rule, they set up their own business, mainly in services and commerce.

As far as foreign capital is concerned, it is attracted to the group of countries in question by the possibility of obtaining profit sufficient for satisfying local capital and ensuring the necessary profit norm for itself. This is achieved thanks to the cruelest exploitation of the work force from other countries and the extremely favorable conditions for contractors, that is, the high level of market prices and profitable contracts. Its purpose, thus, is not only the production of surplus value via the exploitation of the foreign and a negligible proportion of local workers but also picking up surplus value in the form of oil revenues.

In other words, in the surplus-capital oil-exporting countries the capital accumulation process is confined to a social framework. On the one hand national capital has not yet fully become industrial capital, that is, "personified" capital has not yet become a functioning capitalist, and its actions are largely determined not by production but consumption. On the other, the purpose of foreign capital is not so much the accumulation of capital in the countries in question as the picking up of oil revenues and ensuring thanks to them a process of capital accumulation in the developed capitalist countries.

The high rate of urbanization and the changes in the sectorial structure of employment of the population do not mean that an adequate attraction of the rural population to the modern capitalist sector of production is occurring. The migration of the rural population to the cities is a result of an aspiration to the greatest possible participation in the redistribution of oil revenues, access to which depends to a considerable extent on participation in the system of state power. A determining factor of the activity of different social groups of the national population is not so much the acquisition of profit or wages or the attitude toward the means of production as relations with the state. This explains the rapid growth of the urban population inasmuch as the rural inhabitants are endeavoring to enter the civil service or participate in some other way in the distribution of income, which is more easily done precisely in the cities. Besides, indirect distribution of the oil revenues, that is, services rendered by the state, including medical assistance, education, housing construction and so forth, are most accessible precisely in the cities.

If in Saudi Arabia there is still a significant precapitalist sector in agriculture in which up to 50 percent of the local population is employed (there is a modern sector also, but its share of employment is extremely negligible), this is the result not so much of the inadequate development of capitalism as definite policy channeling part of the oil revenues into the preservation of its social base and the conservation of archaic social forms, including the family-tribal structure. The government is trying to support the reproduction process in the traditional sector of the economy, granting subsidies to the nomadic tribes, agricultural bank loans to farmers, bonuses per head of livestock to the stockbreeders and so forth. However, this has led in practice to the allocated resources being spent for consumer purposes and to a certain conservation of the dualistic nature of the economy.

As a whole, the social changes which occurred in the group of countries in question in the 1970's were dissimilar. On the one hand the social structures are undergoing a serious transformation. Millions of people have, if only once, changed "occupations and profession, place and type of settlement, nature of work, territorial-production and social-everyday 'residential environment'," socio-class membership, way of life and forms of intercourse and interpersonal relations.²⁶

On the other, the spread of capitalist relations in the countries in question is marked by great distinctiveness. A significant proportion of the local population represents, if it may be so put, "dummy" capitalists, "dummy" workers and "dummy" employees; the purpose of the local "businessman" is not so much, as a rule, the self-growth of capital as consumption: a specific feature of capitalist production itself, including that based on exploitation of foreign manpower capital, is that the goal is not only the production of surplus value thanks to exploitation of foreign workers and a negligible proportion of the local population but also to pick up the surplus value created outside of the surplus-capital countries in the form of oil revenues. Finally, the process of the spread of hiring among the local population amounts to an endeavor to participate in distribution of the oil revenues, that is, the surplus value created in the world capitalist economy. The form of distribution of a considerable proportion of the revenues is of a precapitalist nature here.

A big part in the socioeconomic development of this group of countries is being played by the export of capital. It should be noted that the reasons for this phenomenon are frequently explained mainly by technical-economic limitations, that is, the low "absorptive potential" of the economy as a consequence of the backward transport, production and financial infrastructure and the manpower shortage. This is undoubtedly so, but the main reason, nonetheless, lies elsewhere--in the social limits of the accumulation process, that is, in the narrowness of the capitalist national manpower market and the limited nature of national "personified" capital. Underestimation of these singularities is leading to a certain extent to identification of the process of the export of capital from the developed capitalist countries with the analogous process in the group of countries in question, although the economic nature of these phenomena of coincident form is different. Whereas the imperialist countries resort to the export of capital as a result of "an abundance of such capital, for which a lowering of the profit norm is not balanced by its mass,"²⁷ for the countries in question the possibilities of the export of capital are determined not by the categories of the norm and mass of profit but mainly by the social limits of accumulation. In other words, in the first case the export of capital is a result of the crisis of capitalism, in the second of its immaturity.

Capital is exported from the group of countries in question mainly in the form of deposits in international banks, purchases of securities of the developed capitalist countries and only in a relatively negligible amount in the form of investments. A considerable proportion of the exported capital is invested in forms which lead to a certain freezing of the capital for the countries exporting it. It is not surprising that Saudi Arabia's average annual income from foreign assets constituted as a whole in the past decade only 6-10 percent on the invested capital, which was considerably lower than the average interest on loan capital in the world capitalist economy of the latter half of the 1970's--start of the 1980's.²⁸

Kuwait has adhered to a special policy in recent years in its overseas investments. Whereas Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Libya prefer short-term portfolio investments, primarily bank deposits, Kuwait, proceeding from considerations of maximizing profits, channels a considerable proportion of its income into direct investments. Whereas in Saudi Arabia foreign assets are regarded as currency reserves and are at the disposal of the country's central bank, in Kuwait foreign assets are disposed of by the Finance Ministry. Kuwait's example shows that the small oil-exporting Persian Gulf countries may in time become rentier-states. Kuwait has been changing its development strategy in recent years, renouncing internal capital investments in favor of as much export of capital as possible. It is probable that both the UAE and Qatar will in the future take this path also. But such a type of development, considering the scale of its economy, is hardly possible for Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, however, it should be noted that as of 1982 the amount of income from foreign assets has been declining constantly as a result of their partial repatriation. This is explained by the fact that there was a deterioration at the start of the 1980's in the external conditions of reproduction in the surplus-capital oil-exporting countries. The sharp decline in the level of oil revenues in the period 1981-1984 showed graphically that their size is determined not by exceptional conditions of oil production and not by the particular quality

of labor expended on oil production but by world market conditions. The decline in oil revenues appropriated by the oil-exporting countries has occurred as the result of the fall in the world oil price and the reduction in the physical volume of oil exports. The level of oil production has declined most significantly here in the group of surplus-capital oil exporters performing the role of buffer of the world oil market: it declined more than twofold in the period 1979-1983, whereas in the remaining oil-producing countries it declined only 10 percent.²⁹

The change in the conditions of the appropriation of oil revenues is a phenomenon by no means only of a market nature and is not confined to the time frame of a cyclical crisis. At least through the start of the 1990's there is no particular reason to suppose that a considerable increase in the oil revenues of the countries in question may be expected. Whereas in 1973 they accounted for 44 percent of world exports of crude, in 1983 they accounted for only 31 percent, and their share of world oil production declined from 24 to 15 percent.³⁰

The sharp, more than twofold, decline in the income of the surplus-capital countries from oil exports given the stabilization and sometimes a certain growth even of real imports has led to chronic deficits in the budget and, in a number of cases, the current account balance sheets. Whereas the small Persian Gulf countries have managed to preserve a current account surplus, albeit negligible, Saudi Arabia and Libya have been running a deficit in recent years. It constituted \$13.2 billion in Saudi Arabia in 1984.³¹

At the same time, however, not one surplus-capital oil-exporting country has in recent years managed to balance its budget. Their aggregate deficit constituted \$13 billion in the 1983-1984 fiscal year and \$17 billion in the 1984-1985 fiscal year.³² As a result they encountered for the first time the need to adopt stabilizing measures to regulate the balance of payments. This was done thanks to a slowing of the growth rate and, in a number of cases, a reduction in the absolute amounts of real imports and the expenditure side of the budget, particularly thanks to a curtailment of national development programs. The construction of many major facilities has been frozen and, in a number of cases, canceled in the surplus-capital countries. In Libya the 5-year development plan was actually frustrated and the construction of new oil refineries in the cities of Tobruk, Az-Zuwayt.nah and Misratah with a total capacity of 820,000 barrels a day and a large petrochemical complex in Ras Lanuf has been postponed. In Saudi Arabia work has been suspended on the construction of an oil refinery in Rabigh with a capacity of 325,000 barrels a day and two desalination complexes on the country's west coast. Work has been postponed in the UAE on a doubling of the capacity of the oil refinery in Ruways. In Qatar the construction of a terminal in Umm Said and a product pipeline from Umm Said to Doha has been postponed.

It was possible as a result to reduce state spending somewhat. Thus the expenditure side of Saudi Arabia's budget in the 1983-1984 fiscal year was reduced 17 percent compared with the preceding year, and capital investments channeled into economic development accounted for the biggest reductions (40 percent), furthermore.³⁴ In the UAE the budget was reduced 7 percent in 1984.³⁵

The crisis phenomena in the world capitalist economy and the reduction in world demand for oil are having a far stronger and more rapid impact on the economy of

the Persian Gulf countries than on the economy of the oil exporters at a higher level of the development of capitalism. This testifies to the weakness of capitalism and its social base in the surplus-capital countries. The sharp reduction in the volumes of state construction contracts, the increase in electric power rates, the lowering of the official purchase price for wheat, a certain growth of taxation and so forth have led to roughly one-third of the existing firms and companies in Saudi Arabia alone going bankrupt or finding themselves in a difficult financial position in 1984-1985. Approximately 300 joint private firms were liquidated in Saudi Arabia in the 1983-1984 fiscal year alone.³⁶ The majority of the liquidated firms were companies in which the participation of the Saudi side had been only formal. As soon as the possibilities of "picking up" oil revenues diminished, the real entrepreneurs began to leave the country in the search for a higher profit norm.

All these measures are proving insufficient, and the surplus-capital oil-exporting countries have for several years in succession now been resorting to a partial spending of their foreign assets and currency reserves. According to estimates, the surplus-capital countries of the Persian Gulf used more than \$12 billion in 1983 and more than \$25 billion in 1984 of their foreign assets and gold-currency reserves.³⁷ Libya is in the most difficult position and using its foreign assets the most intensively: they declined by \$7.4 billion, that is, by almost half, in the period 1980-1982 alone.³⁸

A number of specialists in the West and in the surplus-capital countries themselves believes that in the latter half of the 1980's the latter's dependence on oil revenues will diminish as the result of the completion of the construction of large-scale petroleum-refining and petrochemical complexes, which will lead to the increased proportion of finished products in their exports. An analysis on the one hand of the state and trends of the world petroleum product and petrochemical markets and, on the other, of the structure of the product of the industry being created shows that at least up to the start of the 1990's these sectors as a whole could prove unprofitable and that the dependence of the surplus-capital oil exporters on revenue will increase accordingly.

Under the conditions of the considerable surplus of primary petroleum refining capacity, the incomplete structural reorganization of the developed capitalist countries' petroleum refining industry and the diminished difference in the prices of heavy and light petroleum products the profitability of petroleum refining, both at enterprise level and sectorial level, depends on the correlation of the volumes of primary and secondary (heavy) petroleum refining capacity. Currently heavy petroleum products constitute 52 percent of the total product of the oil refineries in the surplus-capital countries.³⁹ As the construction of new refineries is completed, the production structure will improve somewhat, however, to an insufficient extent for the sector to achieve profitability. The surplus-capital countries will incur the main losses here in exporting the products of petroleum refining inasmuch as heavy petroleum products will constitute the bulk of export potential. The study "Prospects of the Arab Petroleum-Refining Industry" puts their share for the Persian Gulf countries at 50 percent in 1985, 40.3 percent in 1990 and 41.9 percent in 1995.⁴⁰

On the other hand the extremely low level of the prices for the raw material used in petrochemistry--liquid casing-head gas fractions--makes the product of this sector of the economy of the surplus-capital countries, all things being equal,

competitive on practically all world markets. At the same time the new petrochemical exporters could encounter both the protectionism of the developed capitalist countries and a shortage of cheap raw material. As a result this sector of industry also could become unprofitable. Difficulties could arise even for the surplus-capital countries' ferrous metallurgy, which is of an import-substituting nature, owing to imports from the United States and West Europe. The activity of the foundries could demand either additional state subsidies or protectionist measures, which would probably lead to retaliatory actions.

So, it may be said with a number of reservations that in the countries in question we encounter a precapitalist society being pulled into the capitalist production mode and parasitizing thereon as a result of exploitation of the world capitalist market thanks to the appropriation of absolute and differential rent on a natural resource--oil.

Several levels of social contradictions may be distinguished in the surplus-capital countries: between different social groups of the local population participating to a different extent in the revenue distribution and the ruling feudal-monarchical upper stratum, the traditional and modern structure, between foreign and local capital, between foreign workers and the bourgeoisie and between foreign workers and the local population. For the purpose of strengthening its power the ruling feudal-monarchical upper stratum is pursuing a policy of extensive revenue distribution in all social strata, which is leading to the temporary smoothing of the social contradictions. The latter is facilitated by the substantial enlistment of foreign workers, who are fragmented in national factions and do not have relations with the local population and whose time of residence in the country is limited. This alienation makes it possible to neutralize the traditional forms of their class struggle with the constant threat of their deportation from the country. On the other hand, the high level of profits as a result of the picking up of the oil revenue and the exploitation of the work force, the price and value of which are determined by its reproduction conditions in other countries, is leading to a smoothing of the contradiction between foreign and local capital in favor of the community of their interests. The latter is leading to an entirely conscious class alliance.

Under these conditions the social contradictions in the surplus-capital countries are manifested in a specific form. For the foreign workers and capitalists they amount to a struggle for citizenship of the corresponding country, for the local population to a struggle for greater participation in the distribution of the oil revenues. The degree of seriousness of this struggle varies in the Persian Gulf countries. In Kuwait the long-standing nature of Arab immigration and its role in the country's social and economic life as a whole make the problem of integration more acute than in other countries. In Saudi Arabia the greater heterogeneousness of the population compared with other countries could prove a source of a crisis situation. However, until now the oil revenue has made it possible to neutralize the social contradictions to a certain extent and make the protests of the traditional society experiencing a crisis (the Mecca events in 1977) isolated and short-lived and to frustrate the protests of the Shi'ite community of (El-Khasa) on the eve and at the outset of 1978, mainly not by repression but by an improvement in material living conditions and the replacement of the Shi'ite workers by foreign workers or Sunnis. At the same time it has to be remembered that the social situation in the surplus-capital countries is insufficiently stable and could change appreciably in the event of a reduction

in oil revenue. This is confirmed to a certain extent by the entire course of socioeconomic development in the 1980's.

The dependence of the surplus-capital oil exporters on rent has increased markedly: the minimum necessary level of oil revenues for realizing the reproduction process and maintaining the evolved living standard has risen. This increased dependence has been expressed in the fact that there has been a reduction (but far from the disappearance) for the surplus-capital countries in the room for maneuver, the diminished possibility of the state using the oil revenue for smoothing over social contradictions and the reduced capacity of the state for changing its financial requirements depending on market conditions.

This process will in all probability continue in the 1980's also inasmuch as the petroleum-refining and petrochemical industry which is being created of the countries in question as a whole (given individual profitable enterprises and subsectors) will under the conditions of the contemporary world market be viable only on the basis of oil revenues. Bringing the structure of production capacity into line with the structure of world demand is possible thanks to the additional introduction of installations for heavy petroleum refining and processes for manufacture of the end petrochemical product. However, such an introduction is distinguished by high capital- and science-intensiveness, higher-than-usual production engineering demands and the need for additional imports of highly skilled specialists and workers, which would lead to a sharp increase in the surplus-capital countries' financial requirements. There is as yet no particular reason to suppose that the profitability of certain sectors of the nonoil sector (construction materials industry, for example) would be able to compensate for possible losses in petroleum refining and petrochemistry.

On the other hand, inasmuch as the events of 1981-1984 showed that a crisis situation is perfectly feasible, the state in the surplus-capital countries could change the system of official subsidies for the reproduction process, which would lead to the liquidation of many unprofitable works and a certain lessening of dependence on oil revenues. However, it is unlikely, we believe, that the ruling feudal-monarchical upper stratum will venture upon a cardinal change in its economic policy, fearing an exacerbation of social contradictions. Rather, it will prefer maneuvering and partial reforms in anticipation of a growth of the world demand for oil and the enlistment of the accumulated foreign assets. At the same time the gradual narrowing of the possibilities of the surplus-capital oil-exporting countries as a result of all the processes depicted above for smoothing over social contradictions with the help of the oil revenue could lead to the most unexpected and broad-scale upheavals.

FOOTNOTES

1. MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, London, vol 29, No 6, 1985, p 28; A. Knyazev, "Bahrain and Qatar," Moscow, 1984, p 32.
2. Quoted from KOMMUNIST No 11, 1984, p 88.
3. "World Development Report. 1983," Washington, 1984, p 7.

4. QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIA, London, EIU, 1983, Annual Supplement, pp 12-13.
5. Estimated from "Yearbook of National Account Statistics. 1980," New York, 1983, vol 1, pt 2, pp 893-894, 1120, 1235-1236, 1484; 1981, New York, 1983, vol 1, pt 1, p 1065.
6. MEMO No 4, 1983, p 105.
7. QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIA (London) No 4, 1984, p 10.
8. Ibid., 1984, Annual Supplement, p 22.
9. Ibid., No 3, 1983, p 11; No 4, p 10.
10. MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, London, vol 28, No 10, 1984, p 21.
11. QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIA. 1983, Annual Supplement, p 23; "Government Finance Statistics Yearbook," Washington, 1982, , 34-37.
12. QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIA No 2, 1983, pp 15-16.
13. Ibid., No 2, 1983, pp 15-16; A.G. Knyazev, "Bahrain and Qatar," p 32; MEMO No 1, 1984, p 56.
14. VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO UNIVERSITETA. SERIYA 13. VOSTOKOVEDENIYE No 3, 1984, p 19.
15. Ibid., p 4.
16. Sh. Alessa, "The Manpower Problem in Kuwait," London, 1981, p 17.
17. G. Beauge, M. Sader, "The Pattern of Employment, Migration and Labor in the Gulf Countries" in POPULATION BULLETIN OF THE ECWA, 21 December 1981, pp 85-103.
18. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works", vol 46, pt I, pp 498-499.
19. "Kuwait Annual Abstract. 1982."
20. AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 4, 1984, p 52.
21. "Kuwait Annual Abstract. 1982," table 6.
22. J.S. Birce and C.A. Sinclair, "International Migration and Development in the Arab Region," Geneva, 1980, table 32; "Kuwait Annual Abstract. 1982," table 87.
23. V.K. Miknin, "Kuwait," Moscow, 1984, p 62.
24. AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 4, 1984, p 52.
25. EUROMONEY (London), August 1984, p 162.

26. VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO UNIVERSITETA..., p 20.
27. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 25, pt 1, p 275.
28. EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI No 2, 1984, p 70.
29. J.S. Bircs and S.A. Sinclair, "International Migration and Development in the Arab Region."
30. "OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin," 1983, Vienna, pp 14-15, 24-25.
31. MEED (London), vol 29, No 3, 1985, p 5.
32. QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIA, London, 1983, EIU, No 2, p 15; BIKI No 28, 1984, p 6; No 32, p 6.
33. PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, vol L1, No 2, 1984, p 64; QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIA No 2, 1983, pp 15-16.
34. Ibid., p 5.
35. BIKI No 13, 1985, p 1.
36. QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIA No 4, 1984, p 10.
37. MEED, vol 29, No 3, 1985, p 5; INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, Washington, 1984, vol XXXVII, No 10, pp 286, 378, 392, 458.
38. Ibid., p 294.
39. Estimated from "OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin. 1983," Vienna, 1984, pp 74-75.
40. Estimated from PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, vol L11, No 2, 1985, p 44.

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PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 85 pp 161-170

[Article by V.E. Stepanyan: "The Revolutionary Situation: Certain Problems of Theory and Contemporary Practice"]

[Text] The revolutions which occurred in the zone of the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle in the 1970's introduced much that was new and specific to the world treasure house of revolutionary experience. They not only confirmed the former ideas concerning the general regularities of the development of the class struggle but also revealed their content in considerably greater depth, showing new ways of solving basic questions of the revolution. These revolutions are also of appreciable significance for a specification of Lenin's concept of a revolutionary situation with reference to current conditions of the class struggle in Asia, African and Latin American countries.

This problem--a most complex one in the theory of revolution--is currently attracting the close attention of scholars inasmuch as its solution is the key to an adequate analysis of the distinctiveness of the revolutionary process in the developing world. The topicality of the problem in question is also determined by the fact that the vanguard role in the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of the developing countries is in many instances being performed by so-called left-radical movements, and a basic characteristic of theirs is a particular approach to an evaluation of the degree of maturity of the revolutionary situation necessary for the development of a direct struggle for power. In other words, the question of the revolutionary situation is not an abstract, theoretical but an acute political problem concerning the very essence of the present-day revolutionary process.

Examination of the said questions is all the more relevant in that bourgeois ideologists are persistently endeavoring to use the specific experience of the emergent countries for the purpose of denying Lenin's teaching on the revolutionary situation. Thus the West German political pundit K. von Beyme asserts: "...History has not confirmed the fact that revolutions grow out of class struggle, at a time of the greatest disasters. A considerably greater part for the eruption of revolution than a time of the extreme exacerbation of disasters has been played by favorable external conditions and the surmounting of the lethargy of the oppressed."¹ Ultimately the championing of the proposition concerning the chance, irregular nature of its emergence determined allegedly only by a rare confluence of circumstances is typical of all bourgeois political pundits, even those who recognize the significance of a revolutionary situation.²

Until recently in Soviet literature revolutionary situations have been predominantly the subject of specific-historical research confined in the theoretical plane to the "illustrative" function. On the other hand, an abstract-philosophical approach not underpinned by specific empirical material has frequently prevailed in works of a summary nature. True, a number of valuable works of an analytical nature has appeared in the 1980's which raise problems of the revolutionary situation.³ But I believe that today also that there is justice in the remark made in the joint paper of Academician P.N. Fedoseyev and G.P. Frantsov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 20 years ago: "Currently the problem of the revolutionary situation is a most important one, but historians are still greatly in arrears in the elaboration of this problem."⁴

In view of this, the need for a comprehensive study of the problem whereby illustration of the theoretical aspects of the revolutionary situation would be based on a comparative-historical analysis of its specific manifestations becomes increasingly obvious. In other words, the task is not to illustrate by examples the normality of a revolutionary situation but to ascertain the singularities and mechanism of manifestation of this normality under specific conditions.

The starting point for such an analysis is Lenin's teaching on the revolutionary situation. We recall that V.I. Lenin distinguished three main, objective indications thereof: "1. The impossibility for the ruling classes of preserving their state in an unchanged form; this crisis or the other of the upper crust, crisis of the policy of the ruling class creating a crack into which the discontent and anger of the oppressed classes breaks through. It is usually not enough for the offensive of the revolution that 'the lower classes did not want,' and it is further required that 'the upper crust was not able' to live in the old way. 2. The exacerbation, greater than usual, of the straits and disasters of the oppressed classes. 3. A considerable heightening by virtue of the said reasons of the assertiveness of the masses, which in a 'peaceful' era allow themselves to be robbed tranquilly, but in turbulent times are attracted both by the entire atmosphere of crisis and the upper crust itself to independent historical protest."⁵ "Without these objective changes, irrespective of the will not only of individual groups and parties but of individual classes also," V.I. Lenin wrote, "revolution, in accordance with the general rule, is impossible."⁶ But not every revolutionary situation leads to revolution. For this it is essential that the objective changes affording the possibility of revolution be joined by the readiness of the subjective factor, "...the capacity of the revolutionary class for revolutionary mass actions sufficiently powerful to break down (or crack) the old government, which will never, even in an era of crises, 'fall' if it is not 'dropped'."⁷

Lenin's concept of a revolutionary situation represents the theoretically collated, systematized experience of the world-historical practice of revolutionary struggle expressed in the form of a general law. Like any historical regularities, Lenin's three main indications determine the main line of the genesis and development of revolutionary crises in the history of the class struggle, generalizing here from the ethno-political singularities of this country or the other and this region or the other. They are of a universal nature since they ascertain the most general and essential laws of the maturation

of revolution valid for all antagonistic social-economic formations. However much individual revolutionary situations of the past and present differ among themselves, they are united by community of the fundamental indications pointed out by V.I. Lenin.

But the three main factors of a revolutionary situation are not a set of abstract truths mechanically extended to all phenomena. V.I. Lenin always opposed the oversimplification and absolutization of a law and its "fetishization". Divorced from the particular, the general is schematic; "the very significance of the general," V.I. Lenin observed, "is contradictory: it is dead, it is impure, incomplete etc. etc...."⁸ Only in connection with the particular, the specific does it cease to be "abstractly universal" and acquire life: "Embodies the wealth of the particular, individual and separate."⁹

Coming into live contact with reality and reflecting new realities, Lenin's concept of a revolutionary situation is continuously enriched by new experience. And, furthermore, it develops not in circumvention of its main indications corroborated by life but precisely on this basis, by way of their extension and specification, since the most essential has already been "grasped" in the general. Unity, on the other hand, V.I. Lenin wrote, "in the basic, in the fundamental, in the essential is not disrupted but ensured by diversity in the details, in the local singularities, in the methods of the approach to the matter."¹⁰ In this connection attention is called to Lenin's stipulation at the time of formulation of the three main indications of a revolutionary situation--"in accordance with the general rule". It ensues therefrom absolutely clearly that although they are of a universal nature, they are nonetheless manifested differently under different circumstances. "A phenomenon is richer than a law," V.I. Lenin pointed out.¹¹

The experience of the contemporary revolutionary movement in the developing world testifies to a modification of the traditional mechanism of the maturation and development of revolution. Two critical factors of the revolutionary situation--the crisis of the upper crust and the lower classes--more often than not mature asynchronously here and at a different speed. Academician Ye.M. Primakov observed that the uneven nature of economic and social development is reflected in the revolutionary process of Asian, African and Latin American countries and that "the different conditions of revolution mature here, as a rule, nonsimultaneously. Moreover, these conditions frequently prove here to be separated by a considerable time gap."¹²

The "revolutionary situation" concept as applied to the emergent countries encompasses a very wide range of variants of the state of society united by the presence of the basic indications of a revolutionary situation. The forms of revolutionary crisis vary from country to country, reflecting the entire distinctiveness of the national situations. Thus, for example, the third indication of a revolutionary situation--the "extraordinary assertiveness"¹³ and "independent historical protest of the masses"--is manifested with the greatest intensity in popular revolutions, where it is the decisive indicator of the maturity of a revolutionary situation.

Proceeding from the experience of the revolutions of the 20th century, particularly the 1905-1907 revolution in Russia, V.I. Lenin emphasized the

theoretical importance of Marx's "popular revolution" concept and distinguished its main feature--the fact that "the mass of the people, the majority, the most extreme social lower classes, crushed by oppression and exploitation, have risen up independently and have left on the entire course of the revolution the imprint of their demands and their attempts to build in their way a new society in place of the old which is being destroyed."¹⁴ And, naturally, these truly popular revolutions were impossible without the existence of a mature revolutionary situation, with the higher-than-usual political assertiveness of the masses as a most important factor.

At the same time, analyzing the experience of the revolutions of the start of the century in Turkey and Portugal, V.I. Lenin noted the appearance of revolutions of a different type, which are not "popular" for the lower classes "are not noticeably acting assertively and independently and with their own economic and political demands in either revolution."¹⁵ This proposition makes it possible to speak of V.I. Lenin's admission of the possibility of a specific type of revolutionary situation--without the higher-than-usual assertiveness of the masses--which nonetheless could, given certain conditions, lead to revolution. Incidentally, F. Engels admitted theoretically, as an exception, the likelihood of an instance "where a tiny handful of people could make revolution, in other words, force to collapse with one small push an entire system in a more than unsteady balance...."¹⁶

Thus the Marxist-Leninist concept of a revolutionary situation presupposes in practice a multiplicity of forms of revolutionary situation and the different correlation and significance of its three main indications depending on the nature of the revolution, distinctiveness of the socioeconomic structure, historical traditions of political struggle and so forth. As the contemporary experience of the class struggle in the emergent countries shows, country and regional differences here consist not only of the different degree of intensity of the process but are also connected in some cases with specific features of a fundamental nature.

A complex problem of the theory of revolution is that of the correlation of the revolutionary situation and revolution itself categories. Some scholars insist on the precise delineation of these categories not only theoretically but also practically, which can hardly be acknowledged to be methodologically sufficiently substantiated in respect of all instances. Analysing the experience of the 1848 French revolution, K. Marx distinguished in the work "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon" a particular period in its development which he called the "prologue to the revolution".¹⁷ V.I. Lenin also emphasized attention to this aspect of the problem. "Revolutions," he observed, "have never been born ready-made, do not spring from the head of Jupiter and do not erupt all at once. They are always preceded by a process of fermentation, crises, movements, indignation and the beginning of the revolution, and this beginning, furthermore, does not always develop through to the end (if the revolutionary class is weak, for example)."¹⁸ In the article "May Day Meeting of the Revolutionary Proletariat" V.I. Lenin provides the following definition of a revolutionary situation--"the moment of the mounting of the activity of the revolution".¹⁹

These propositions concerning the "prologue," "moment of the mounting of the activity" and the process of the "beginning of the revolution" advance to the

fore the dialectical connection and unity of the revolutionary situation and the revolution. N.G. Levintov's thought concerning the dependence of the correlation of the revolutionary situation and the revolution "on the forms of the directly revolutionary struggle in which the revolution begins"²⁰ would appear fruitful in this connection.

Truly, the classical revolutions of the end of the 18th-19th century, which usually began with a national uprising, are characterized by a precise boundary between the revolutionary situation and the revolution. It is determined by the moment of transition to a qualitatively new form of the struggle, specifically, to armed uprising. But the 1905-1907 revolution in Russia even--the first popular revolution of the era of imperialism--showed another type of development: it began not with a universal armed uprising, the conditions for which had not at that time matured, but with other forms of struggle--revolutionary strikes, demonstrations, clashes with the police, individual scattered uprisings and so forth--which developed in December 1905 into an armed uprising of the proletariat. In this case of "protracted uprising"²¹ the boundaries between the main stages of the maturation of the revolution--revolutionary situation, national crisis--and the revolution itself are more relative and mobile.

The high tempo and contradictoriness of the revolutionary process in the emergent countries and the multiplicity of types and forms of revolutionary upheaval summon into being the most varied types of correlation of revolutionary situation and revolution. Thus the 1978-1979 Iranian revolution reveals features of similarity with the 1905-1907 revolution in Russia both in terms of the use of the means and methods of struggle (mass demonstrations, attacks on the punitive organs, a general strike, armed uprising) and in terms of the depth and rapidity of maturation of the revolutionary situation and the mounting "vertical" takeoff of the political assertiveness of the masses.

A different type of development of the revolutionary movement is shown by the experience of the countries where guerrilla warfare (Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola and others) was the main form of struggle. Here the beginning of the revolution was preceded by the emergence of small "centers" of revolutionary power and struggle, and a guerrilla war was fought at all stages of the development of the revolution right up to its victory. The transition to revolution in this case is expressed not in a qualitative change in the forms of struggle but in the buildup of its scale and the acquisition of mass, national proportions. And, correspondingly, the boundary between the revolutionary situation and the beginning of the revolution in these countries is even more eroded and "elusive" and the transition from one phase to another more prolonged since the maturation of the revolutionary situation in all its components is extended in time.

In turn, the experience of such a relatively frequent and distinctive form of contemporary revolutionary-democratic upheaval as "revolution from above" reveals new aspects of the said problem. The practice of such revolutions testifies that a revolutionary situation and national crisis may mature not only on the eve but in the course even of the revolutionary process itself. This is traced particularly distinctly in countries where the revolutionary initiative is assumed by military circles of the left (Ethiopia, Peru and others).

"Sometimes a revolution," B.I. Koval observes, "has virtually overtaken the process of maturation of all indications and has merely by its own beginning contributed to the final formation of the full revolutionary situation."²² In Ethiopia, for example, obvious manifestations of the impending revolutionary explosion had not been observed prior to 1974: the upper crust seemingly had a firm hold on power, while the lower classes, in spite of horrifying poverty and exploitation, were reconciled with the feudal-monarchical regime based on the almost mystical cult of Emperor Haile Selassie, who had occupied the throne unchanged since 1930. But following the army's protest in April 1974 the latent accumulated discontent of the lower classes spilled out into the open in an unprecedented mass revolutionary movement. Thus although the outline expressed in the formula "from revolutionary situation to national crisis, and from this to revolution" undoubtedly reflects in summary form consecutive stages of the development of the revolutionary process, practice, in turn, shows that revolution does not always and everywhere develop along such a path and in such a sequence.²³

Real life, as V.I. Lenin emphasized repeatedly, is always richer, more diverse and "cunning" than a general outline, however correct it may be methodologically. Analyzing the correlation of political-theory formulas and actual practice (it was a question of the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry"), V.I. Lenin wrote: "Life has led it from the realm of formulas and into the realm of reality, invested it with flesh and blood and concretized and thereby modified it."²⁴

In this connection the important question arises: what is the minimum of conditions necessary for the beginning of a struggle for power, what criteria determine the degree of maturity of a revolutionary situation? It is impossible to determine this degree merely by way of theoretical analysis alone. The inner mechanism of the maturation of a revolutionary situation incorporates components which are revealed and become increasingly apparent in the course of revolutionary practice itself. Only the open struggle of the broad people's masses and their political vanguard reveals the entire extent of maturity of a revolutionary crisis. Answering the question of whether this specific revolutionary situation or the other would lead to revolution, V.I. Lenin wrote: "We do not know this, and no one can know this. This will be shown only by the experience of the development of the revolutionary sentiments and the transition to revolutionary actions of the progressive class, the proletariat."²⁵ The growth of "revolutionary sentiments" into "revolutionary actions," the assertiveness of the socio-political forces of revolution--this is the main criterion of the maturity of a revolutionary situation. The tempo of the buildup of the revolutionary situation and the transition to revolution depend on the struggle of the revolutionary classes and the resolve and correct policy of the vanguard parties.

Any unfolding revolutionary situation contains the possibility of several decisions: compromise and noncompromise, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary and so forth. It cannot be "infinite": it has its limits and a beginning and end.

"Inordinate emphasis on objective factors," G. Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, observed, "leads to a passive hope for the spontaneous element. This is a form of conservative opportunism. It becomes an excuse for avoiding revolutionary actions and leads to a marking time until the

objective conditions mature."²⁶ The correct determination of the moment of the unfolding and degree of maturity of a revolutionary situation is of tremendous practical-policy significance. If a vanguard party does not begin a revolutionary struggle in the soil of a revolutionary situation which is already taking shape, but which has yet to fully ripen, the powers that be may cut short the process of its buildup by repression or "direct" it into a reformist channel--as a result (such instances have been frequent in the history of the class struggle) the revolutionary situation "disappears".

A revolutionary situation may also not grow into a revolution under the influence of foreign policy factors. The strongest impact of international aspects is on the revolutionary process in the developing countries which are dependent on international, particularly American, imperialism. Revolutionary situations have arisen in the contemporary political practice of these countries which either have not led to the success of the revolution (Guatemala, El Salvador and others) or the revolutions which began did not go beyond the confines of the first stage (Chile, Peru and others) owing to imperialist interference from outside. The world is witnessing attempts by the imperialist forces to cut short revolutionary processes in Afghanistan, Angola, Iran, Nicaragua and other countries. In October 1983 the revolution on Grenada was stifled by way of the United States' open military intervention. The facts show that imperialism is prepared to go to any lengths if a threat of a reduction in the sphere of its domination arises. This is undoubtedly making its mark on the course and rhythm of maturation of revolutionary crises in the developing world, confronting the forces of the left in this zone with additional difficulties.

Contemporary experience of the revolutionary movement has confirmed that the correlation of revolutionary initiative and conditions which objectively exist is the main thing in Lenin's concept of a revolutionary situation, and the disagreements on this question concern not only theory but, what is particularly important, political practice also. The impact of the subjective factor on the nature of the revolutionary process in the developing countries, where the socioeconomic contradictions giving rise to a revolutionary situation accumulate the most rapidly, is particularly great. It is impossible to comprehend the distinctiveness of the revolutionary struggle in certain regions of the developing world, particularly in Latin America, without analyzing the revolutionary situation concept which was elaborated and applied in Cuba by F. Castro and his close associates.

The question of the correlation of a revolutionary situation and guerrilla warfare is a central question in the said concept. The most important singularity of guerrilla warfare is the fact that it does not always arise under the conditions of a typical, mature revolutionary situation. In addition, guerrilla warfare more often than not presupposes the insufficient maturity of a number of factors of the revolutionary situation for otherwise it is meaningless as a catalyst of the latter.²⁷⁻²⁸ The history of the world revolutionary process reveals a considerable diversity of forms of transition to mass struggle. In Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador and certain other countries guerrilla warfare was such a form. In the course thereof the prerequisites were created for pulling into the revolutionary struggle the broad people's masses, whose "extraordinary assertiveness," being, as is known, a most important factor of a revolutionary situation, could not have arisen spontaneously in the said countries.

The course of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions reveals convincingly fully the interaction of guerrilla warfare and the revolutionary situation. The Batista coup in Cuba of 10 March 1952 served as impetus to the development of a revolutionary situation in the country, having exacerbated to the utmost all the contradictions inherent in the neocolonial regime. The incapacity of the ruling class for preserving its domination within the framework of bourgeois democracy brought about the initial stage of the crisis of the upper crust. The coup led to the increased exploitation of the working masses, unemployment became chronic and the cruelest terror in Cuban history was unleashed. "Exacerbation, greater than usual, of the straits of the oppressed masses" became a fact. Inflammable material of tremendous explosive power accumulated in the country. The lagging of such a most important factor of the revolutionary situation as the "extraordinary assertiveness" of the masses (according to C.R. Rodríguez, "there were symptoms of passivity in the behavior of the urban proletariat of Cuba in the period 1952-1958"²⁹) and the weakness of the revolutionary movement in the country, considering the isolation of the Popular Socialist Party, were revealed particularly manifestly in the given situation.

As R. Arismendi observed, under these conditions of the incomplete maturation of a revolutionary situation "the vanguard is confronted with a dilemma: either to wait for the spontaneous explosion, which will come it is not known when, or to resort to extraordinary and energetic means (guerrilla warfare represents one of the highest forms of these means in the given situation)."³⁰ The historic service of F. Castro and his associates was that they correctly evaluated guerrilla warfare as the main form of struggle under the specific conditions of Cuba and its function as catalyst of a revolutionary situation. The Cuban revolutionaries thereby realized their vanguard role in practice, performing what V.I. Lenin called "the most undisputed and most basic duty" of a revolutionary party: "the duty of revealing to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, explaining its breadth and depth, awakening the revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary resolve of the proletariat, helping it switch to revolutionary actions and creating the organizations for work in this direction corresponding to the revolutionary situation."³¹

The beginning in December 1956 of the guerrilla struggle in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra marked the first stage of the ripening of the "extraordinary assertiveness" of the masses. Having become the nucleus of the revolutionary forces, the insurgent army lent impetus to the mass movement against the dictatorship: the guerrilla war, the protests in the cities, the strikes of the workers and the struggle of the peasants led to the decisive stage of the crisis of the upper crust. The main prop of the regime--the army--was shaken. Batista's authority was undermined even in the eyes of the Cuban bourgeoisie and U.S. ruling circles. Thus by the end of 1958 the national revolutionary crisis had ripened in the country which led to the victory of the revolution of 1 January 1959.

The popular revolution in Nicaragua, which was accomplished 20 years after the victory of the revolution in Cuba, revealed the original interaction of guerrilla warfare and a revolutionary situation in its own way. Importance in this connection is attached to the question of the role of the army, which was associated in these countries with the upper stratum. The experience of Nicaragua--and, earlier, of Cuba--reveals new specific aspects of this problem

forcing an adjustment of the settled notions according to which ferment in the army is the true indication of a crisis of the upper stratum, while successful armed struggle is possible only given a split of the government forces and the switch of part of these forces to the side of the revolution.

These propositions were undoubtedly correct for the conditions of urban uprising during the revolutions of the 18th-19th centuries in West Europe and the three revolutions in Russia (the Iran revolution was in this respect also of a "classical" nature--the clash of air force personnel with the shah's guard on 9 February 1979 served as the signal for popular uprising). But they do not reflect the particular regularities of such a form of struggle as guerrilla warfare. The insurgent army in Cuba in 1959 and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979 proved that, given certain conditions, a monolithic army can be conquered also.

The main thing contributed by the theory and practice of the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua to the specification of the Marxist-Leninist concept of a revolutionary situation with reference to the sociopolitical conditions of the given region is the fact that the simultaneous maturation of all factors of a revolutionary situation are not obligatory for the start of revolutionary struggle; they mature in the course of the struggle itself. These revolutions revealed the role of guerrilla warfare as the catalyst of a revolutionary situation, as "the form of struggle chosen for the start of an uprising before the typical conditions of an actual revolutionary situation had fully ripened."³² At the same time the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua showed that the insurgent "center" cannot create all the conditions of a revolutionary situation, that the existence of certain components of this situation is essential for the start and development of armed struggle and that ultimately the political assertiveness of the lower classes and mass popular struggle constitute an indispensable condition of the victory of the revolution.

"Although the Cuban revolution is distinguished by a whole number of specific features conditioned by specific national conditions and singularities and also the international situation, it is subordinate to the basic laws of historical development discovered by Marxism-Leninism; its example corroborates the main Leninist propositions concerning revolution."³³

The contemporary experience of the revolutionary struggle in the developing countries testifies to the particular diversity of forms of revolutionary situation and the varying depth of the crises of the upper crust and the lower classes and the tempo of their maturation. Each revolutionary situation has been distinctive in its own way, which has not precluded, however, the manifestation of certain features of universality.

A comparative analysis of the actual revolutionary situations and their definite classification are necessary for revealing the dialectically general and particular in the genesis of revolutionary situations and their growth into revolution.

What are the criteria of such a classification? The simplest and, it would seem, most obvious way is to proceed from a typology of revolutions, that is, distinguish revolutionary situations characteristic of national liberation,

popular-democratic and socialist revolutions. But such a classification would not reflect the intrinsic differences characteristic even of revolutionary situations inherent in revolutions with a nature of direct, immediate tasks of the same type like, say, the Nicaraguan and Iranian revolutions. Methodological importance in this connection is attached to Ye.M. Primakov's thought that "the very multiplicity of types of revolutions (in the developing countries--V.S.) has obviously been connected less with a fundamental difference in the nature of the tasks being accomplished than with the unevenness of the maturation of different conditions of the revolutions."³⁴

It would seem that a most important factor of a revolutionary situation like the "extraordinary assertiveness of the masses" and "independent historical protest" could serve as the criterion of such a classification. This factor is objective, is easily recorded and is ultimately the decisive indicator of the maturity of a revolutionary situation.

Thus there was an "incomplete" revolutionary situation in a number of countries (Ethiopia, South Yemen, Benin and others). It takes shape, as a rule, in countries where an archaic nature of social structures impedes the working people's active participation in politics. More often than not such a revolutionary situation precedes events occurring not on a wave of mass revolutionary upsurge but usually as a result of a lightning military coup, without direct reliance on the lower classes, which act assertively only after the seizure of power by the revolutionary forces. A characteristic feature of an "incomplete" revolutionary situation is the absence of the "extraordinary assertiveness" of the masses. Despite the existence of working people's broad discontent, there are no significant protests against the regime, and the lower classes maintain a wait-and-see position. The ruling classes display increasingly clearly their impotence in overcoming the "straits and disasters" of the people, which testifies to the latent buildup of the crisis of the upper crust, given the absence, however, of obvious manifestations thereof. A big role in the specific nature of the genesis of such revolutionary situations and the appearance of vanguard forces in these countries is performed by the "demonstration effect": the impact of the achievements of the world socialist system, the victory of revolutions in other states of the region, recognition of the backwardness and underdevelopment of national existence and so forth.

It is a correct assertion that "under the conditions of the East and, particularly, Africa, where class-formation processes have not yet been completed and for this reason a considerable proportion of the population is outside of politics, as it were, and where there are forces of different, sometimes opposite, social persuasions, a revolutionary situation in its incomplete form could be a characteristic feature of a whole number of countries."³⁵ But in this case also the question of whether events will be confined to the usual coup d'etat or will lead to a "real" revolution will depend on whether, in G.V. Flekhanov's successful phrase, the awoken energy of the lower classes changes from "potential to kinetic".

In countries where guerrilla warfare was the main axis of the revolutionary struggle a distinctive revolutionary situation of an "intermediate type," so to speak, was observed (Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, El Salvador and others). It is characteristic of states where much inflammable material has been accumulated and

the general sociopolitical situation is conducive to revolution, but the growth of the subjective factor does not correspond to the maturity of the objective conditions, while the military-police power of the machinery of repression is containing the mass explosion. In this case guerrilla warfare acts as the catalyst of a revolutionary situation whose distinctive features are asynchronism in the maturation of the crisis of the upper crust and the lower classes, prolongation in time and merger with the revolution. In these countries the "extraordinary assertiveness" of the masses may be absent at the beginning of the revolutionary struggle,³⁶ but it is an indispensable condition and guarantor of the victory of the revolution. The revolutionary situation ripens fully in the course of the revolutionary struggle itself: only on the eve of the victory of the revolution, after many years of armed struggle, did Cuba in 1958, Nicaragua in 1979 and Angola in 1975 represent a picture of an entirely finished, mature revolutionary situation.

The Iranian revolution, in turn, demonstrated an example of a complete, "classical" revolutionary situation: the "extraordinary assertiveness" of the masses, which arose spontaneously from the exacerbation of "straits and disasters," and its almost absolute synchronization with the profound, hopeless crisis of the upper crust leading to a revolutionary situation of an "explosive" nature which rapidly developed into revolution.

The given classification, which is confined, moreover, to an analysis of revolutionary situations of the nonpeaceful (armed) path of revolution, cannot, of course, encompass the entire wealth of the revolutionary process in all its diversity. The zone of the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle is fraught with new revolutionary explosions, and the appearance of new, perhaps, even more distinctive and new revolutionary situations, even more distinctive and unexpected in form, perhaps, is inevitable. And for this reason such a classification will always be of quite a provisional nature since it is impossible to reduce to a single denominator the entire diversity and many-sidedness of the revolutionary crises of the developing world.

At the same time, however, the comparative analysis of revolutionary processes in the emergent countries which has been made enables us to find behind the unique distinctiveness, behind the particular form, behind the specific features recurrent, stable regularities. The political practice of the 1970's confirmed once again the proposition which V.I. Lenin called the basic law of revolution--however original the paths of the ripening of revolution in this country or the other, the pivotal moment of the seizure of the plenitude of power by the revolutionary forces has always been preceded by a revolutionary situation with this combination or the other of its three main indications.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Marxism, Communism and Western Society. A Comparative Encyclopedia," N.V., 1972, vol 2, p 16.
2. For more details see M.L. Gavlin, L.A. Kazakova, "Current Bourgeois Theories of Social Revolution," Moscow, 1980, pp 53-67; Yu.A. Krasin, "Frightened by Revolution," Moscow, 1975, pp 104-114.
3. See Yu.A. Krasin, "The Present-Day Revolutionary Process: Theoretical Outline," Moscow, 1982; B.I. Koval, "The Revolution Continues (Experience of the 1970's)," Moscow, 1984; Ye.M. Primakov, "The East Following the Collapse of the Colonial System," Moscow, 1982; and others.
4. "History and Sociology," Moscow, 1964, p 50.
5. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 26, p 218.
6. Ibid., pp 218-219.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., vol 29, p 252.
9. Ibid., p 90.
10. Ibid., vol 35, p 203.
11. Ibid., vol 29, p 137.
12. Ye.M. Primakov, Op. Cit., p 41.
13. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 26, p 279.
14. Ibid., vol 33, p 39.
15. Ibid.
16. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 36, p 260.
17. Ibid., vol 8, p 124.
18. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 27, p 112.
19. Ibid., vol 23, p 299.
20. N.G. Levintov, "The Problem of the Beginning of Revolution" in "Questions of General History," Ulyanovsk, 1974, p 17.
21. See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 11, p 418.
22. B.I. Koval, "The Revolution Continues (Experience of the 1970's)," p 122.

23. The Comintern's press organ observed back in 1930: "These three phases usually follow one another in history. But it by no means follows from this that an abridged path--the merger of the second and third phases into one or the first and second phases into one--is impossible" (KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL Nos 34-35, 1930, p 10).
24. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 31, p 134.
25. Ibid., vol 26, p 221.
26. G. Hall, "Maximum Use of Objective Factors in the Creation and Acceleration of a Revolutionary Crisis" in "Leninism and the World Revolutionary Process," Moscow, 1970, p 147.
- 27-28. This is not just the opinion of "left-radical" theorists. G. Vieira, general secretary of the Colombian CP Central Committee, wrote: "It is important to emphasize that under the specific conditions of our country it would be wrong to make the beginning of guerrilla warfare conditional upon the full maturity of all components of a revolutionary situation" (PMS No 8, 1965, p 7).
29. C.R. Rodrigues, "The Cuban Revolution: Characteristic Features" in LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 6, 1978, p 12.
30. R. Arismendi, "Lenin, Revolution and Latin America," Moscow, 1973, p 438.
31. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 26, p 221.
32. R. Arismendi, Op. cit., p 435.
33. "First Cuban CP Congress," Moscow, 1976, p 309.
34. Ye.M. Primakov, Op. cit., p 57.
35. A.S. Shin, "National-Democratic Revolutions. Certain Questions of Theory and Practice," Moscow, 1981, p 64.
36. Describing the contemporary situation in his country, S.J. Handal, general secretary of the Salvadoran CP Central Committee, observed that "a revolutionary situation exists, but the movement of the popular masses--an aspect of the law--is experiencing a period of decline..." (S.J. Handal, A.G. Martinez, "We Will Win," Moscow, 1984, p 45).

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON SOCIALIST TRADE UNIONS, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 85 pp 178-181

[M.V. Baglay review: "Real Socialism, the Scientific-Technical Revolution and the Trade Unions"]

[Text] Socialist economic integration, as a natural phenomenon in the development of the socialist system, encompasses not only the factors of the development of production, economic potential and the productive forces. Such most important social changes as the socio-occupational and cultural growth of the working class and the elevation of its material and spiritual requirements are also within the sphere of its impact. The all-around development of the leading force of society--the working class--and the growth of the role of its most populous--professional--organizations serve as a most essential social indicator characterizing the socialist system as a whole. This is being manifested particularly graphically under the conditions of the increasingly extensive scale and the intensification of the scientific-technical transformations penetrating the most diverse spheres of production and influencing society's entire economic, social and spiritual life. As not only the object but also the active subject of the scientific-technical revolution (STR), the working class appears here as the main force accomplishing one of society's principal tasks--combination of the achievements of the STR with the advantages of socialism. Both regularities common for the socialist countries and singularities specific for each of them of the contribution of the working class and the trade unions to the deepening of cooperation, integration and internationalization and the solution of key problems of the building of the new society are manifested in the actual process of this combination.

The growth of the role of the working class and the trade unions in the extension and improvement of the socialist countries' cooperation and the development of their integration (which is inevitably becoming socioeconomic integration) is bringing about the need for an analysis and scientific collation of the wealth of experience which has been accumulated in the community countries in the sphere of the socialist assimilation of the STR. M.N. Nochevnik's monograph,* which examines a number of important aspects of the influence of the STR on the activity of the trade unions, would appear topical and significant both theoretically and practically in this connection.

* N.M. Nochevnik, "Rabochiy klass i profsoyuzy v stranakh sotsializma" [The Working Class and the Trade Unions in the Socialist Countries]. Some Aspects of the Influence of the Scientific-Technical Revolution on the Activity of the Trade Unions," Moscow, Profizdat, 1984, pp 200.

An undoubted merit of the work is the construction of its content from the viewpoint of a comparative analysis of the position of the working class and trade unions under the conditions of the STR under socialism and under capitalism; the adduced material of the international comparative studies conducted by scientists and trade union personalities of both the socialist--Hungary, GDR, Poland, USSR, CSSR and Yugoslavia--and a number of capitalist countries--Austria, Great Britain, Denmark, Italy, United States, Finland, FRG, France and Sweden--is of special interest. The book reveals the fundamental dependence of the actual progress and consequences of the STR on the socio-economic conditions of society. The corresponding chapter, which is of great scientific and counterpropaganda significance, we believe, makes an all-around analysis of the consequences of the STR for the working class and its trade unions under the conditions of capitalism and the singularities of its development in the socialist countries.

Relying on a great deal of factual material, the author refutes the assertions of the ideological opponents of Marxism concerning the "erosion" of the boundaries of the working class and its general decline in skills and "disappearance," incapacity for revolutionary transformations, conservatism and the inevitable "disintegration" of the workers movement under the conditions of the STR; he shows the groundlessness of the concepts of "new working class," the "bourgeoisification" of the working class and its integration in the capitalist system being advanced as a counterweight to Marxist propositions concerning the intensification of class antagonism and social polarization in bourgeois society. Cogent criticism is leveled at the positions of the social reformists, who although not denying either the disastrous consequences for the working people of the present crisis of capitalism or its interconnection with the mass retooling of production, nonetheless see a way out of the grim socioeconomic position on the paths of class collaboration, manifestly closing their eyes to the serious danger looming over the trade unions and the working people's social gains.

In evaluating the influence of the STR on the working class under capitalism the author managed to avoid the standard and one-sided assessments which are encountered quite frequently in our literature. The book correctly points out, in particular, that an improvement in the quality of the work force--its increased general educational and occupational-skills level--may be observed in the industrially developed capitalist countries under the impact of the STR. The intensive introduction of microelectronics in various sectors of production, the increasingly mass nature of the development of robotization and flexible automation and so forth have led to an increase in industry in the proportion of those employed in semiskilled and unskilled labor, although together with this the STR is leading also to the creation of jobs which do not require high vocational training. The objective need for a growth of labor productivity is compelling the employers to submit to the demands of the STR and the latest technology and to display concern for the training and retraining of personnel and a rise in the occupational-skills level of workers of many categories. However, the author rightly emphasizes, inasmuch as such concern is subordinate to the egotistic interests of the ruling class, the system of personnel training and retraining is inevitably of a limited nature. Evidence of this, as is well known, is the large number of positions available requiring highly skilled work given the millions of unemployed.

Nor does the author avoid a quite detailed analysis of individual aspects of the interconnection between the STR and the activity of the trade unions. Despite the fact that even in the industrially developed capitalist countries the envelopment of working people by unions is insufficient, and, furthermore, in a number of West European countries the latter lack organizations of theirs at enterprises altogether, it is the unions which mainly exercise the function of defense of the workers' rights and interests. The author concentrates his attention on an aspect of the unions' activity which has been studied quite insufficiently--their functions at industrial enterprises. The fundamental difference in priorities in the problems of the mutual relations of the trade union organizations and management under the conditions of socialism and capitalism is analyzed here. The book shows that at capitalist enterprises the unions' attention is concentrated increasingly on protection against dismissals (employment guarantees), the making of other work available to those who are dismissed or payment of compensation to them and so forth, in a word, on assuaging to the greatest possible extent the problem of unemployment, which is being intensified by the STR. The author's arguments are underpinned by interesting material of international comparative sociological studies. The data of these studies show, inter alia, the general socio-psychological background of the mood of workers at enterprises of the developed capitalist countries in connection with technology innovations characterizing a fear of such innovations and uncertainty in the future. At the same time, however, the functions of the unions of capitalist countries are being suffused increasingly with political content; they also support the progressive processes of the STR and put forward a democratic alternative to the policy of monopoly capital and the TNC--a policy which is leading to the military-technical deformation of the STR.

In the multifaceted trade union activity under the conditions of socialism the objective interconnection between scientific-technical transformations and the working people's changing requirements is adequately reflected: the trade unions have the opportunity to proceed constantly and without hindrance in their activity from the fact that the STR is not only an objective prerequisite of the development of production but also a powerful catalyst of the development of people's new requirements and interests. The viewpoint described above from which the book examines the subject of study (that of a comparative analysis of the very conditions of the activity of trade unions under capitalism and under socialism) enables the author not only to ascertain the fundamental differences in the position and role of the trade unions at enterprises in countries with opposite social systems but also to show graphically the actual degree of realization of the possibilities of the participation of the workers and trade unions of the socialist countries in the economic life of the enterprises and to analyze the content and forms of the working people's direct real participation in the management of production and the accomplishment of tasks of the social development of the labor collectives. The specifics of individual socialist countries also are ascertained here.

While emphasizing the as a whole favorable conditions of the development of the STR under socialism and characterizing the regularities of its combination with the advantages of socialism and its positive thrust the author also examines a number of problems and contradictions of the development of the STR in the CEMA countries caused by objective factors. Among the latter are exhaustion of the extensive sources of growth, complication of the raw material and fuel-energy

problem, the need for the speediest modernization of the material-technical base of all sectors of the national economy and also the training and retraining of skilled personnel, its relocation from one sector of the economy to others and its territorial reassignment, more modern work and social conditions in localities which were hitherto not habitable and so forth. Problems of a subjective nature connected with people's behavior, imperfection of the methods and style of leadership and shortcomings in the economic mechanism are noted also.

In the business of overcoming difficulties of an objective and subjective nature a very important role is performed by socialist economic integration aimed on the one hand at an intensification of production based on comprehensive mechanization and automation, the introduction of electronics and microelectronics and so forth and, on the other, on an improvement in the control of social processes, a rise in material well-being and the development of spiritual culture and the creation of the conditions for the all-around development of the personality. Scientific-technical progress in the sphere, for example, of microelectronics in the socialist countries is brought about, as the author rightly points out, not only by the presence of a sufficiently powerful scientific research, design and production base for the development and manufacture of products and special production engineering equipment but also by the absence of any fear of exchange of the latest data and discoveries and firm reciprocal supplies and special consideration of the traditional areas and experience of various enterprises in the socialist community countries.

That which is new in trade unions' activity, which is the answer, as it were, to the processes of objective development, has been reflected in all the main spheres of their activity and their exercise of their basic functions (the production-economic sphere, the protective function and cultural-educational and, finally, international activity). These functions and areas of activity of the trade unions of the socialist countries, which are largely interconnected, are at the same time relatively independent and have, besides, a number of specific singularities when realized in individual CEMA countries.

Concisely, but accurately the author reveals the functional singularities of the activity of trade unions at enterprises of the socialist community countries. A special place is assigned the subject of the interaction of the trade unions and the administration at the enterprises. Trade unions' rights at enterprises and supervision of the activity of the administration are not, the author emphasizes, something given once for all and absolutely static in their form and content, they are constantly being developed and improved, and an appreciable influence on this process is being exerted by, in particular, scientific-technical transformations and their manifold social consequences. In the light of them such categories as the "interest," "requirement" and "value orientations of the personality" of the working people are for the trade unions not abstractions but vital, real and, furthermore, developing essences manifested in people's complex mutual relations in the process of joint activity. In exercising their production and education functions the trade unions proceed from the fact that each worker should recognize his real interests and combine them with the interests of the collective and society. The problem of combination of the interests of the individual, the collective and society is inseparable from such a function of the trade unions as the planning or participation in the planning of production, economic and social indicators. Consideration of the social aspects of the STR,

the endeavor to put the achievements of scientific-technical progress at the service of the interests of the working people, the enlistment of an increasingly large number of workers in the management of production and the development of the principles of democratic centralism in planning making it possible to reveal increasingly fully the masses' possibilities in the sphere of production activity can be traced most distinctly in the exercise of precisely this function.

Increasingly great significance is attached to the impact of the trade unions (participating in planning at the most varied levels) on the balanced nature of the plans; they must, further, provide for discussion of new economic initiatives in the labor collectives and, in addition, "contribute to the success of organizational changes, a rise in the level of the socio-psychological training of industrial leaders, workers and engineering-technical personnel and their correct perception of the reorganization, the realization of economic policy, the creation of new forms of material and moral incentive, the display of initiative and creative assertiveness in the accomplishment of an important state task, particularly in finding potential both at the stage of development of the plan and in the course of its fulfillment" (pp 102-103).

The STR is inseparable from such a mass manifestation of the working people's social assertiveness as socialist competition. The diverse forms of competition in the socialist countries and its link with the economic mechanism and the system of enterprises' economic indicators confront the trade unions with tasks of the integration of international experience taking account of the working people's occupational-skills differences, the level of culture and general education, national singularities and so forth. Inasmuch as competition is a powerful catalyst of the STR great significance in its organization and realization is attached to consideration of the human factor and socio-psychological aspects. Pointing to the existing appreciable differences in approach to an evaluation of competition and its criteria, the author traces how the trade unions in different CEMA countries endeavor to ascertain common features enabling them to enrich and systematize international experience.

The creative assertiveness and initiative of the masses are directly dependent on the efficiency of the activity of the standing production conferences, the working people's scientific-technical creativity, the scientific organization of labor and the new brigade forms of the organization of labor; all this is the sphere of the direct influence and control of the trade unions, the sphere where they stimulate progress. The said forms of the manifestation of the initiative of workers at enterprises of the socialist countries have enjoyed very considerable development. As the author emphasizes, the unions have to pay particular attention not so much to the quantitative as the qualitative aspect of the development of the amateur working people's organizations, including those such as scientific-technical societies, inventor and efficiency expert organizations and so forth.

Examining the factors of the growth of the unions' role in the accomplishment of social tasks in interconnection with the increase in the role of the labor collectives, the author of the monograph reveals the mechanisms of the unions' realization of social policy, particularly of the exercise of social planning at the enterprises. Incorporating the development of goal-oriented programs and measures to improve work and social conditions, raise the vocational-skills

training and cultural-technical level of the workers, develop their social assertiveness and so forth, it serves as the basis for orienting the labor collectives in the corresponding spheres toward the long term.

Among the monograph's shortcomings we should put the unduly minute and detailed enumeration of the trade unions' tasks, which prevented a more extensive and graphic analysis of individual examples characterizing their activity in different countries. Unfortunately, the work contains insufficient data of mass sociological surveys at enterprises characterizing the workers' labor motivations and also of material revealing socio-psychological aspects of the unions' activity.

As a whole, M.N. Nochevnik's work contains original and scientifically substantiated material on a topical and practically important subject; the book collates the interesting and fruitful experience of the activity of the trade union of the socialist countries. The monograph's comparative analysis of the position and role of the trade unions and the working class at enterprises under the conditions of opposite socioeconomic systems makes up considerably for the shortage of literature on this question and is of undoubted value for the theory of the trade union movement and the practice of propaganda work.

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